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Resning till förmån för den tilltalade - med tilläggsregeln i främsta fokus. - ”vad den oskyldigt dömde söker är icke nåd utan rättvisa”

Ghavamnejad, Arash LU (2016) LAGF03 20162
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Det kan sägas att extraordinära rättsmedel och dess resningsregler i dagens rättegångsbalk 58 kap. härstammar från konungens förmånsrätt att bryta domar under 1100-talets högmedeltid. Begreppet rättskraft och behovet av att angripa lagakraftvunna domar slog inte igenom förrän i slutet av 1600-talet. Dåvarande regler tillämpades formellt inte vid brottmål, men kom ändå att i praktiken att göra det. Att bryta frikännande domar i syfte att åtala den tilltalade på nytt var av större intresse än att få den oskyldigt dömde till upprättelse. Inte förrän under 1900-talet blev intresset för den oskyldigt dömde större. Istället för den dåvarande hämndinspirerade lagtillämpningen ville man nu hellre fria än fälla i syfte att minimera risken att ha... (More)
Det kan sägas att extraordinära rättsmedel och dess resningsregler i dagens rättegångsbalk 58 kap. härstammar från konungens förmånsrätt att bryta domar under 1100-talets högmedeltid. Begreppet rättskraft och behovet av att angripa lagakraftvunna domar slog inte igenom förrän i slutet av 1600-talet. Dåvarande regler tillämpades formellt inte vid brottmål, men kom ändå att i praktiken att göra det. Att bryta frikännande domar i syfte att åtala den tilltalade på nytt var av större intresse än att få den oskyldigt dömde till upprättelse. Inte förrän under 1900-talet blev intresset för den oskyldigt dömde större. Istället för den dåvarande hämndinspirerade lagtillämpningen ville man nu hellre fria än fälla i syfte att minimera risken att ha oskyldigt dömda i sina fängelser. Resningsreglerna är idag en framgång av statens påbörjade lagstiftningsarbete under 1920-talet och avslutade processlagsberedning i slutet av 1930-talet med en ny rättegångsbalk innehållande bland annat resningsregler. Förarbetet har satt ramarna för det som praktiskt verksamma jurister skulle utveckla för framtiden. Enligt den juridiska litteraturen är dagens resningsregler ett resultat av två motstående intressen, nämligen orubblighetsprincipen och sanningsprincipen. Utgångspunkten är alltså att rättskraftvunna domstolsdomar inte ska kunna ändras och därmed stå fast om inte sanningen, dvs. statens önskan om att producera materiellt riktiga domar, måste tillgodoses på grund av att rättegången på ordinär väg varit otillräcklig för säkerställandet av den rättssäkerhetsgarantin som lagstiftaren tidigt ställt. De huvudsakliga och uppsatsaktuella materiella resningsgrunderna berör nya omständigheter och bevis som på något vis ska medföra att tvivel av olika grader uppkommer angående den tidigare domens riktighet, se 58 kap. 2 § 4 p första led, jfr 1 § 3 p och 3 § 2 p RB. I första hand förutsätts för resning till förmån för den tilltalade att det nya bevismaterialet är av sådan styrka att det går att konstatera att eventuella existensen av materialet på ordinär väg sannolikt skulle ha lett till en frikännande dom eller att brottet skulle hänföras under en mildare straffbestämmelse, den s.k. huvudregeln. Till den dömdes förmån kom resningsmöjligheten att ytterligare utbredas till skillnad från resning i tvistemål och resning till nackdel för den tilltalade. Resning till förmån för den tilltalade skulle nämligen bli möjlig redan av att upptäckten och åberopandet av nya omständigheter eller bevis till följd av vad som i övrigt förekom i målet framkallade tvivelsmål om den tilltalades skuld till brottet, den s.k. tilläggsregeln. Den svåra tanken av att en oskyldig person eventuellt kunde sitta i fängelse gjorde att det för resning i dessa mål inte räckte med att utgången sannolikt hade blivit en annan i målet. Det fanns således ett behov av att möjliggöra resning vid en lägre sannolikhetsgrad. Rättssäkerheten har därmed ansetts viktigare för den dömde än i andra resningsprocesser. Därmed har tilliten och förtroendet för domstolsväsendets avgörande domar ytterligare upprätthållits. Tilläggsregeln bör tillämpas restriktivt och enligt förarbetena är regelns tillämpning särskilt intressant vid grövre brottmål. På senare år har regeln dock visat sig tillämpas i större utsträckning än vad lagstiftaren tänkt sig och även mer än huvudregeln. Möjligen har detta att göra med att resningsinstansen har en mer liberal inställning till resning idag, men likväl medför detta att lagstiftarens vilja inte följts i praktiken. Dessutom är reglernas rekvisit svåruträknade i förhållande till det enskilda fallet, vilket i och för sig har att göra med att resningsinstansen gör en egen bedömning i varje enskild resningsansökan. I både domstolspraxis och juridisk litteratur har rekvisiten i tilläggsregeln utforskats och sammansatt, och utgångspunkten för resning enligt tilläggsregeln är att det föreligger särskilda omständigheter som i ljuset av nya omständigheter och bevis som åtminstone går at ta hänsyn till, framkallar tvivelsmål och därmed synnerliga skäl att på nytt pröva skuldfrågan på ordinär väg. (Less)
Abstract
