Coherentism and the Sensation Objection
(2013) FTEK01 20122Theoretical Philosophy
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Coherentist theories of justification face the Sensation objection, according to which some experiences, such as that of a headache, independently justify us in holding certain beliefs regardless of whether they cohere with the rest of our beliefs. Since coherentism holds that our beliefs are justified only on the basis of coherence with the rest of our beliefs, coherentism is, or so it has been argued, false. But the Sensation objection fails. First of all, there is no independent justification going on in these cases. And second, a variant of BonJour's theory of introspection can make sense of these cases within a pure coherentist position.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/3405864
- author
- Rosenqvist, Simon LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- FTEK01 20122
- year
- 2013
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Coherentism, BonJour, introspection, Sensation objection.
- language
- English
- id
- 3405864
- date added to LUP
- 2013-01-24 13:37:56
- date last changed
- 2013-01-24 13:37:56
@misc{3405864,
abstract = {{Coherentist theories of justification face the Sensation objection, according to which some experiences, such as that of a headache, independently justify us in holding certain beliefs regardless of whether they cohere with the rest of our beliefs. Since coherentism holds that our beliefs are justified only on the basis of coherence with the rest of our beliefs, coherentism is, or so it has been argued, false. But the Sensation objection fails. First of all, there is no independent justification going on in these cases. And second, a variant of BonJour's theory of introspection can make sense of these cases within a pure coherentist position.}},
author = {{Rosenqvist, Simon}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Coherentism and the Sensation Objection}},
year = {{2013}},
}