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Avtalsrekvisitets innebörd vid ensidiga ageranden – Med fokus på beviskravet samt rättsfrågor

Karlsson, Elias LU (2016) JURM02 20162
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Konkurrensen inom EU är reglerad genom konkurrensrätten i syfte att skapa och upprätthålla en effektiv marknad, den inre marknadens funktion samt välfärden för konsumenten. Förbudsregeln – se art. 101 FEUF och 2:1 KL – utgör tillsammans ett centralt verktyg som ska användas av kommissionen eller annan konkurrensmyndighet för att bryta upp otillåtna samarbeten mellan två eller fler företag, vilka är skadliga för de ovan nämnda syftena. Att tillämpa förbudsregeln förutsätter att kommissionen eller annan konkurrensmyndighet lyckas bevisa åberopade sakomständigheter som i första hand gör avtalsrekvisitet uppfyllt. Avtalsrekvisitet träffar samordningar, avtal och samordnat förfarande, mellan två eller fler företag som uppvisar en gemensam vilja... (More)
Konkurrensen inom EU är reglerad genom konkurrensrätten i syfte att skapa och upprätthålla en effektiv marknad, den inre marknadens funktion samt välfärden för konsumenten. Förbudsregeln – se art. 101 FEUF och 2:1 KL – utgör tillsammans ett centralt verktyg som ska användas av kommissionen eller annan konkurrensmyndighet för att bryta upp otillåtna samarbeten mellan två eller fler företag, vilka är skadliga för de ovan nämnda syftena. Att tillämpa förbudsregeln förutsätter att kommissionen eller annan konkurrensmyndighet lyckas bevisa åberopade sakomständigheter som i första hand gör avtalsrekvisitet uppfyllt. Avtalsrekvisitet träffar samordningar, avtal och samordnat förfarande, mellan två eller fler företag som uppvisar en gemensam vilja att agera tillsammans mot ett gemensamt ändamål, på den inre marknaden. Noterbart är att vissa utåt sett ensidiga ageranden i förlängningen definierats som enbart skenbara ensidiga ageranden, där avtalsrekvisitet i vissa fall anses vara uppfyllt.
Framställningens övergripande syfte är att skapa en mer förutsägbar tillämpning av 2:1 KL. För att uppnå syftet med framställningen analyseras beviskravet beträffande sakförhållanden vilka, om bevisade, uppfyller det abstrakta rättsfaktumet som är avtalsrekvisitet. Preciseringen sker primärt i förhållande till vissa typer av ensidiga ageranden. Vidare har framställningen ett fokus på att ringa in vilka ytterligare faktorer som bör påverka de svenska domstolarnas bedömning, när det handlar om ensidigt utlämnande av strategisk information samt ensidigt implementerade policys i ett selektivt distributionssystem. I det sammanhanget handlar det om att precisera vilka juridiska kriterier som åberopade och bevisade sakomständigheter måste ge uttryck för, i förhoppning om att uppfylla avtalsrekvisitet. Två viktiga frågor i sammanhanget är i vilken utsträckning EU-rätten bör påverka ett svenskt, nationellt, beviskrav samt om beviskravet är förutsägbart.
Principen om processuell autonomi medför att nivån på beviskravet, oaktat om det är Sveriges eller EU:s konkurrensrätt som tillämpas, primärt får finna vägledning från svensk rätt. Min uppfattning är att EU-rättsliga bedömningspunkter med fördel, och efter noggranna överväganden, bör beaktas av svenska domstolar. Framställningen konstaterar att bedömningspunkterna som bör påverka beviskravet i en strängare riktning är robusthetskravet, lagregelns funktion, konsekvensteorin och oskuldspresumtionen. De bedömningspunkter som bör påverka beviskravet i en mildare riktning är effektivitetsprincipen och lagregelns funktion. Beviskravet är enligt svensk praxis förhållandevis högt, vilket enligt egen uppfattning framstår som en rimlig formulering. Att tillämpa ett så pass relativt begrepp för att beskriva ett beviskrav förutsätter däremot att lagstiftaren eller rättstillämparen ensamt alternativt tillsammans utförligt går igenom vilka bedömningspunkter som påverkar beviskravet. En utförlig genomgång har inte gjorts vilket påverkar förutsägbarheten angående beviskravet negativt.
Vad beträffar ensidigt utlämnande av strategisk information blir presumtionen angående orsakssambandet – företagen presumeras ta hänsyn till utlämnade strategiska uppgifter – och ett parallellt beteende viktiga inslag i bedömningen. Vad beträffar ensidigt implementerade policys i ett selektivt distributionssystem blir den gemensamma viljan avgörande. Den styrks genom att kommissionen eller annan konkurrensmyndighet bevisar sakomständigheter som visar på förekomsten av dels en inbjudan att samarbeta och dels ett uttryckligt eller underförstått samtycke till denna inbjudan. Av vikt blir att fastslå huruvida ena aktören lämnat en inbjudan som accepterats av annan aktör eller om aktörerna delar en gemensam intention att agera tillsammans mot ett gemensamt ändamål.
