Prestationsbaserade incitamentssystemets påverkan på agentkostnader

Abstract (Swedish)

Examensarbetets titel: Prestationsbaserade incitamentssystemets påverkan på agentkostnader

Seminariedatum: 2015-01-16

Ämne/kurs: FEKH19, Examensarbete kandidatnivå, 15 högskolepoäng

Författare: Sarah Mansour, Ladan Odaway, Fredrik Persson, Darko Puljic.

Handledare: Christine Blomquist

Fem nyckelord: Prestationsbaserade incitamentssystem, Agentteorin, Psykisk Påverkan, Adverse Learning, Mätproblem.

Syfte: Syftet med studien är att ur principalens perspektiv analysera agentkostnader som är förenade med nyttjandet av prestationsbaserade incitamentssystem.

Metod: För studien tillämpas en fallstudiedesign med deduktiv ansats. Studiens kvalitativa forskningsstrategi ligger till grund för valt forskningsinstrument i form av semistrukturerade intervjuer. Studiens urval utgjordes av ett bekvämlighets- och snöbollsurval. Vidare har studiens analysverktyg utgjorts av studiens teoretiska ramverk för att söka hypotesstöd i den empiriska datan.

Teoretiska perspektiv: Resonemanget kring prestationsbaserade incitamentssystem utifrån agentteorin har föranlett Kohns (1993) artikel "Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work". Med utgångspunkt i Kohns (1993) artikel har tre faktorer identifierats. Dessa benämns som psykisk påverkan, adverse learning och mätproblem. De tre identifierade faktorerna låg sedan till grund för det fenomen vi ämnade analysera.

Empiri: Kohn (1993) menar att prestationsbaserade incitamentssystem inverkar negativt på agenters prestation. För att testa detta resonemang har studiens analysföretag utgjorts av tre aktörer inom säljbranschen. Samtliga aktörer nyttjar ett prestationsbaserat incitamentssystem i ett principal-agent förhållande.

Resultat: Inget hypotesstödd var funnet i studiens empiriska data. Andra påverkande faktorer, utöver studiens identifierade, påvisades. De påvisade faktorerna utgörs av rekrytering och lojalitet.

Popular Abstract

Title: The performance-based incentive plan's impact on agency costs

Seminar date: 2015-01-16

Course: FEKH19, Degree Project Undergraduate level, Business Administration, Undergraduate level, 15 University Credits Points (UPC) or ECTS‐cr)

Authors: Sarah Mansour, Ladan Odaway, Fredrik Persson, Darko Puljic.

Advisor/s: Christine Blomquist

Key words: Performance-based Incentives, Agency theory, Psychological impact, Adverse Learning, Performance measurements.

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze agency costs associated with the use of performance-based incentive plans from the perspective of the principal.

Methodology: An interview-based case study with a deductive approach was conducted on three companies in the sales industry. The qualitative research strategy underlies chosen research- instrument in the form of semi-structured interviews. The sampling techniques used for this study were a convenience- and snowball sample. The results were analysed using the study's theoretical framework to search for evidence, which serves to either support or counter the hypotheses of the study.

Theoretical perspectives: The reasoning behind performance-based incentive plans based on agency theory has led to Kohn’s (1993) article "Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work". Three factors were identified based on Kohn’s (1993) article. The identified factors are referred to as psychological impact, adverse learning and measurement problems. The three identified factors were then the basis for the phenomenon we intended to analyze.

Empirical foundation: Kohn (1993) argues that performance-based incentive plans have a negative impact on agents' performance. To test this argument, three players in the sales industry were analyzed. All actors use performance-based incentive plans in a principal-agent relationship.

Conclusions: No hypotheses were supported in the study’s empirical data. Other influential factors apart from the study's identified were detected. The influential factors were composed of recruitment and loyalty.

• author: Mansour, Sarah ; Odaway, Ladan ; Persson, Fredrik and Puljic, Darko
• supervisor: Christine Blomquist
• organization: Department of Business Administration
• alternative title: - En jämförande studie av incitamentsstrukturen inom säljbranschen.
• course: FEKH19 20142
• year: 2015
• type: M2 - Bachelor Degree
• subject: Business and Economics
• keywords: Prestationsbaserade incitamentssystem, Agentteorin, Psykisk Påverkan, Adverse Learning, Mätproblem
• language: Swedish
• id: 5045614
• date added to LUP: 2015-02-12 11:53:11
• date last changed: 2015-02-12 11:53:11