Skatteflykt som rättfärdigandegrund inom EU-rätten - En studie om i vilken utsträckning skatteflykt kunnat åberopas som rättfärdigandegrund för att inskränka den fria etableringsrätten
(2018) LAGF03 20182Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- I denna uppsats undersökte jag i vilken utsträckning skatteflykt har kunnat användas som en rättfärdigandegrund av en medlemsstat för att med framgång inskränka den fria etableringsrätten inom Europeiska unionen.
I uppsatsen behandlades totalt nio rättsfall som bidrog till att besvara min frågeställning och förtydliga rättsläget. De fyra första (Marks & Spencer, Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap Group Litigation och Felixstowe Dock m.fl.) utgjorde själva grunden för min undersökning då dessa beslutades av EU-domstolens stora avdelning och därmed fick anses vara mer auktoritativa. Eftersom dessa rättsfall är cirka 15 år gamla använde jag mig av ytterligare tre rättsfall som visserligen hade beslutats i en av domstolens “vanliga” avdelningar... (More) - I denna uppsats undersökte jag i vilken utsträckning skatteflykt har kunnat användas som en rättfärdigandegrund av en medlemsstat för att med framgång inskränka den fria etableringsrätten inom Europeiska unionen.
I uppsatsen behandlades totalt nio rättsfall som bidrog till att besvara min frågeställning och förtydliga rättsläget. De fyra första (Marks & Spencer, Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap Group Litigation och Felixstowe Dock m.fl.) utgjorde själva grunden för min undersökning då dessa beslutades av EU-domstolens stora avdelning och därmed fick anses vara mer auktoritativa. Eftersom dessa rättsfall är cirka 15 år gamla använde jag mig av ytterligare tre rättsfall som visserligen hade beslutats i en av domstolens “vanliga” avdelningar men som samtidigt beslutats senare än de tre första och därför bättre bidrar till att belysa hur rättsläget ser ut i dag. Slutligen använde jag mig av två rättsfall till som på ett förtjänstfullt sätt förklarade EU-rättens krav på att nationell lagstiftning är förutsebar.
Beträffande när skatteflykt ensamt kan användas som en rättfärdigande omständighet för att inskränka den fria etableringsrätten förklarades detta i Cadbury Schweppes. För att ett rent fiktivt upplägg ska anses föreligga måste såväl subjektiva som objektiva element vara uppfyllda och först då kan skatteflykt som ensam rättfärdigandegrund rättfärdiga en inskränkning. Detta framgår även tydligt av senare rättspraxis, se exempelvis Felixstowe Dock m.fl. och C-398/16.
När det däremot gäller om flera rättfärdigandegrunder åberopas kan detta, trots att ett rent fiktivt upplägg inte föreligger, vara tillräckligt vid en sammanvägd bedömning för att EU-domstolen ska anse att hindret är rättfärdigat. Detta klargjordes i Marks & Spencer och Thin Cap Group Litigation där flera rättfärdigandegrunder tillsammans gjorde en inskränkning tillåten. Det finns dock andra rättsfall där EU-domstolen inte godtagit flera åberopade rättfärdigandegrunder tillsammans, se till exempel Felixstowe Dock m.fl. och Deister Holding. En stor brist, som jag påpekar i min analys, är att domstolen sällan motiverar tillräckligt tydligt varför rättfärdigandegrunderna inte var tillräckliga i vissa fall medan de i andra fall var godtagbara. (Less) - Abstract
- In this essay I was analysing to what extent tax avoidance can be used by a member state as a ground of justification to restrict the freedom of establishment in the European Union.
In the essay nine court cases in total were examined. These contributed to answer my question and clarify the matter I analysed in my essay. The first four (Marks & Spencer, Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap Group Litigation and Felixstowe Dock) constitutes the very fundament of my analysis, as these were dealt by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Thus, they are considered more authoritative. Since they are approximately 15 years old I used an additional three cases that were decided more recently. Although these were dealt by one... (More) - In this essay I was analysing to what extent tax avoidance can be used by a member state as a ground of justification to restrict the freedom of establishment in the European Union.
