Why the Exclusion Problem Still Seems Intractable for the Counterfactual Compatibilist
(2020) FTEM02 20172Theoretical Philosophy
- Abstract
- The exclusion problem has been a longstanding problem for the property dualist. The Compatibilist solution is to deny overdetermination, and thus they say we may preserve both mental and physical efficacy. However, in my paper I wish to show why the Compatibilist solution has not secured a materialist position. She has not established how supervenient properties are grounded in physicalism.
- Popular Abstract
- The mind has been considered mysterious to science and something qualitatively different from the physical brain. The puzzle has been to understand its place in the physical world. The exclusion problem forces us to choose between the mind being a causal power on its own (dualism), having no causal power (eliminativism and epiphenomenalism), or that the mind just is the brain (reductionsim), and therefore causal. The choice we make affects our metaphysics and ontology, what things there really are in the world. How then, is the minds efficacy best explained if we want to remain physicalist? In this paper I argue that the mind and the brain as separate properties cannot both have causal powers; at least the Comapatibilist's solution has not... (More)
- The mind has been considered mysterious to science and something qualitatively different from the physical brain. The puzzle has been to understand its place in the physical world. The exclusion problem forces us to choose between the mind being a causal power on its own (dualism), having no causal power (eliminativism and epiphenomenalism), or that the mind just is the brain (reductionsim), and therefore causal. The choice we make affects our metaphysics and ontology, what things there really are in the world. How then, is the minds efficacy best explained if we want to remain physicalist? In this paper I argue that the mind and the brain as separate properties cannot both have causal powers; at least the Comapatibilist's solution has not shown that it is the case. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9024231
- author
- Tsapos, Melina LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- FTEM02 20172
- year
- 2020
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Philosophy of mind, metaphysics, dualism, property dualism, compatibilism, counterfactual compatibilist, materialsim, physicalism, the exclusion problem, materialism, consciousness, supervenience, reductionism.
- language
- English
- id
- 9024231
- date added to LUP
- 2020-11-26 13:39:22
- date last changed
- 2020-11-26 13:39:22
@misc{9024231, abstract = {{The exclusion problem has been a longstanding problem for the property dualist. The Compatibilist solution is to deny overdetermination, and thus they say we may preserve both mental and physical efficacy. However, in my paper I wish to show why the Compatibilist solution has not secured a materialist position. She has not established how supervenient properties are grounded in physicalism.}}, author = {{Tsapos, Melina}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Why the Exclusion Problem Still Seems Intractable for the Counterfactual Compatibilist}}, year = {{2020}}, }