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Uppsåtstäckning vid medhjälp – Om täckningsprincipens tillämpning när ansvar för medhjälp aktualiseras

Sköld, Ida LU (2015) LAGM01 20152
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Syftet med detta examensarbete har varit att undersöka täckningsprincipen i svensk rätt, med ett särskilt fokus på dess tillämpning när ansvar för medhjälp aktualiseras. Målet har varit att försöka utreda dels vilka krav gällande rätt uppställer vid uppsåtstäckningen vid medhjälp och dels bidra med ett normativt perspektiv genom att granska gällande rätt ur ett konformitets- och skuldperspektiv. Den rättsdogmatiska metoden har härvid använts.

Täckningsprincipen är en straffrättslig princip som innebär att en jämförelse måste göras mellan det verkliga händelseförloppet (så långt det är visat i processen) och den tilltalades föreställning av händelseförloppet. Dessa jämförelseobjekt ska överensstämma med varandra i så hög grad att det kan... (More)
Syftet med detta examensarbete har varit att undersöka täckningsprincipen i svensk rätt, med ett särskilt fokus på dess tillämpning när ansvar för medhjälp aktualiseras. Målet har varit att försöka utreda dels vilka krav gällande rätt uppställer vid uppsåtstäckningen vid medhjälp och dels bidra med ett normativt perspektiv genom att granska gällande rätt ur ett konformitets- och skuldperspektiv. Den rättsdogmatiska metoden har härvid använts.

Täckningsprincipen är en straffrättslig princip som innebär att en jämförelse måste göras mellan det verkliga händelseförloppet (så långt det är visat i processen) och den tilltalades föreställning av händelseförloppet. Dessa jämförelseobjekt ska överensstämma med varandra i så hög grad att det kan sägas röra sig om samma rättsstridiga gärning. Hur mycket det föreställda händelseförloppet kan avvika från det verkliga, utan att det får sägas finnas brister avseende uppsåtstäckningen, är inte helt klarlagt. Såväl i praxis som doktrin har det uttalats att det inte kan krävas en fullständig överensstämmelse. I SOU 1996:185 har det dock hävdats att det i vart fall krävs en huvudsaklig överensstämmelse.

I uppsatsen har vidare konstaterats att en åtskillnad måste göra mellan bedömningen om vad som måste vara uppsåtstäckt samt hur mycket täckning som krävs. För att ta reda på vad som måste uppsåtstäckas måste en tolkning av de aktuella straffbuden göras. Det är nämligen lagens ord, rekvisiten, som sätter gränserna för vad som ska täckas av den tilltalades uppsåt. Frågan om hur mycket uppsåtstäckning som krävs berörs inte särskilt ofta i förarbetena till de enskilda straffbestämmelserna och frågan har sällan behandlats i praxis. Detta gör det svårare att ge ett tydligt svar på vilken grad av uppsåtstäckning som krävs i det enskilda fallet.

Det finns vissa specifika krav som aktualiseras när uppsåtstäckningen ska prövas i relation till en medhjälpare. Prövningen sker då i två led. Det krävs att medhjälparen har uppsåt till såväl den egna medverkansgärningen (att främja någon annans gärning med råd eller dåd) som till medverkansobjektet (någon annans otillåtna gärningar). Arbetet har härvid kommit att beröra frågan om hur konkret medhjälparens föreställning måste vara avseende medverkansobjektet. Svaret har sökts bl.a. genom att analysera ett antal rättsfall där frågan kommit upp till prövning. I uppsatsen har det framkommit att den generella miniminivån är låg, avseende hur diffust/oklart uppsåtet får vara utan att relevanta brister i uppsåtstäckningen föreligger. I praxis och doktrin har man ansett att det inte krävs att medhjälparen har någon närmare vetskap vad gäller händelseförloppet som utgör medverkansobjektet. Medhjälparens föreställning får dock inte vara så diffus att dennes uppsåt inte omfattar de aktuella rekvisiten i straffbudet. Detta kan innebära att relativt omfattande skillnader mellan händelseförloppet såsom det har blivit bevisat i processen och det föreställda händelseförloppet, får accepteras. Arbetet har även besvarat frågan om hur skillnader mellan gärningspersonens agerande och det av medhjälparen tänkta händelseförloppet hanteras inom ramen för svensk rätt. Resultatet som framkommit efter en studie av förarbeten, doktrin och rättsfall är att om avvikelsen är så stor att medhjälparens uppsåt inte kan sägas täcka de relevanta omständigheterna och följderna som konstituerar medverkansobjektet finns brister avseende uppsåtstäckningen. Det har även framkommit att viss vikt måste läggas vid medhjälparens efterföljande beteende för att kunna fastställa om medhjälparens uppsåt täcker avvikelsen eller överdriften.

