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Tjänstefelsbestämmelsen - ur ett kriminalpolitiskt perspektiv

Larsson, Emma LU (2015) LAGM01 2015
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Inledning
Tjänstefelsbestämmelsen återfinns i 20:1 BrB och har diskuterats kriminalpolitiskt under lång tid, vilket medfört att tjänstefelsansvarets stränghet varierat. Frågeställningen blir då vilka argument som framförts för och mot kriminalisering av tjänstefelsgärningar och vilka kriminaliseringsbegränsande principer som kan anföras för och mot kriminalisering av tjänstefelsgärningar. Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att besvara dessa frågor. Således kan uppsatsens perspektiv sägas bestå i ett kriminalpolitiskt, argumentationskomparativt och legitimeringsperspektiv. Avgränsningar har gjorts av utrymmesskäl, relevansskäl och tidsskäl. Uppsatsen har avgränsats till att gälla nationella förhållanden och enbart behandla rättspraxis för att... (More)
Inledning
Tjänstefelsbestämmelsen återfinns i 20:1 BrB och har diskuterats kriminalpolitiskt under lång tid, vilket medfört att tjänstefelsansvarets stränghet varierat. Frågeställningen blir då vilka argument som framförts för och mot kriminalisering av tjänstefelsgärningar och vilka kriminaliseringsbegränsande principer som kan anföras för och mot kriminalisering av tjänstefelsgärningar. Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att besvara dessa frågor. Således kan uppsatsens perspektiv sägas bestå i ett kriminalpolitiskt, argumentationskomparativt och legitimeringsperspektiv. Avgränsningar har gjorts av utrymmesskäl, relevansskäl och tidsskäl. Uppsatsen har avgränsats till att gälla nationella förhållanden och enbart behandla rättspraxis för att tillräckligt kunna beskriva gällande rätt avseende tjänstefelsbestämmelsen, och därmed har också vissa specialområden avgränsats bort. Vidare avgränsades kriminaliseringsargument avseende påföljder samt teorier om straff och straffsystem. Uppsatsens teoretiska utgångspunkt är teorier om rättspositivism och legitimitet. Den rättsvetenskapliga metoden har använts, vilket inkluderar material i form av rättskällor som förarbeten, rättspraxis och doktrin. Forskningsläget avseende gällande rätt är tillräckligt, medan det avseende kriminaliseringsteori är relativt skralt, i alla fall nationellt.

De kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna
Att kriminalisera är detsamma som att belägga ett visst beteende med straff. De gärningar som saknar eller enbart i mindre mån har kännetecken från kärnstraffrätten bör inte vara kriminaliserade. Dessa kännetecken är att det ska finnas ett straffvärt beteende som angriper ett godtagbart skyddsintresse där det inte finns något tillräckligt värdefullt motstående intresse, att andra alternativ än kriminalisering saknas och att skuldprincipen upprätthålls. De kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna är sammanfattningsvis dessa. Att det finns ett identifierat, konkretiserat godtagbart skyddsintresse. Att beteendet är straffvärt eftersom det kan befaras innebära fara, kränkning eller skada på skyddsintresset. Att paternalistisk, altruistisk eller garderande kriminalisering inte bör förekomma. Att ett närhetskrav mellan gärningen och fullbordat brott eller inträffad skada uppställs. Att skuld- och konformitetsprincipen upprätthålls. Att något tillräckligt värdefullt motstående intresse inte får finnas till skyddsintresset. Att kriminaliseringarna följer ultima-ratio-principen. Att gärningens allvar kräver straffsanktion. Att kriminaliseringen är generell och uppfyller effektivitetskravet, att legalitetsprincipen, förutsebarhetskravet, proportionalitetsprincipen och restriktivitetsprincipen följs. Att kriminalisering i enbart pedagogiskt syfte inte görs. Att de allmänna syftena med en kriminalisering förväntas uppfyllas till en viss nivåm, såsom symbolverkan, handlingsdirigerande verkan, moralbildande verkan, allmänprevention, effektivitet och vanebildande verkan. Samt att missbruksmöjligheter övervägs.