Beviskravet för sakförhållandet som påstås uppfylla avtalsrekvisitet är i sin helhet och speciellt i förhållande till ensidiga ageranden oförutsägbart och kommer troligtvis förbli det. Det går inte göra en uttömmande lista angående vilka sakförhållande som uppfyller avtalsrekvisitet eller att precisera beviskravet till en nivå där aktörerna är fullt medvetna kring dess räckvidd. För att skapa en något större förutsägbarhet, för svensk del, angående det aktuella beviskravet hade antingen lagstiftaren eller rättstillämparen ensamt eller tillsammans på ett mer utförligt vis kunnat analysera de bedömningspunkter som påverkar beviskravet. Därutöver hade även domstolarna på ett tydligare sätt kunnat konstatera i vilken utsträckning som EU-rättsliga bedömningspunkter bör inverka på strängheten angående samma beviskrav. (Less)
Abstract
Competition within the European union is regulated through a system of competition rules, with the purpose of creating and maintaining an efficient market, the function of the inner market and the consumer welfare. The prohibition rule – see art. 101 TEUF and 2:1 KL – constitutes together an essential tool that ought to be used to break up unwarranted collaborations between two or more undertakings, which are harmful to the above-mentioned purposes. The applicability of the prohibition rule requires the commission or other competition authority to prove invoked facts of a case that initially shows that an agreement between two or more undertakings exists. In order fulfil the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite; the... (More)
Competition within the European union is regulated through a system of competition rules, with the purpose of creating and maintaining an efficient market, the function of the inner market and the consumer welfare. The prohibition rule – see art. 101 TEUF and 2:1 KL – constitutes together an essential tool that ought to be used to break up unwarranted collaborations between two or more undertakings, which are harmful to the above-mentioned purposes. The applicability of the prohibition rule requires the commission or other competition authority to prove invoked facts of a case that initially shows that an agreement between two or more undertakings exists. In order fulfil the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite; the authorities need to prove the existence of either an agreement or a concerted practice. The agreement requisite within the scope of competition catches collaborations between two or more undertakings that displays a concurrence of will to act together toward a common goal, on the inner market. Notable is that certain, seen outward, unilateral conduct can be defined as just seemingly unilateral, where an agreement in some cases can be established.
The more comprehensive goal with this essay is to create a more foreseeable application of 2:1 KL. To concretize the evidentiary requirement required regarding the facts of a case which, if being proved, establish an agreement or a concerted practice, especially regarding certain types of unilateral conduct, is a way to fulfil this essays more comprehensive goal. Therefore, the focus of this essay is to gather up all the aspects that is included and which affects the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite, but also to gather up all the factors that will affect the Swedish, national, courts when the case is about a unilateral disclosure of strategic information or a unilateral implemented policy in a selective distribution system. In this regard, it is about to precise what legal conditions that invoked and proved facts of a case need to consist of, in the hope of making the agreement requisite applicable. Two important questions arise in relation to this which is first to what extent EU-law should affect a Swedish, national, evidentiary requirement for the existence of an agreement and second if the evidentiary requirement, as seen today, is foreseeable.
The principle of procedural autonomy will affect the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite, no matter if Swedish or EU competition rules are applied. It will mean that procedural aspects regarding the evidentiary requirement will be guided and established mainly through Swedish law. EU-based aspects regarding an evidentiary requirement should with benefit, and after careful consideration, be considering by the Swedish courts in this sense. Therefore, this essay establishes on one hand that the function of the rule, consequence-theory and presumption of innocence are aspects that leads to an acutely evidentiary requirement in regards to the agreement requisite. Also, on the other hand, it is established that principle of effectiveness and the function of the rule can be used to lower the evidentiary requirement regarding the same requisite. In a sense, the evidentiary requirement needs to be well balanced, where above mentioned aspects need to be taken into consideration.
The evidentiary requirement for establishing an agreement or a concerted practice between two or more undertakings is set down in Swedish praxis as relatively high, which in my opinion makes sense. To use such a relative term for an evidentiary requirement presumes – on the other hand – that the legislator or the courts in detail goes through every aspect that influences the evidentiary requirement in question, which has not been done and which creates an unforeseeable evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite.
In relation to a unilateral disclosure of strategic information; the presumption of cause – the undertakings presume to take disclosed strategic information into consideration – and a parallel behaviour will be important aspects in the proceedings. In relation to a unilateral implemented policy in a selective distribution system the concurrence of will is central. The concurrence of will can be established by the commission or other competition authorities if they can prove an explicit or tacit consent. In this regard, it is essential to look whether an invitation from one party has been accepted by another, or if the parties share a common intention to act together toward a common goal.
