Effect of Effort on Self Image: The Case of Monotonically Increasing Self-Image Functions
(2012) NEKP01 20121Department of Economics
- Abstract (Swedish)
- In this paper, the model of moral motivation as developed by Brekke et al (2003) is analysed with the new assumption that self-image is an increasing function of effort. While the effects of increased efficiency and new information on optimal effort levels are largely similar, different results are obtained when individuals are faced with responsibility and economic incentives. Following Brekke et al, this paper uses the example of dugnad, whereby members of an organisation can choose to voluntarily do practical work for the organisation. Participation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium even when it is not considered morally ideal. Two specific examples are used to demonstrate the different behaviours produced when varying the steepness... (More)
- In this paper, the model of moral motivation as developed by Brekke et al (2003) is analysed with the new assumption that self-image is an increasing function of effort. While the effects of increased efficiency and new information on optimal effort levels are largely similar, different results are obtained when individuals are faced with responsibility and economic incentives. Following Brekke et al, this paper uses the example of dugnad, whereby members of an organisation can choose to voluntarily do practical work for the organisation. Participation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium even when it is not considered morally ideal. Two specific examples are used to demonstrate the different behaviours produced when varying the steepness of the self-image functions. All results adhere to previously established theories on responsibility and crowding out. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/2542642
- author
- Samahita, Margaret LU
- supervisor
-
- Jerker Holm LU
- organization
- course
- NEKP01 20121
- year
- 2012
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- Self-image, Volunteerism, Economic incentives, Crowding out
- language
- English
- id
- 2542642
- date added to LUP
- 2012-06-15 09:29:31
- date last changed
- 2012-06-15 09:29:31
@misc{2542642, abstract = {{In this paper, the model of moral motivation as developed by Brekke et al (2003) is analysed with the new assumption that self-image is an increasing function of effort. While the effects of increased efficiency and new information on optimal effort levels are largely similar, different results are obtained when individuals are faced with responsibility and economic incentives. Following Brekke et al, this paper uses the example of dugnad, whereby members of an organisation can choose to voluntarily do practical work for the organisation. Participation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium even when it is not considered morally ideal. Two specific examples are used to demonstrate the different behaviours produced when varying the steepness of the self-image functions. All results adhere to previously established theories on responsibility and crowding out.}}, author = {{Samahita, Margaret}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Effect of Effort on Self Image: The Case of Monotonically Increasing Self-Image Functions}}, year = {{2012}}, }