Tjänstefelsbestämmelsen – gällande rätt
Den som vid myndighetsutövning, uppsåtligen eller av oaktsamhet av normalgraden, åsidosätter vad som gäller för uppgiftenm, genom handling eller underlåtenhet, döms för tjänstefel. Är brottet att anse som grovt och har begåtts uppsåtligen döms den tilltalade för grovt tjänstefel. Tjänstefelsbestämmelsen är subsidiär till andra straffbud. Ledamöter av beslutande statlig eller kommunal församling har inget straffansvar för tjänstefel. I ringa fall ådöms inte straffansvar.

Specifika kriminalpolitiska argument för och mot kriminalisering av tjänstefelsgärningar
Tjänstefelsbestämmelsens skyddsintresse och därmed främsta syfte är att tillgodose medborgarnas intresse av att offentlig verksamhet utförs på ett korrekt sätt utan ovidkommande hänsyn. Före 1975 års reform var straffansvaret nästintill strikt och omfattade alla former av fel och försummelser, även om de skett p.g.a. oskicklighet eller oförstånd. Skälen för detta vara att garantera en viss kvalitet inom den offentliga verksamheten, skydda tjänstens integritet och behöriga gång, inskärpa förkastligheten av att begå fel i den offentliga verksamheten i det allmänna medvetandet, tjänstemännens förtroendeställning och tjänstefelsansvarets skyddsfunktion.

För avkriminalisering anfördes att det nästintill strikta straffansvaret medförde gränsdragningsproblem avseende de olika ansvarssystemens tillämpningsområden, att personkretsens avgränsning var otydlig, att gränsdragningsproblemen lett till icke enhetliga bedömningar i rättstillämpningen avseende personkretsen, att sanktionssystemet behövde bli mer enhetligt, att det var angeläget att olika verksamhetsformer kunde beaktas och att avtalsförbudet avseende tjänsteåligganden skulle utökas i för hög utsträckning om tjänsteansvarets personkrets utvidgades, samt att det var olämpligt att skiljande från tjänsten behandlades straffrättslig. Vidare betonades disciplinansvaret i första hand framför det straffrättsliga ansvaret och att tjänstefel som utgångspunkt inte skulle finnas, förutsatt att det fanns rimliga rättssäkerhetskrav och effektivitetskrav inom disciplinansvarssystemet. 1975 års reforms främsta syfte var att avgränsa personkretsen mer rationellt, närma den offentliga och privata arbetsmarknadens sanktionssystem och inskränka straffansvarsområdet betydligt. Tjänstefelsansvar skulle bara anses motiverat utifrån den offentliga verksamhetens särart.

Straffansvaret utvidgades vid 1989 års reform. Skälen var att straffsystemet ansågs vara bättre ägnat att tillgodose den enskilde medborgarens intressen, att det faktiskt kriminaliserade området i rättspraxis visat sig vara för snävt, vilket minskat allmänhetens förtroende för den offentliga verksamheten i viss mån, att straffrättsliga sanktioner enbart bör användas i speciella fall och att utbildning och kompetensutveckling kan vara tillräckligt effektiva metoder för att höja den offentliga verksamhetens kvalitet istället för ett utökat straffansvar. Men för att uppfylla de särskilda rättssäkerhetskrav, som ansågs behöva ställas på den offentliga verksamheten, ansåg regeringen att det krävdes tillräckligt effektiva bestämmelser för de situationer när det är påkallat med ingripande för att upprätthålla allmänhetens förtroende.

Att rekvisitet ”i myndighetsutövning” ändrades till ”vid myndighetsutövning” berodde på syftet att markera den särskilda noggrannhet och omsorg som alltid måste iakttas i alla avseenden av betydelse för myndighetsutövningen och på att det tidigare avgränsande rekvisitet varit för snävt, eftersom det inte omfattade misstag i förberedandestadiet. Vad gäller ”åsidosättande av vad som gäller för uppgiften” har några specifika kriminaliseringsargument inte funnits, utan enbart utformningsargument.

