Introspective equilibrium for coordination games with changing group size
(2021) NEKN01 20201Department of Economics
- Abstract
- In the laboratory, minimum-effort coordination games routinely reach low levels for larger group sizes. Weber (2006 American Economic Review) showed that by simply starting with a small group and adding players that are exposed to the group’s history over time, one can “grow” larger groups with high effort levels. Adapting the concept of introspective equilibrium, I create a model to replicate the findings of minimum-effort games with growing player counts. While remaining simple and flexible for further extensions it manages to explain almost all findings of previous growth experiments.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9035474
- author
- Bartuseck, Lukas LU
- supervisor
-
- Erik Mohlin LU
- organization
- course
- NEKN01 20201
- year
- 2021
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- coordination game, minimum effort, weakest-link, introspective equilibrium
- language
- English
- id
- 9035474
- date added to LUP
- 2021-01-27 15:57:19
- date last changed
- 2021-01-27 15:57:19
@misc{9035474, abstract = {{In the laboratory, minimum-effort coordination games routinely reach low levels for larger group sizes. Weber (2006 American Economic Review) showed that by simply starting with a small group and adding players that are exposed to the group’s history over time, one can “grow” larger groups with high effort levels. Adapting the concept of introspective equilibrium, I create a model to replicate the findings of minimum-effort games with growing player counts. While remaining simple and flexible for further extensions it manages to explain almost all findings of previous growth experiments.}}, author = {{Bartuseck, Lukas}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Introspective equilibrium for coordination games with changing group size}}, year = {{2021}}, }