När resultatet sedan har studerats ur ett konformitets- och skuldperspektiv har problem som aktualiseras vid uppsåtstäckningen vid medhjälpsansvar uppmärksammats. Härvid har konstaterats att om medhjälparen har en allt för otydlig föreställning om medverkansobjektet, har denne inte haft tillfälle att rätta sig efter lagen – vilket strider mot konformitetsprincipen. Denne kan heller inte anses ha rått för sin gärning, vilket strider mot skuldprincipen. Detsamma gäller om en gärningspersons agerande avviker helt från medhjälparens initiala föreställning om det tänkta händelseförloppet. Medhjälparen har då inte haft tillfälle att rätta sig efter lagen. Om medhjälparen däremot fortsätter med sin medverkansgärning efter att det ”nya” medverkansobjektet står klart för denne blir bedömningen emellertid annorlunda. Det har också påståtts att vissa avsteg från konformitetsprincipens ideal kan motiveras med vikten av en effektiv lagföring. (Less)
Abstract
The purpose of this master thesis has been to investigate the ”coverage principle”, in Swedish law, which means that the accused´s criminal intent needs to “cover” the unlawful act, for which he or she stands accused. The focus has been on the principles meaning when aiding and abetting, as defined in the Swedish Penal Code, become actualized. The applicable law has also been studied from a conformity- and guilt perspective. In the paper the legal dogmatic method has been used.

The “coverage principle” means, in short, that a comparison must be made between the actual sequence of events (as proven in court) and the accused´s perception of the sequence of events. The objects of comparison must correspond to such a degree that it can... (More)
The purpose of this master thesis has been to investigate the ”coverage principle”, in Swedish law, which means that the accused´s criminal intent needs to “cover” the unlawful act, for which he or she stands accused. The focus has been on the principles meaning when aiding and abetting, as defined in the Swedish Penal Code, become actualized. The applicable law has also been studied from a conformity- and guilt perspective. In the paper the legal dogmatic method has been used.

The “coverage principle” means, in short, that a comparison must be made between the actual sequence of events (as proven in court) and the accused´s perception of the sequence of events. The objects of comparison must correspond to such a degree that it can still be said to be the same unlawful act. If that is not the case, relevant defects regarding the “coverage principle” is at hand. It is unclear how much the imagined sequence of events may differ from the reality without causing relevant defects regarding the “coverage” of the criminal intent. In case law as well as in legal literature, it has been stated that full consistency is not needed. In SOU 1996:185 it has been argued that in each case, there needs to be a substantial equivalence.

In the paper it has further been noted that a distinction has to be made regarding the assessment of what and how much coverage that is required. To find out what needs to be covered an interpretation of the prerequisites, which are stated in the law, has to be made. It is hard to give a clear answer to the question regarding how much coverage is required, because the issue is rarely addressed in the legislative history or in the case law.

There are some specific requirements that arise when the coverage of criminal intent is examined in relation to aiding and abetting. The trial has to be made in two stages. It is required that the aider´s criminal intent covers the aiding and abetting deed itself (to promote someone else's act by advice or deed) as well as the participation object ( the perpetrator's unlawful act). This paper has addressed the question regarding how concrete the aider's perception must be of the participation object. The answer has been sought by analyzing a number of cases where the issue came up for consideration. In the paper it has been noted that the general minimum level is low regarding how vague/unclear, the criminal intent can be without claiming there is relevant shortcomings regarding the coverage of criminal intent. In case law and legal literature it has been stated that it is not required that the aider has a detailed knowledge regarding the sequence of events that constitute the participation object. However, the aider's perception may not be so diffuse that his or hers intent do not cover the conditions of criminalization, stated in the provisions. The paper also tries to answer the question regarding how Swedish law handles differences between the perpetrator's action and the aider´s perception of the imagined participation object. The result that emerged after a study of the legislative history, legal literature and case law is that if the differences are too big, the aider's criminal intent can not be said to cover the participation object. It has also emerged that some importance must be given to the aider's subsequent behavior in order to determine whether the aider's intent covers the deviation or the exaggeration.