Oaktsamheten skulle före 1989 års reform vara grov för att kunna medföra straffansvar för tjänstefel i syfte att skilja ringa fall från oaktsamhetsfallen och att enbart ha straffrättsliga sanktioner för de allvarligaste fallen. Syftet var också att ha en tydligare avgränsning mellan sanktionssystemen. Vid 1989 års reform ansågs avgränsningen olämplig, särskilt eftersom en skarpare hållning var motiverad ur rättssäkerhetssynpunkt, eftersom särskilda noggrannhetskrav och omsorgskrav kan ställas vid myndighetsutövning vari enskildas intressen berörs. Kravet om grov oaktsamhet hade tolkats restriktivt i praxis och ansvar för tjänstefel hade prövat disciplinär i för hög utsträckning. Istället valde man att avgränsa straffansvaret för tjänstefel mot ringa fall. Syftet med ett sådant avgränsande rekvisit var att endast straffvärda handlingar skulle omfattas av straffansvaret. Numera räcker det med normal oaktsamhet. Tidigare uppställdes det s.k. förfångsrekvisitet som vållade bevissvårigheter och begränsade tillämpningsutrymmet för mycket i praktiken. Vid 1989 års reform ansågs att klart klandervärda handlingar inte skulle lämnas obeivrade enbart på den grunden att någon konkret skadlig effekt inte uppstått, kanske enbart p.g.a. tillfälliga omständigheter.

Vad gäller bestämmelsens personkrets har politiskt ansvar ansetts tillräckligt för beslutande folkvalda församlingar och dessa lyder däremot under medverkansansvar enligt 23:4 BrB. Vad gäller bestämmelsen om grovt tjänstefel saknas också specifika kriminaliseringsargument, utan det finns enbart utformningsargument.

Slutsatser av jämförelsen mellan de specifika kriminalpolitiska argumenten och de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna
De slutsatser som har kunnat dras av undersökningen är följande. Att förtroendefunktionen är viktig för den offentliga verksamhetens legitimitet. Att tjänstefel sällan beivras genom straffansvar. Att ökad rätt till juridiskt biträde, information till enskilda om rättigheter och skyldigheter, vidareutbildning av och en skyldighet att inhämta sakkunnig vid tjänstefelsutredningar för de rättsvårdande myndigheterna skulle kunna öka uppklarnings- och lagföringsfrekvensen, vilket skulle kunna leda till ökat förtroende, ökad legitimitet, ökad anmälningsbenägenhet och ökad prevention. Att många av de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna motsäger ett nästintill strikt straffansvar som det var före 1975 års reform men att ett strängt straffansvar på en nivå mittemellan rättsläget före år 1975 och dagens rättsläge nog hade kunnat gå att förena med de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna. Att avkriminaliseringen vid 1975 års reform kan ha varit alltför omfattande och inte stod i överensstämmelse med eller överdrev de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna. Att regeringen vid 1989 års reform hade skäl nog för en utvidgning av straffansvaret och att dessa skäl i vart fall inte strider mot de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna. Att det avgränsande rekvisitet ”vid myndighetsutövning” är lämpligt utformat och bör bibehållas.
Att om en handling eller underlåtenhet vid myndighetsutövning bryter mot t.ex. objektivitetsprincipen i 1:9 RF eller 23:4 RB ska det anses som ett åsidosättande av vad som gäller för uppgiften, vilket kan främja symbolfunktionen och den moralbildande verkan med en kriminalisering. Vidare ska det tas hänsyn till vad som anses följa av uppgiftens beskaffenhet eller av allmänna principer om dessa följer av ett naturligt och självklart handlingsmönster. Att det inte finns några betänkligheter vad gäller förmågan hos rekvisitet att tillgodose kraven som ställs i de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna. Att den goda bedömningsmarginalen avseende de bedömningsfaktorer som angetts i förarbetena om möjligt bör undvikas med hänsyn tagen till tjänstefelsbestämmelsens skyddsintresse och förtroendefunktion och därmed den offentliga verksamhetens legitimitet, liksom hänsyn tagen till rättssäkerhetskraven, enligt min mening. Att vissa av bedömningsfaktorerna som anges i förarbeten och praxis för att anse gärningen som ringa kan ifrågasättas utifrån kriminaliseringens funktioner och principer. Att skälen för att politiskt ansvar ansetts tillräckligt för ledamöter av kommunala beslutande församlingar är otillräckliga, att det finns många skäl för ett rättsligt ansvar och att ett sådant de lege ferenda skulle kunna vara att införa en bestämmelse om anstiftan till tjänstefel. Att bestämmelsen om grovt tjänstefel kan sägas uppfylla de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna, men det hade varit önskvärt med fler argument som legitimerar en sådan bestämmelse, liksom dess utformning, men att stadgandet om grovt tjänstefel utgör ytterligare en garanti och möjlighet för att medborgarnas intresse av att offentlig förvaltning utförs korrekt utan ovidkommande hänsyn tillvaratas.

