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Introspective equilibrium for coordination games with changing group size

Bartuseck, Lukas LU (2021) NEKN01 20201
Department of Economics
Abstract
In the laboratory, minimum-effort coordination games routinely reach low levels for larger group sizes. Weber (2006 American Economic Review) showed that by simply starting with a small group and adding players that are exposed to the group’s history over time, one can “grow” larger groups with high effort levels. Adapting the concept of introspective equilibrium, I create a model to replicate the findings of minimum-effort games with growing player counts. While remaining simple and flexible for further extensions it manages to explain almost all findings of previous growth experiments.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Bartuseck, Lukas LU
supervisor
organization
course
NEKN01 20201
year
type
H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
subject
keywords
coordination game, minimum effort, weakest-link, introspective equilibrium
language
English
id
9035474
date added to LUP
2021-01-27 15:57:19
date last changed
2021-01-27 15:57:19
@misc{9035474,
  abstract     = {{In the laboratory, minimum-effort coordination games routinely reach low levels for larger group sizes. Weber (2006 American Economic Review) showed that by simply starting with a small group and adding players that are exposed to the group’s history over time, one can “grow” larger groups with high effort levels. Adapting the concept of introspective equilibrium, I create a model to replicate the findings of minimum-effort games with growing player counts. While remaining simple and flexible for further extensions it manages to explain almost all findings of previous growth experiments.}},
  author       = {{Bartuseck, Lukas}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Introspective equilibrium for coordination games with changing group size}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}