One can say that the extraordinary remedies and their rules regarding the relief for a substantive defect in today’s Code of Civil Procedure (Section 58) originate in the king’s preferential right to annulate court decisions during the late middle ages in the 1100s. The concept of legal force and the need to impugn court decisions that have taken legal effect was not noticed before the end of the 1600s. The rules of that time did not formally apply to criminal cases, but they did anyway in practice. There was greater interest to impugn acquittals with the aim to prosecute the defendant than to get redress for the innocently convicted. The interest for the innocently convicted did not increase before the 1900s. Instead of the... (More)
One can say that the extraordinary remedies and their rules regarding the relief for a substantive defect in today’s Code of Civil Procedure (Section 58) originate in the king’s preferential right to annulate court decisions during the late middle ages in the 1100s. The concept of legal force and the need to impugn court decisions that have taken legal effect was not noticed before the end of the 1600s. The rules of that time did not formally apply to criminal cases, but they did anyway in practice. There was greater interest to impugn acquittals with the aim to prosecute the defendant than to get redress for the innocently convicted. The interest for the innocently convicted did not increase before the 1900s. Instead of the revenge-inspired adjudication process of that time, now one would rather acquit than convict, with the aim to minimize the risk of having innocents convicted in prisons. The rules for relief for a substantive defect are today a success of the state’s legislative process, started during the 1920s. The drafting of the procedural law concluded in the end of the 1930s with a new Code of Civil Procedure, including inter alia rules for relief for a substantive defect. The legislative history has set the framework for what the litigation lawyers would evolve in the future. According to doctrine, today’s rules for relief for a substantive defect are the result of two opposing interests, more specifically the principle of firmness and principle of truth. Thus, the starting point is that all the court decisions that have taken legal effect will not be able to be changed and consequently will be upheld, unless the truth, i.e. the state’s wish to generate substantially correct judgments, has to be satisfied, on the ground of the process, during the ordinary course of events, was insufficient to ensure the procedural guarantees set by the legislator. The main and relevant for this essay substantive grounds for relief for a substantive defect concern new circumstances and evidence, that in a way will result in various degrees of doubt occurring, regarding the correctness of the earlier decision (Section 58 par. 2 p. 4 first part, cf. par. 1 p. 3 and par. 3 p. 2 CCP). On one hand, it is required for relief for a substantive defect in favour of the accused that the new evidence is of such gravity that it can be established the potential existence of the material during the ordinary course of events would likely have led to an acquittal or that the crime would fall under a more lenient provision, the so called principal rule. Possibilities for relief for a substantive defect in favour of the convicted were increased further, unlike similar relief in civil cases and to the detriment of the accused. Namely, relief for a substantive defect in favour of the accused would be possible as early as the discovery and invocation of new circumstances or evidence due to what otherwise occurred in the case induced doubt regarding the accused’s guilt of the crime, the so called additional rule. The uncomfortable thought that an innocent could potentially be imprisoned led to the likelihood of another result in the case was insufficient. There was, therefore, a need to enable relief for a substantive defect even for a lower degree of likelihood. Consequently, the rule of law has been considered to be more important for the convicted than in other relief procedures. Thereby, the trust and confidence for the decisive judgments of the judicial system has been maintained. The additional rule should be applied restrictively and, according to the legislative history, the rule’s application is especially interesting in more serious criminal cases. In the later years, however, the rule has been applied in greater extent than what the legislator had envisioned, even more than the principal rule. This may be because the highest instance court has a more liberal approach to the measure of relief for a substantive defect today, nevertheless this entails that the legislator’s intent is not followed in practice. In addition, it is difficult to calculate the rules’ preconditions in each case, which has to do with the fact that the highest instance courts do an individual assessment in each petition. In both the jurisprudence and the doctrine, the prerequisites for the additional rule have been researched and compounded, and the starting point for relief for a substantive defect according to the additional rule is that there are special circumstances which, in the light of new circumstances and evidence that it is at least possible to consider, induce doubt and thereby exceptional reasons to try the question of guilt again under the ordinary procedure. (Less)
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author