Slutsatserna om de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna är i hög utsträckning generaliserbara till andra straffstadganden men inte till andra rättsområden än straffrätten, men kan möjligen tjäna som underlag när man genomför regelförändringar även inom andra rättsområden. Generaliserbarheten hos övriga slutsatser är inte så hög eftersom dessa specifikt inriktar sig på de kriminalpolitiska argumenten för kriminalisering av tjänstefelsgärningar. Analysmetoden kan däremot användas för att analysera andra straffbuds lagmotiv avseende kriminalisering i förhållande till de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna. Genom detta har uppsatsen också ett nyhetsvärde, dels genom sammanställningen av de kriminaliseringsbegränsande principerna, dels genom valt angreppssätt och genomförande av analysen. (Less)
Abstract
Introduction
The misconduct provision is found in 20:1 in the Penal Code and has been discussed in criminal policy for a long time, resulting in that the severity of the misconduct responsibility has varied. The question that follows is what arguments that are presented for and against the criminalization of misconduct offences and which criminalization limiting principles that can be set in contrast to the arguments made for and against the criminalization of misconduct deeds. The purpose of this paper has been to answer these questions. Thus, the thesis perspectives can be said to consist in a criminal policy perspective, argumentation-comparative perspective and legitimization perspective. Demarcations have been made for reasons of... (More)
Introduction
The misconduct provision is found in 20:1 in the Penal Code and has been discussed in criminal policy for a long time, resulting in that the severity of the misconduct responsibility has varied. The question that follows is what arguments that are presented for and against the criminalization of misconduct offences and which criminalization limiting principles that can be set in contrast to the arguments made for and against the criminalization of misconduct deeds. The purpose of this paper has been to answer these questions. Thus, the thesis perspectives can be said to consist in a criminal policy perspective, argumentation-comparative perspective and legitimization perspective. Demarcations have been made for reasons of space limitations, relevance and time. The thesis has been limited to apply national conditions and deal exclusively with the case-law in order to adequately describe the law in force regarding the misconduct provision and case-law that describes special areas has been demarcated. Furthermore, the criminalization arguments in relation to penalties and theories of punishment and penal systems have been demarcated. The essay’s theoretical basis is theories of legal positivism and legitimacy. The jurisprudential method has been used, which includes material in the form of legal sources as preparatory work, case law and jurisprudence. The research regarding the applicable law is sufficient, while regarding criminalization theory is rather scant, at least nationally.

The criminalization limiting principles
Criminalizing is tantamount to penalize a certain behavior. The conducts that have no or only to a lesser extent, characteristics of the core criminal law should not be criminalized. These characteristics are that there should be a culpable behavior that attacks an acceptable legitimate interest where there is no conflicting interest valuable enough, that there is a lack of options other than criminalization and that the guilt principle is maintained. The criminalization-limiting principles can be summarized as these. That there is an identified concretized acceptable legitimate interest. The conduct is culpable enough to penalize because the conduct may be dangerous to, a violation of or constitute damage to the legitimate interest. That paternalistic, altruistic or gardening generating criminalization should not occur. That a proximity requirement is laid down between the offense and the completed crime or damage occurred. That the guilt- and conformity-principles are maintained. That some conflicting interest valuable enough may not exist in relation to the legitimate interest. That criminalization increases follow the ultima-ratio-principle. That the offense is so serious that criminalization is required. That the criminalization is general and meets the requirement of efficiency, the principle of legality, the requirement of legal predictability and that the proportionality- and restrictiveness-principles are followed. The criminalization for mere educational purposes is not acceptable. That the general aims of the criminalization are expected to reach a certain level, as the symbolic effect, action-directional effect, moral-forming effect, universal prevention, efficiency and the deterrent effect. And that the abuse potential should be taken into consideration.

The misconduct provision - applicable law
He who by intent or by normal degree of negligently violates what is set to be his tasks of duty, by act or omission, will be convicted of misconduct. If the offense is considered gross and has been committed intentionally he will be sentenced for gross misconduct. The misconduct provision is subsidiary to other penal provisions. Members of the governing state or municipal council have no criminal liability for misconduct. In minor cases no penalties are imposed.