In the essay nine court cases in total were examined. These contributed to answer my question and clarify the matter I analysed in my essay. The first four (Marks & Spencer, Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap Group Litigation and Felixstowe Dock) constitutes the very fundament of my analysis, as these were dealt by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Thus, they are considered more authoritative. Since they are approximately 15 years old I used an additional three cases that were decided more recently. Although these were dealt by one of the court´s “usual” chambers, I believe they contribute to explaining the matter that I have analysed. Finally, I used another two cases which in a meritorious way explained what requirements the EU law have on national legislation regarding its predictability.
Concerning when tax avoidance can be used as the sole ground of justification to restrict the freedom of establishment, this was explained in Cadbury Schweppes. In order for a wholly artificial arrangement to be considered to exist both subjective and objective elements must occur. Only then can tax avoidance be used as the sole ground of justification to justify a restriction. This is evident from recent case law, see for example Felixstowe Dock and C-398/16.
Regarding if several grounds of justification are invoked, although a wholly artificial arrangement does not occur, the justifications can be considered sufficient in an overall evaluation by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This was clarified in Marks & Spencer and Thin Cap Group Litigation where several grounds of justification together made a restriction acceptable. However, there are examples of cases where the court has not accepted several grounds of justification in an overall evaluation, see for example Felixstowe Dock and Deister Holding. As I have observed in my analysis, the court rarely explains why the grounds of justification were acceptable in some cases while in other cases they were not. This inconsistency is something I consider to be lacking on their side. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8965480
- author
- Andersson, Adrian LU
- supervisor
-
- Jacob Öberg LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20182
- year
- 2018
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- skatterätt, skatteflykt, fri etableringsrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 8965480
- date added to LUP
- 2019-03-10 13:50:54
- date last changed
- 2019-03-10 13:50:54
@misc{8965480,
abstract = {{In this essay I was analysing to what extent tax avoidance can be used by a member state as a ground of justification to restrict the freedom of establishment in the European Union.
In the essay nine court cases in total were examined. These contributed to answer my question and clarify the matter I analysed in my essay. The first four (Marks & Spencer, Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap Group Litigation and Felixstowe Dock) constitutes the very fundament of my analysis, as these were dealt by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Thus, they are considered more authoritative. Since they are approximately 15 years old I used an additional three cases that were decided more recently. Although these were dealt by one of the court´s “usual” chambers, I believe they contribute to explaining the matter that I have analysed. Finally, I used another two cases which in a meritorious way explained what requirements the EU law have on national legislation regarding its predictability.
Concerning when tax avoidance can be used as the sole ground of justification to restrict the freedom of establishment, this was explained in Cadbury Schweppes. In order for a wholly artificial arrangement to be considered to exist both subjective and objective elements must occur. Only then can tax avoidance be used as the sole ground of justification to justify a restriction. This is evident from recent case law, see for example Felixstowe Dock and C-398/16.
Regarding if several grounds of justification are invoked, although a wholly artificial arrangement does not occur, the justifications can be considered sufficient in an overall evaluation by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This was clarified in Marks & Spencer and Thin Cap Group Litigation where several grounds of justification together made a restriction acceptable. However, there are examples of cases where the court has not accepted several grounds of justification in an overall evaluation, see for example Felixstowe Dock and Deister Holding. As I have observed in my analysis, the court rarely explains why the grounds of justification were acceptable in some cases while in other cases they were not. This inconsistency is something I consider to be lacking on their side.}},
author = {{Andersson, Adrian}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Skatteflykt som rättfärdigandegrund inom EU-rätten - En studie om i vilken utsträckning skatteflykt kunnat åberopas som rättfärdigandegrund för att inskränka den fria etableringsrätten}},
year = {{2018}},
}