The evidentiary requirement for the agreement requisite – regarding the mentioned unilateral conducts – is not foreseeable and will most likely stay that way. The commission or other competition authority cannot create an exhaustive list of conducts that fulfil the evidentiary requirement for the agreement requisite in this sense, or to define the evidentiary requirement to a level where undertakings are full aware of its range. To create a somewhat more foreseeable evidentiary requirement, for Sweden, the legislator together with the Swedish courts could in a more detailed manner analyse all the aspects affecting the agreement requisite. Also, pinpoint to what extent EU-based aspects should be respected in this regard. (Less)
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author
Karlsson, Elias LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM02 20162
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Konkurrensrätt, Förbudsregeln, Avtalsrekvisitet, Avtal, Samordnat förfarande, 2:1 KL, unilateral conduct, beviskrav
language
Swedish
id
8897182
date added to LUP
2017-01-18 12:39:22
date last changed
2017-01-18 12:39:22
@misc{8897182,
  abstract     = {Competition within the European union is regulated through a system of competition rules, with the purpose of creating and maintaining an efficient market, the function of the inner market and the consumer welfare. The prohibition rule – see art. 101 TEUF and 2:1 KL – constitutes together an essential tool that ought to be used to break up unwarranted collaborations between two or more undertakings, which are harmful to the above-mentioned purposes. The applicability of the prohibition rule requires the commission or other competition authority to prove invoked facts of a case that initially shows that an agreement between two or more undertakings exists. In order fulfil the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite; the authorities need to prove the existence of either an agreement or a concerted practice. The agreement requisite within the scope of competition catches collaborations between two or more undertakings that displays a concurrence of will to act together toward a common goal, on the inner market. Notable is that certain, seen outward, unilateral conduct can be defined as just seemingly unilateral, where an agreement in some cases can be established.
The more comprehensive goal with this essay is to create a more foreseeable application of 2:1 KL. To concretize the evidentiary requirement required regarding the facts of a case which, if being proved, establish an agreement or a concerted practice, especially regarding certain types of unilateral conduct, is a way to fulfil this essays more comprehensive goal. Therefore, the focus of this essay is to gather up all the aspects that is included and which affects the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite, but also to gather up all the factors that will affect the Swedish, national, courts when the case is about a unilateral disclosure of strategic information or a unilateral implemented policy in a selective distribution system. In this regard, it is about to precise what legal conditions that invoked and proved facts of a case need to consist of, in the hope of making the agreement requisite applicable. Two important questions arise in relation to this which is first to what extent EU-law should affect a Swedish, national, evidentiary requirement for the existence of an agreement and second if the evidentiary requirement, as seen today, is foreseeable.
The principle of procedural autonomy will affect the evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite, no matter if Swedish or EU competition rules are applied. It will mean that procedural aspects regarding the evidentiary requirement will be guided and established mainly through Swedish law. EU-based aspects regarding an evidentiary requirement should with benefit, and after careful consideration, be considering by the Swedish courts in this sense. Therefore, this essay establishes on one hand that the function of the rule, consequence-theory and presumption of innocence are aspects that leads to an acutely evidentiary requirement in regards to the agreement requisite. Also, on the other hand, it is established that principle of effectiveness and the function of the rule can be used to lower the evidentiary requirement regarding the same requisite. In a sense, the evidentiary requirement needs to be well balanced, where above mentioned aspects need to be taken into consideration. 
The evidentiary requirement for establishing an agreement or a concerted practice between two or more undertakings is set down in Swedish praxis as relatively high, which in my opinion makes sense. To use such a relative term for an evidentiary requirement presumes – on the other hand – that the legislator or the courts in detail goes through every aspect that influences the evidentiary requirement in question, which has not been done and which creates an unforeseeable evidentiary requirement regarding the agreement requisite.
In relation to a unilateral disclosure of strategic information; the presumption of cause – the undertakings presume to take disclosed strategic information into consideration – and a parallel behaviour will be important aspects in the proceedings. In relation to a unilateral implemented policy in a selective distribution system the concurrence of will is central. The concurrence of will can be established by the commission or other competition authorities if they can prove an explicit or tacit consent. In this regard, it is essential to look whether an invitation from one party has been accepted by another, or if the parties share a common intention to act together toward a common goal.
The evidentiary requirement for the agreement requisite – regarding the mentioned unilateral conducts – is not foreseeable and will most likely stay that way. The commission or other competition authority cannot create an exhaustive list of conducts that fulfil the evidentiary requirement for the agreement requisite in this sense, or to define the evidentiary requirement to a level where undertakings are full aware of its range. To create a somewhat more foreseeable evidentiary requirement, for Sweden, the legislator together with the Swedish courts could in a more detailed manner analyse all the aspects affecting the agreement requisite. Also, pinpoint to what extent EU-based aspects should be respected in this regard.},
  author       = {Karlsson, Elias},
  keyword      = {Konkurrensrätt,Förbudsregeln,Avtalsrekvisitet,Avtal,Samordnat förfarande,2:1 KL,unilateral conduct,beviskrav},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Avtalsrekvisitets innebörd vid ensidiga ageranden – Med fokus på beviskravet samt rättsfrågor},
  year         = {2016},
}