Specific criminal policy arguments for and against the criminalization of misconduct offenses
The misconduct provision’s legitimate interest and thus primary purpose is to meet citizens' interest in that public administration is exercised in a proper manner without extraneous considerations. Before the 1975 reform the criminal liability was almost strict and covered all forms of errors and omissions, even if they occurred due incompetence or ignorance. The reasons for this were to ensure a certain quality of the public service, protecting public administration integrity and due process, make sure that the reprehensibility of making errors in public administration is printed into the public’s consciousness, the confidence function in official positions and the misconduct responsibility’s protection function. For decriminalization it was argued that the almost strict criminal liability resulted in demarcation problems concerning the various responsibility system’s applicability, the person-circuit demarcation was unclear, that the demarcation problems led to non-uniform assessments of the law concerning the person-circuit, that the sanction systems needed to be more consistent, that it was important that various forms of administration could be considered, that the agreement prohibition relating to official duties was inappropriate, that the person-circuit would be extended into a too high degree was inappropriate, and that it was inappropriate to use dismissal from the service as a criminal process. Furthermore it was emphasized that discipline responsibility should be used in the first place in front of the criminal liability and misconduct wouldn’t exist from a starting point of view, assuming that there was reasonable legal certainty and efficiency requirements in the disciplinary system. The 1975 reform's main objective was to demarcate the person-circuit more rationally, make the public and private work-sanctions regimes get closer to one another and restrain the criminal liability area significantly. The misconduct liability would only be justified on the basis of the specific nature of the public administration.

The criminal responsibility for misconduct was expanded by the 1989 reform. The reasons were that the penal system was considered to be better adapted to meet the citizens´ interests, that the de facto criminalized area in case-law had proved to be too narrow, which had reduced public confidence in the public sector to some extent, that criminal sanctions should only be used in special cases and to training and skills development can be sufficiently effective methods for improving the public service quality instead of an expanding criminal liability. But to meet the specific requirements of legal certainty, which was considered to be required in the public sector, the Government considered that it was necessary that sufficiently effective provisions for situations when intervention was called for to maintain public’s confidence. That the requirement “in exercising public authority” was changed to “practices regarding exercising public authority” was due to the purpose to mark the special care and attention that must always be observed in all respects relevant to the exercise of authority and that the former demarcation prerequisite had been too narrow, because it did not include mistakes in the exploratory stage. As for the prerequisite "breach of what applies to the task" no specific criminalization argument has been found, only the design arguments.

Negligence had to be gross before the 1989 reform to entail criminal liability for misconduct in order to distinguish minor cases of negligence and that only to have criminal sanctions for the most serious cases. The aim was also to have a clearer demarcation between the sanctioning regimes. At the 1989 reform, the demarcation was considered inappropriate, especially since sharper attitudes was justified from a legal certainty view, because the specific accuracy requirements and care demands can be held towards the public authority practice where the interests of individuals are concerned. The requirement for gross negligence had been interpreted restrictively in case-law and accountability for misconduct had been tried disciplinary in a too high extent. Instead they chose to demarcate criminal liability for misconduct against minor cases. The purpose of such a boundary element demarcating prerequisite was that only acts worthy of penalization should be subject to the criminal liability. Nowadays, it is enough with normal negligence. The so-called detrimental prerequisite was imposed before, which led to evidential difficulties and limited the application area too much in practice. At the 1989 reform it was considered that clearly culpable acts should not be left unrepressed solely on the basis that any substantial detrimental effect had not occurred, perhaps only because of temporary circumstances.
Regarding the provision of the person-circuit, political responsibility has been considered sufficient for decision-making deputations but these are also under liability for complicity under 23:4 of the Penal Code. Regarding the provision on gross misconduct there is also a lack of specific criminalization arguments, and there are only design arguments.