Ghavamnejad, Arash LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20162
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
straffrätt, resning, tilläggsregeln
language
Swedish
id
8897455
date added to LUP
2017-02-08 11:30:17
date last changed
2017-02-08 11:30:17
@misc{8897455,
  abstract     = {One can say that the extraordinary remedies and their rules regarding the relief for a substantive defect in today’s Code of Civil Procedure (Section 58) originate in the king’s preferential right to annulate court decisions during the late middle ages in the 1100s. The concept of legal force and the need to impugn court decisions that have taken legal effect was not noticed before the end of the 1600s. The rules of that time did not formally apply to criminal cases, but they did anyway in practice. There was greater interest to impugn acquittals with the aim to prosecute the defendant than to get redress for the innocently convicted. The interest for the innocently convicted did not increase before the 1900s. Instead of the revenge-inspired adjudication process of that time, now one would rather acquit than convict, with the aim to minimize the risk of having innocents convicted in prisons. The rules for relief for a substantive defect are today a success of the state’s legislative process, started during the 1920s. The drafting of the procedural law concluded in the end of the 1930s with a new Code of Civil Procedure, including inter alia rules for relief for a substantive defect. The legislative history has set the framework for what the litigation lawyers would evolve in the future. According to doctrine, today’s rules for relief for a substantive defect are the result of two opposing interests, more specifically the principle of firmness and principle of truth. Thus, the starting point is that all the court decisions that have taken legal effect will not be able to be changed and consequently will be upheld, unless the truth, i.e. the state’s wish to generate substantially correct judgments, has to be satisfied, on the ground of the process, during the ordinary course of events, was insufficient to ensure the procedural guarantees set by the legislator. The main and relevant for this essay substantive grounds for relief for a substantive defect concern new circumstances and evidence, that in a way will result in various degrees of doubt occurring, regarding the correctness of the earlier decision (Section 58 par. 2 p. 4 first part, cf. par. 1 p. 3 and par. 3 p. 2 CCP). On one hand, it is required for relief for a substantive defect in favour of the accused that the new evidence is of such gravity that it can be established the potential existence of the material during the ordinary course of events would likely have led to an acquittal or that the crime would fall under a more lenient provision, the so called principal rule. Possibilities for relief for a substantive defect in favour of the convicted were increased further, unlike similar relief in civil cases and to the detriment of the accused. Namely, relief for a substantive defect in favour of the accused would be possible as early as the discovery and invocation of new circumstances or evidence due to what otherwise occurred in the case induced doubt regarding the accused’s guilt of the crime, the so called additional rule. The uncomfortable thought that an innocent could potentially be imprisoned led to the likelihood of another result in the case was insufficient. There was, therefore, a need to enable relief for a substantive defect even for a lower degree of likelihood. Consequently, the rule of law has been considered to be more important for the convicted than in other relief procedures. Thereby, the trust and confidence for the decisive judgments of the judicial system has been maintained. The additional rule should be applied restrictively and, according to the legislative history, the rule’s application is especially interesting in more serious criminal cases. In the later years, however, the rule has been applied in greater extent than what the legislator had envisioned, even more than the principal rule. This may be because the highest instance court has a more liberal approach to the measure of relief for a substantive defect today, nevertheless this entails that the legislator’s intent is not followed in practice. In addition, it is difficult to calculate the rules’ preconditions in each case, which has to do with the fact that the highest instance courts do an individual assessment in each petition. In both the jurisprudence and the doctrine, the prerequisites for the additional rule have been researched and compounded, and the starting point for relief for a substantive defect according to the additional rule is that there are special circumstances which, in the light of new circumstances and evidence that it is at least possible to consider, induce doubt and thereby exceptional reasons to try the question of guilt again under the ordinary procedure.},
  author       = {Ghavamnejad, Arash},
  keyword      = {straffrätt,resning,tilläggsregeln},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Resning till förmån för den tilltalade - med tilläggsregeln i främsta fokus. - ”vad den oskyldigt dömde söker är icke nåd utan rättvisa”},
  year         = {2016},
}