In the paper some issues, from a conformity- and guilt perspective, have been noted. It has been stated that if the aider has an overly vague notion of the participation object, he or she has not had the opportunity to comply with the law - which is contrary to the principle of conformity. Nor could he or she help acting as he or she did, which is contrary to the principle of guilt. The same applies if the perpetrator’s conduct deviates completely from the aider's initial conception of the planned events. If that is the case, the aider has not had the opportunity to comply with the law. If the aider however continues its involvement after the "new" participation object is clear to him or her, it is a different story. It has also been argued that some deviations from the principle of conformity can be justified by referring to the importance of effective prosecution. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Sköld, Ida LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The "coverage principle" when aiding and abetting become actualized
course
LAGM01 20152
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Straffrätt
language
Swedish
id
8511948
date added to LUP
2016-02-04 13:39:30
date last changed
2016-02-04 13:39:30
@misc{8511948,
  abstract     = {The purpose of this master thesis has been to investigate the ”coverage principle”, in Swedish law, which means that the accused´s criminal intent needs to “cover” the unlawful act, for which he or she stands accused. The focus has been on the principles meaning when aiding and abetting, as defined in the Swedish Penal Code, become actualized. The applicable law has also been studied from a conformity- and guilt perspective. In the paper the legal dogmatic method has been used.

The “coverage principle” means, in short, that a comparison must be made between the actual sequence of events (as proven in court) and the accused´s perception of the sequence of events. The objects of comparison must correspond to such a degree that it can still be said to be the same unlawful act. If that is not the case, relevant defects regarding the “coverage principle” is at hand. It is unclear how much the imagined sequence of events may differ from the reality without causing relevant defects regarding the “coverage” of the criminal intent. In case law as well as in legal literature, it has been stated that full consistency is not needed. In SOU 1996:185 it has been argued that in each case, there needs to be a substantial equivalence.

In the paper it has further been noted that a distinction has to be made regarding the assessment of what and how much coverage that is required. To find out what needs to be covered an interpretation of the prerequisites, which are stated in the law, has to be made. It is hard to give a clear answer to the question regarding how much coverage is required, because the issue is rarely addressed in the legislative history or in the case law. 

There are some specific requirements that arise when the coverage of criminal intent is examined in relation to aiding and abetting. The trial has to be made in two stages. It is required that the aider´s criminal intent covers the aiding and abetting deed itself (to promote someone else's act by advice or deed) as well as the participation object ( the perpetrator's unlawful act). This paper has addressed the question regarding how concrete the aider's perception must be of the participation object. The answer has been sought by analyzing a number of cases where the issue came up for consideration. In the paper it has been noted that the general minimum level is low regarding how vague/unclear, the criminal intent can be without claiming there is relevant shortcomings regarding the coverage of criminal intent. In case law and legal literature it has been stated that it is not required that the aider has a detailed knowledge regarding the sequence of events that constitute the participation object. However, the aider's perception may not be so diffuse that his or hers intent do not cover the conditions of criminalization, stated in the provisions. The paper also tries to answer the question regarding how Swedish law handles differences between the perpetrator's action and the aider´s perception of the imagined participation object. The result that emerged after a study of the legislative history, legal literature and case law is that if the differences are too big, the aider's criminal intent can not be said to cover the participation object. It has also emerged that some importance must be given to the aider's subsequent behavior in order to determine whether the aider's intent covers the deviation or the exaggeration.

In the paper some issues, from a conformity- and guilt perspective, have been noted. It has been stated that if the aider has an overly vague notion of the participation object, he or she has not had the opportunity to comply with the law - which is contrary to the principle of conformity. Nor could he or she help acting as he or she did, which is contrary to the principle of guilt. The same applies if the perpetrator’s conduct deviates completely from the aider's initial conception of the planned events. If that is the case, the aider has not had the opportunity to comply with the law. If the aider however continues its involvement after the "new" participation object is clear to him or her, it is a different story. It has also been argued that some deviations from the principle of conformity can be justified by referring to the importance of effective prosecution.},
  author       = {Sköld, Ida},
  keyword      = {Straffrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Uppsåtstäckning vid medhjälp – Om täckningsprincipens tillämpning när ansvar för medhjälp aktualiseras},
  year         = {2015},
}