Conclusions of the comparison between the specific criminal policy arguments and the criminalization limiting principles
The conclusions that have been drawn from the survey are as follows. The function of confidence is important for the legitimacy of public service. Misconduct is rarely prosecuted by criminal liability. That increased right to legal counsel, information to individuals about rights and responsibilities, training and an obligation to consult an expert in misconduct investigations for law enforcement agencies, could increase the frequency of clear-up and prosecution, which could lead to increased confidence, increased legitimacy, increased propensity to make charges and increased prevention. That many of the criminalization limiting principles contradicts an almost strict criminal liability as it was before the 1975 reform, but that a midway between the almost strict criminal liability prior to the legal situation 1975 and the applicable law probably could have been able to reconcile with the criminalization limiting principles. That decriminalization during the 1975 reform may have been too broad and did not conform with or exaggerated the criminalization limiting principles. That the Government at the 1989 reform had reason enough for expansion of criminal liability and that those reasons at least not are contrary to the criminalization limiting principles. That the demarcating prerequisite “practices regarding exercising public authority” is appropriately designed and should be maintained. That if an act or omission during public authority practice violates e.g. principle of objectivity in 1:9 IG or 23:4 the Code of Judicial Procedure should be considered as a violation of the tasks of duty, which can promote the symbolic function and the moral-forming effect of criminalization. Furthermore, consideration shall be given to what is believed to be the nature of the task and to general principles arising from natural and obvious patterns of behavior. That there are no concerns regarding the ability of the prerequisite to meet the requirements stipulated in the criminalization limiting principles. That the wide assessment margin in respect of the assessment factors specified in the preparatory works if possible should be avoided with regards to the legitimate interest in respect of the misconduct provision and to the confidence function, and thus the legitimacy of public administration, as well as taking into account the legal certainty requirements, in my opinion. That some of the evaluation factors set out in the preparatory works and case-law to assess the misconduct to be a minor case can be put into question on the basis of criminalization functions and principles. That the reasons for political responsibility is sufficient for members of the municipal decision-making assemblies are insufficient, that there is much reason for a criminal liability and that such liability de lege ferenda could be to introduce a provision for incitement to commit misconduct. That the provision for gross misconduct can be said to meet the requirements of the criminalization limiting principles, but it would have been desirable to have more arguments that legitimize such a provision, as well as its design, but that the requirement of gross misconduct constitutes an additional warranty and opportunity for that the citizens´ interest in public administration is performed correctly without irrelevant considerations are safeguarded.

The conclusions on the criminalization limiting principles are largely able to generalize to other penal provisions but not to other areas of law than criminal law, but may possibly serve as a basis when implementing regulatory changes in other areas of law. The ability to generalize the other conclusions is not as extended as the conclusions, that specifically focuses on the criminal policy arguments for the criminalization of misconduct deeds. The analysis method can, however, be used to analyze other criminalization preparatory works in relation to the criminalization limiting principles. Through this essay there is also a news-value, partly through the compilation of the criminalization limiting principles, and through selected approaches and the conducting of analysis. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Larsson, Emma LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The misconduct provision - from a criminal policy perspective
course
LAGM01 2015
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
straffrätt, tjänstefel, tjänstefelsbestämmelsen, 20:1 BrB, kriminalpolitik, kriminalisering
language
Swedish
id
5151626
date added to LUP
2015-05-07 14:14:32
date last changed
2015-05-07 14:38:00
@misc{5151626,
  abstract     = {Introduction
The misconduct provision is found in 20:1 in the Penal Code and has been discussed in criminal policy for a long time, resulting in that the severity of the misconduct responsibility has varied. The question that follows is what arguments that are presented for and against the criminalization of misconduct offences and which criminalization limiting principles that can be set in contrast to the arguments made for and against the criminalization of misconduct deeds. The purpose of this paper has been to answer these questions. Thus, the thesis perspectives can be said to consist in a criminal policy perspective, argumentation-comparative perspective and legitimization perspective. Demarcations have been made for reasons of space limitations, relevance and time. The thesis has been limited to apply national conditions and deal exclusively with the case-law in order to adequately describe the law in force regarding the misconduct provision and case-law that describes special areas has been demarcated. Furthermore, the criminalization arguments in relation to penalties and theories of punishment and penal systems have been demarcated. The essay’s theoretical basis is theories of legal positivism and legitimacy. The jurisprudential method has been used, which includes material in the form of legal sources as preparatory work, case law and jurisprudence. The research regarding the applicable law is sufficient, while regarding criminalization theory is rather scant, at least nationally.

