Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Quadratic Voting and Heterogeneous Beliefs

Arbman Hansing, Anton LU (2020) NEKH01 20201
Department of Economics
Abstract
Quadratic voting has been proposed as a voting procedure that aggregates preferences in a near-utilitarian way. A voter’s optimal strategy is, however, not solely a function of her preferences, but also of her beliefs about how others will vote. This thesis presents a formal model of quadratic voting that, unlike previous models, allows for heterogeneity in the beliefs of voters. The specification is then used to answer two questions about the relationship between beliefs and voting outcomes. Firstly, how does heterogeneity in beliefs impact election outcomes? Secondly, what incentives do individual voters have to acquire information about how others will vote? Results suggest that heterogeneity in beliefs leads election outcomes to... (More)
Quadratic voting has been proposed as a voting procedure that aggregates preferences in a near-utilitarian way. A voter’s optimal strategy is, however, not solely a function of her preferences, but also of her beliefs about how others will vote. This thesis presents a formal model of quadratic voting that, unlike previous models, allows for heterogeneity in the beliefs of voters. The specification is then used to answer two questions about the relationship between beliefs and voting outcomes. Firstly, how does heterogeneity in beliefs impact election outcomes? Secondly, what incentives do individual voters have to acquire information about how others will vote? Results suggest that heterogeneity in beliefs leads election outcomes to represent preferences only noisily. As long as preferences and beliefs are independently distributed, the detrimental effects on efficiency decline as the number of voters grows large. If beliefs and preferences are correlated, however, heterogeneous beliefs may lead to outcomes that are systematically inefficient. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Arbman Hansing, Anton LU
supervisor
organization
course
NEKH01 20201
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
social choice, market design, strategic voting, beliefs, value of information
language
English
id
9028639
date added to LUP
2021-01-19 15:21:34
date last changed
2021-01-19 15:21:34
@misc{9028639,
  abstract     = {{Quadratic voting has been proposed as a voting procedure that aggregates preferences in a near-utilitarian way. A voter’s optimal strategy is, however, not solely a function of her preferences, but also of her beliefs about how others will vote. This thesis presents a formal model of quadratic voting that, unlike previous models, allows for heterogeneity in the beliefs of voters. The specification is then used to answer two questions about the relationship between beliefs and voting outcomes. Firstly, how does heterogeneity in beliefs impact election outcomes? Secondly, what incentives do individual voters have to acquire information about how others will vote? Results suggest that heterogeneity in beliefs leads election outcomes to represent preferences only noisily. As long as preferences and beliefs are independently distributed, the detrimental effects on efficiency decline as the number of voters grows large. If beliefs and preferences are correlated, however, heterogeneous beliefs may lead to outcomes that are systematically inefficient.}},
  author       = {{Arbman Hansing, Anton}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Quadratic Voting and Heterogeneous Beliefs}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}