Advanced

A simulation study of two combinatorial auctions

Nordström, David LU (2012) NEKP01 20121
Department of Economics
Abstract (Swedish)
Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun-
dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et
al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain
conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by
Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves
VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the
PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number
of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for
a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results
indicate that for some... (More)
Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun-
dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et
al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain
conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by
Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves
VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the
PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number
of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for
a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results
indicate that for some numbers of buyers, the UCE auction yields slightly
less revenue. There does not seem to be any dierence in the number of
iterations before termination. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Nordström, David LU
supervisor
organization
course
NEKP01 20121
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
PD auction, UCE auction, Combinatorial auction, Ascending auction, VCG payments, Strategy-proof, Primal-dual algorithm
language
English
id
2856200
date added to LUP
2012-06-28 08:26:35
date last changed
2012-06-28 08:26:35
@misc{2856200,
  abstract     = {Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun-
dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et
al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain
conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by
Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves
VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the
PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number
of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for
a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results
indicate that for some numbers of buyers, the UCE auction yields slightly
less revenue. There does not seem to be any dierence in the number of
iterations before termination.},
  author       = {Nordström, David},
  keyword      = {PD auction,UCE auction,Combinatorial auction,Ascending auction,VCG payments,Strategy-proof,Primal-dual algorithm},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {A simulation study of two combinatorial auctions},
  year         = {2012},
}