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Det var inte jag, det var min robot! - En kartläggning av det skadeståndsrättsliga behovet av en elektronisk personlighet samt en analys av dess potentiella civilrättsliga konsekvenser

Hellewig, Lisa LU (2018) JURM02 20181
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
The past few years a new type of advanced robots have developed that possess a high degree of technical autonomy. Because of the developments in artificial intelligence they can make autonomous decisions and act independently in new environments. When that kind of smart robots cause damage, existing liability rules cover damage that can be traced back to a human agent. According to the European Parliament resolution on civil law rules in robotics the current rules on liability will not suffice to give rise to liability for damages caused by such smart robots. An electronic personality is presented as a way to regulate liability. That would entail that smart robots, like natural persons and legal persons, are recognised as persons in law.... (More)
The past few years a new type of advanced robots have developed that possess a high degree of technical autonomy. Because of the developments in artificial intelligence they can make autonomous decisions and act independently in new environments. When that kind of smart robots cause damage, existing liability rules cover damage that can be traced back to a human agent. According to the European Parliament resolution on civil law rules in robotics the current rules on liability will not suffice to give rise to liability for damages caused by such smart robots. An electronic personality is presented as a way to regulate liability. That would entail that smart robots, like natural persons and legal persons, are recognised as persons in law. Thereby they can be held liable for damages they may cause.

With Swedish law as point of departure, the purpose of this thesis is to critically investigate the need of an electronic personality from a tort law perspective and to analyse its consequences for civil law. By using a legal dogmatic method and a critical perspective, I find the current liability laws to be enough to give rise to legal liability for damage caused by smart robots. A producer is strictly liable for damage that is caused by a defective robot. The producer’s liability for defective products is not affected by the fact that the product in question is a robot. If the damage is dependent on the behaviour of the robot rather than a defect, liability is based on negligence. Several human agents can be held liable according to the general rule of negligence based liability, even when the robot autonomously causes damage. By prescribing a strict liability or a vicarious liability for the owner of the robot it is possible to increase the responsibility of the owner. By examining the arguments regarding why an electronic personality would be a better way to handle tortuous liability compared to the current view of robots as objects, I discover that there is no need of an electronic personality. The thesis also shows that the consequences for civil law in general would be comprehensive if we were to introduce an electronic personality. Not only for tort law, but also for contract law. Even if an electronic person would aim at solving a problem in liability law I find it probable that it would create new problems in other areas of the law. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
De senaste åren har en ny typ av avancerade robotar utvecklats som har en hög grad av teknisk autonomi. Tack vare artificiell intelligens kan de fatta självständiga beslut och självständigt verka i nya miljöer. För att skadeståndsansvar ska uppkomma då en sådan smart robot orsakar skada måste skadan kunna hänföras till en mänsklig aktör. Enligt Europaparlamentets resolution om civilrättsliga bestämmelser om robotteknik är gällande skadeståndsrättsliga regelverk otillräckliga eftersom de inte omfattar skador som orsakas av smarta robotar. En elektronisk personlighet framförs som ett sätt att reglera skadeståndsansvaret på. Det skulle innebära att robotar jämte fysiska och juridiska personer erkänns som rättssubjekt och därmed själva kan... (More)
De senaste åren har en ny typ av avancerade robotar utvecklats som har en hög grad av teknisk autonomi. Tack vare artificiell intelligens kan de fatta självständiga beslut och självständigt verka i nya miljöer. För att skadeståndsansvar ska uppkomma då en sådan smart robot orsakar skada måste skadan kunna hänföras till en mänsklig aktör. Enligt Europaparlamentets resolution om civilrättsliga bestämmelser om robotteknik är gällande skadeståndsrättsliga regelverk otillräckliga eftersom de inte omfattar skador som orsakas av smarta robotar. En elektronisk personlighet framförs som ett sätt att reglera skadeståndsansvaret på. Det skulle innebära att robotar jämte fysiska och juridiska personer erkänns som rättssubjekt och därmed själva kan hållas civilrättsligt ansvariga för skada de orsakar.