The criminalization limiting principles
Criminalizing is tantamount to penalize a certain behavior. The conducts that have no or only to a lesser extent, characteristics of the core criminal law should not be criminalized. These characteristics are that there should be a culpable behavior that attacks an acceptable legitimate interest where there is no conflicting interest valuable enough, that there is a lack of options other than criminalization and that the guilt principle is maintained. The criminalization-limiting principles can be summarized as these. That there is an identified concretized acceptable legitimate interest. The conduct is culpable enough to penalize because the conduct may be dangerous to, a violation of or constitute damage to the legitimate interest. That paternalistic, altruistic or gardening generating criminalization should not occur. That a proximity requirement is laid down between the offense and the completed crime or damage occurred. That the guilt- and conformity-principles are maintained. That some conflicting interest valuable enough may not exist in relation to the legitimate interest. That criminalization increases follow the ultima-ratio-principle. That the offense is so serious that criminalization is required. That the criminalization is general and meets the requirement of efficiency, the principle of legality, the requirement of legal predictability and that the proportionality- and restrictiveness-principles are followed. The criminalization for mere educational purposes is not acceptable. That the general aims of the criminalization are expected to reach a certain level, as the symbolic effect, action-directional effect, moral-forming effect, universal prevention, efficiency and the deterrent effect. And that the abuse potential should be taken into consideration.

The misconduct provision - applicable law
He who by intent or by normal degree of negligently violates what is set to be his tasks of duty, by act or omission, will be convicted of misconduct. If the offense is considered gross and has been committed intentionally he will be sentenced for gross misconduct. The misconduct provision is subsidiary to other penal provisions. Members of the governing state or municipal council have no criminal liability for misconduct. In minor cases no penalties are imposed.

Specific criminal policy arguments for and against the criminalization of misconduct offenses
The misconduct provision’s legitimate interest and thus primary purpose is to meet citizens' interest in that public administration is exercised in a proper manner without extraneous considerations. Before the 1975 reform the criminal liability was almost strict and covered all forms of errors and omissions, even if they occurred due incompetence or ignorance. The reasons for this were to ensure a certain quality of the public service, protecting public administration integrity and due process, make sure that the reprehensibility of making errors in public administration is printed into the public’s consciousness, the confidence function in official positions and the misconduct responsibility’s protection function. For decriminalization it was argued that the almost strict criminal liability resulted in demarcation problems concerning the various responsibility system’s applicability, the person-circuit demarcation was unclear, that the demarcation problems led to non-uniform assessments of the law concerning the person-circuit, that the sanction systems needed to be more consistent, that it was important that various forms of administration could be considered, that the agreement prohibition relating to official duties was inappropriate, that the person-circuit would be extended into a too high degree was inappropriate, and that it was inappropriate to use dismissal from the service as a criminal process. Furthermore it was emphasized that discipline responsibility should be used in the first place in front of the criminal liability and misconduct wouldn’t exist from a starting point of view, assuming that there was reasonable legal certainty and efficiency requirements in the disciplinary system. The 1975 reform's main objective was to demarcate the person-circuit more rationally, make the public and private work-sanctions regimes get closer to one another and restrain the criminal liability area significantly. The misconduct liability would only be justified on the basis of the specific nature of the public administration.

The criminal responsibility for misconduct was expanded by the 1989 reform. The reasons were that the penal system was considered to be better adapted to meet the citizens´ interests, that the de facto criminalized area in case-law had proved to be too narrow, which had reduced public confidence in the public sector to some extent, that criminal sanctions should only be used in special cases and to training and skills development can be sufficiently effective methods for improving the public service quality instead of an expanding criminal liability. But to meet the specific requirements of legal certainty, which was considered to be required in the public sector, the Government considered that it was necessary that sufficiently effective provisions for situations when intervention was called for to maintain public’s confidence. That the requirement “in exercising public authority” was changed to “practices regarding exercising public authority” was due to the purpose to mark the special care and attention that must always be observed in all respects relevant to the exercise of authority and that the former demarcation prerequisite had been too narrow, because it did not include mistakes in the exploratory stage. As for the prerequisite "breach of what applies to the task" no specific criminalization argument has been found, only the design arguments.
 
