A simulation study of two combinatorial auctions
(2012) NEKP01 20121Department of Economics
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun-
dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et
al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain
conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by
Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves
VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the
PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number
of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for
a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results
indicate that for some... (More) - Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun-
dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et
al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain
conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by
Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves
VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the
PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number
of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for
a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results
indicate that for some numbers of buyers, the UCE auction yields slightly
less revenue. There does not seem to be any dierence in the number of
iterations before termination. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/2856200
- author
- Nordström, David LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- NEKP01 20121
- year
- 2012
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- PD auction, UCE auction, Combinatorial auction, Ascending auction, VCG payments, Strategy-proof, Primal-dual algorithm
- language
- English
- id
- 2856200
- date added to LUP
- 2012-06-28 08:26:35
- date last changed
- 2012-06-28 08:26:35
@misc{2856200, abstract = {{Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun- dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results indicate that for some numbers of buyers, the UCE auction yields slightly less revenue. There does not seem to be any dierence in the number of iterations before termination.}}, author = {{Nordström, David}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{A simulation study of two combinatorial auctions}}, year = {{2012}}, }