Uppsatsen syftar till att – med utgångspunkt ur svensk rätt – kritiskt utreda det utomobligatoriska skadeståndsrättsliga behovet av en elektronisk personlighet samt analysera dess tänkbara civilrättsliga konsekvenser. Med hjälp av den rättsdogmatiska metoden och ett kritiskt perspektiv finner jag att det civilrättsliga skyddet är tillräckligt då en smart robot orsakar skada. En tillverkare kan hållas strikt ansvarig för skada som en smart robot orsakar p.g.a. en säkerhetsbrist. Tillverkarens produktansvar påverkas inte av det faktum att produkten i fråga är en smart robot. Om skadan enbart är hänförlig till robotens beteende regleras skadeståndsansvaret av den allmänna culparegeln. Ansvar enligt culparegeln kan uppkomma för ett flertal olika aktörer, även då roboten helt självständigt orsakar skada. Skadeståndsansvaret kan skärpas genom att införa ett rent strikt ansvar, alternativt ett principalansvar för robotens ägare. Genom att undersöka vilka argument som har lagts fram för att en elektronisk personlighet skulle vara ett bättre sätt att reglera skadeståndsansvaret på jämfört med nuvarande ordning kommer jag fram till att det inte finns något skadeståndsrättsligt behov av en elektronisk person. Uppsatsen visar också att de civilrättsliga konsekvenserna av att införa en elektronisk personlighet skulle bli omfattande, inte bara på skadeståndsrättens område utan också ur ett avtalsrättsligt perspektiv. Även om en elektronisk person skulle syfta till att lösa ett skadeståndsrättsligt problem finner jag att en elektronisk person sannolikt skulle skapa nya problem på andra (rätts) områden. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Hellewig, Lisa LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
It wasn't me, it was my robot! - A survey of the of the need of an electronic personality from a tort law perspective and its potential impact on civil law
course
JURM02 20181
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
skadeståndsrätt, civilrätt
language
Swedish
id
8940902
date added to LUP
2018-06-08 10:14:39
date last changed
2018-06-08 10:14:39
@misc{8940902,
  abstract     = {The past few years a new type of advanced robots have developed that possess a high degree of technical autonomy. Because of the developments in artificial intelligence they can make autonomous decisions and act independently in new environments. When that kind of smart robots cause damage, existing liability rules cover damage that can be traced back to a human agent. According to the European Parliament resolution on civil law rules in robotics the current rules on liability will not suffice to give rise to liability for damages caused by such smart robots. An electronic personality is presented as a way to regulate liability. That would entail that smart robots, like natural persons and legal persons, are recognised as persons in law. Thereby they can be held liable for damages they may cause. 

With Swedish law as point of departure, the purpose of this thesis is to critically investigate the need of an electronic personality from a tort law perspective and to analyse its consequences for civil law. By using a legal dogmatic method and a critical perspective, I find the current liability laws to be enough to give rise to legal liability for damage caused by smart robots. A producer is strictly liable for damage that is caused by a defective robot. The producer’s liability for defective products is not affected by the fact that the product in question is a robot. If the damage is dependent on the behaviour of the robot rather than a defect, liability is based on negligence. Several human agents can be held liable according to the general rule of negligence based liability, even when the robot autonomously causes damage. By prescribing a strict liability or a vicarious liability for the owner of the robot it is possible to increase the responsibility of the owner. By examining the arguments regarding why an electronic personality would be a better way to handle tortuous liability compared to the current view of robots as objects, I discover that there is no need of an electronic personality. The thesis also shows that the consequences for civil law in general would be comprehensive if we were to introduce an electronic personality. Not only for tort law, but also for contract law. Even if an electronic person would aim at solving a problem in liability law I find it probable that it would create new problems in other areas of the law.},
  author       = {Hellewig, Lisa},
  keyword      = {skadeståndsrätt,civilrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Det var inte jag, det var min robot! - En kartläggning av det skadeståndsrättsliga behovet av en elektronisk personlighet samt en analys av dess potentiella civilrättsliga konsekvenser},
  year         = {2018},
}