Negligence had to be gross before the 1989 reform to entail criminal liability for misconduct in order to distinguish minor cases of negligence and that only to have criminal sanctions for the most serious cases. The aim was also to have a clearer demarcation between the sanctioning regimes. At the 1989 reform, the demarcation was considered inappropriate, especially since sharper attitudes was justified from a legal certainty view, because the specific accuracy requirements and care demands can be held towards the public authority practice where the interests of individuals are concerned. The requirement for gross negligence had been interpreted restrictively in case-law and accountability for misconduct had been tried disciplinary in a too high extent. Instead they chose to demarcate criminal liability for misconduct against minor cases. The purpose of such a boundary element demarcating prerequisite was that only acts worthy of penalization should be subject to the criminal liability. Nowadays, it is enough with normal negligence. The so-called detrimental prerequisite was imposed before, which led to evidential difficulties and limited the application area too much in practice. At the 1989 reform it was considered that clearly culpable acts should not be left unrepressed solely on the basis that any substantial detrimental effect had not occurred, perhaps only because of temporary circumstances.
Regarding the provision of the person-circuit, political responsibility has been considered sufficient for decision-making deputations but these are also under liability for complicity under 23:4 of the Penal Code. Regarding the provision on gross misconduct there is also a lack of specific criminalization arguments, and there are only design arguments.

Conclusions of the comparison between the specific criminal policy arguments and the criminalization limiting principles
The conclusions that have been drawn from the survey are as follows. The function of confidence is important for the legitimacy of public service. Misconduct is rarely prosecuted by criminal liability. That increased right to legal counsel, information to individuals about rights and responsibilities, training and an obligation to consult an expert in misconduct investigations for law enforcement agencies, could increase the frequency of clear-up and prosecution, which could lead to increased confidence, increased legitimacy, increased propensity to make charges and increased prevention. That many of the criminalization limiting principles contradicts an almost strict criminal liability as it was before the 1975 reform, but that a midway between the almost strict criminal liability prior to the legal situation 1975 and the applicable law probably could have been able to reconcile with the criminalization limiting principles. That decriminalization during the 1975 reform may have been too broad and did not conform with or exaggerated the criminalization limiting principles. That the Government at the 1989 reform had reason enough for expansion of criminal liability and that those reasons at least not are contrary to the criminalization limiting principles. That the demarcating prerequisite “practices regarding exercising public authority” is appropriately designed and should be maintained. That if an act or omission during public authority practice violates e.g. principle of objectivity in 1:9 IG or 23:4 the Code of Judicial Procedure should be considered as a violation of the tasks of duty, which can promote the symbolic function and the moral-forming effect of criminalization. Furthermore, consideration shall be given to what is believed to be the nature of the task and to general principles arising from natural and obvious patterns of behavior. That there are no concerns regarding the ability of the prerequisite to meet the requirements stipulated in the criminalization limiting principles. That the wide assessment margin in respect of the assessment factors specified in the preparatory works if possible should be avoided with regards to the legitimate interest in respect of the misconduct provision and to the confidence function, and thus the legitimacy of public administration, as well as taking into account the legal certainty requirements, in my opinion. That some of the evaluation factors set out in the preparatory works and case-law to assess the misconduct to be a minor case can be put into question on the basis of criminalization functions and principles. That the reasons for political responsibility is sufficient for members of the municipal decision-making assemblies are insufficient, that there is much reason for a criminal liability and that such liability de lege ferenda could be to introduce a provision for incitement to commit misconduct. That the provision for gross misconduct can be said to meet the requirements of the criminalization limiting principles, but it would have been desirable to have more arguments that legitimize such a provision, as well as its design, but that the requirement of gross misconduct constitutes an additional warranty and opportunity for that the citizens´ interest in public administration is performed correctly without irrelevant considerations are safeguarded.

The conclusions on the criminalization limiting principles are largely able to generalize to other penal provisions but not to other areas of law than criminal law, but may possibly serve as a basis when implementing regulatory changes in other areas of law. The ability to generalize the other conclusions is not as extended as the conclusions, that specifically focuses on the criminal policy arguments for the criminalization of misconduct deeds. The analysis method can, however, be used to analyze other criminalization preparatory works in relation to the criminalization limiting principles. Through this essay there is also a news-value, partly through the compilation of the criminalization limiting principles, and through selected approaches and the conducting of analysis.},
  author       = {Larsson, Emma},
  keyword      = {straffrätt,tjänstefel,tjänstefelsbestämmelsen,20:1 BrB,kriminalpolitik,kriminalisering},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Tjänstefelsbestämmelsen - ur ett kriminalpolitiskt perspektiv},
  year         = {2015},
}