Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Bolagsstämmans ansvarsfrihetsbeslut - om majoritetskrav för ansvarsfrihetsbeslut och preskription av styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar

Abdul Ahad, Jennifer LU (2021) JURM02 20211
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Ansvarsfrihetsbeslutet är ett obligatoriskt ärende på årsstämman i ett aktiebolag, vilket motiveras med intresset att få ett snabbt och klart avgörande i frågan om bolagsledningens skadeståndsansvar. Det finns ingen särskild bestämmelse i ak-tiebolagslagen om majoritetskrav vid detta beslut. Däremot finns en generell re-gel om att bolagsstämmans beslut utgörs av den mening som har fått mer än hälf-ten av de avgivna rösterna. I den juridiska litteraturen har vissa författare påstått att det ändå finns ett särskilt majoritetskrav vid beslut om ansvarsfrihet, som in-nebär att ägare till minst tio procent av bolagets aktier kan förhindra stämmans beslut om ansvarsfrihet. Lagtexten ger däremot inte stöd för denna uppfattning. I uppsatsen... (More)
Ansvarsfrihetsbeslutet är ett obligatoriskt ärende på årsstämman i ett aktiebolag, vilket motiveras med intresset att få ett snabbt och klart avgörande i frågan om bolagsledningens skadeståndsansvar. Det finns ingen särskild bestämmelse i ak-tiebolagslagen om majoritetskrav vid detta beslut. Däremot finns en generell re-gel om att bolagsstämmans beslut utgörs av den mening som har fått mer än hälf-ten av de avgivna rösterna. I den juridiska litteraturen har vissa författare påstått att det ändå finns ett särskilt majoritetskrav vid beslut om ansvarsfrihet, som in-nebär att ägare till minst tio procent av bolagets aktier kan förhindra stämmans beslut om ansvarsfrihet. Lagtexten ger däremot inte stöd för denna uppfattning. I uppsatsen redogör jag för de olika uppfattningarna och vilka stöd som finns för och emot dessa. Jag diskuterar även hållbarheten i de olika argumenten som fö-rekommer i den juridiska litteraturen och framför även egna argument till stöd för min uppfattning. Min uppfattning är att en minoritet inte kan förhindra stämmans ansvarsfrihetsbeslut. Däremot anser jag att en minoritet kan förhindra ansvars-friheten.
Beslutet får praktisk betydelse för styrelsen som är underordnad bolagsstämman. Styrelsen ska som huvudregel agera i enlighet med stämmans beslut. Har an-svarsfrihet nekats av stämman, ska styrelsen normalt utreda om talan ska väckas, vilket måste ske inom ett år från årsredovisningen och revisionsberättelsens framläggande på årsstämman. Preskriptionstiden för en skadeståndstalan mot en ledamot eller verkställande direktör börjar som huvudregel löpa vid årsredovis-ningen och revisionsberättelsens framläggande, vilket ska ske inom sex månader från räkenskapsårets slut varvid ansvarsfrågan ska avgöras. Lagen anger att års-stämman får skjuta upp ansvarsfrihetsärendet i högst åtta veckor, men att ytterli-gare uppskov inte är tillåtet. En intressant fråga som inte besvarats i de juridiska rättskällorna är hur uppskovsförbudet förhåller sig till preskriptionstidens start-punkt. I uppsatsen undersöker jag vilka stöd det kan tänkas finnas för och emot uppfattningen att uppskovsförbudet har något samband med preskriptionstidens startpunkt. Med anledning av bland annat effektivitetsändamålet och författ-ningskommentarer landar jag tillslut i uppfattningen att preskriptionstiden för skadeståndstalan mot en styrelseledamot börjar löpa senast sex månader och åtta veckor efter räkenskapsårets slut. (Less)
Abstract
The discharge decision is a mandatory matter at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of a limited liability company. It is motivated by the interest in obtaining a quick and clear decision on the issue of company management's liability for damages. There is no special provision in the Swedish Companies Act on majority requirements for this decision, although there is a general rule stating that the decision of the general meeting consists of the opinion that has received more than half of the votes cast. In the legal literature, some authors argue that there is still a special majority requirement for decisions on discharge from liability, meaning that owners of at least ten percent of the company's shares can prevent the AGM's decision on... (More)
The discharge decision is a mandatory matter at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of a limited liability company. It is motivated by the interest in obtaining a quick and clear decision on the issue of company management's liability for damages. There is no special provision in the Swedish Companies Act on majority requirements for this decision, although there is a general rule stating that the decision of the general meeting consists of the opinion that has received more than half of the votes cast. In the legal literature, some authors argue that there is still a special majority requirement for decisions on discharge from liability, meaning that owners of at least ten percent of the company's shares can prevent the AGM's decision on discharge from liability. However, the text of the law does not support this view. In this essay, I explain the different perceptions and what support there is for and against them. I also discuss the sustainability of the various arguments that appear in the legal literature as well as present arguments in support of my view. My view is that a minority cannot prevent the AGM's discharge decision. Nevertheless, I do believe that a minority can prevent discharge.
The decision has practical significance for the Board, which is subordinate to the AGM. The Board shall, as a general rule, act in accordance with the AGM's de-cision. If discharge from liability has been denied by the AGM, the Board shall normally investigate whether an action is to be brought. This must take place within one year of the annual report and the presentation of the auditor's report at the AGM. As a general rule, the limitation period for an action for damages against a member or managing director begins to run at the time of presentation of the annual report and the auditor’s report, which must take place within six months from the end of the financial year, whereby the liability issue must be de-cided. The law states that the AGM may postpone the discharge issue for a max-imum of eight weeks, but that further deferral is not permitted. An interesting question that has not been answered in the legal sources is how the prohibition on deferral relates to the starting point of the limitation period. In this essay, I ex-amine what support there may be for and against the idea that the deferral ban has anything to do with the starting point of the limitation period. Among other things, arguments relating to efficiency purpose and constitutional comments enable me to finally come to the conclusion that the limitation period for claims for damages against a board member begins to run no later than six months and eight weeks after the end of the financial year. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Abdul Ahad, Jennifer LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The Annual General Meeting's decision on discharge from liability - majority requirements for discharge decisions and prescription of board members' liability for damages
course
JURM02 20211
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
associationsrätt, civilrätt, förmögenhetsrätt, ansvarsfrihet, ansvarsfrihetsinstitutet, preskription
language
Swedish
id
9046295
date added to LUP
2021-06-27 10:55:35
date last changed
2021-06-27 10:55:35
@misc{9046295,
  abstract     = {{The discharge decision is a mandatory matter at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of a limited liability company. It is motivated by the interest in obtaining a quick and clear decision on the issue of company management's liability for damages. There is no special provision in the Swedish Companies Act on majority requirements for this decision, although there is a general rule stating that the decision of the general meeting consists of the opinion that has received more than half of the votes cast. In the legal literature, some authors argue that there is still a special majority requirement for decisions on discharge from liability, meaning that owners of at least ten percent of the company's shares can prevent the AGM's decision on discharge from liability. However, the text of the law does not support this view. In this essay, I explain the different perceptions and what support there is for and against them. I also discuss the sustainability of the various arguments that appear in the legal literature as well as present arguments in support of my view. My view is that a minority cannot prevent the AGM's discharge decision. Nevertheless, I do believe that a minority can prevent discharge.
The decision has practical significance for the Board, which is subordinate to the AGM. The Board shall, as a general rule, act in accordance with the AGM's de-cision. If discharge from liability has been denied by the AGM, the Board shall normally investigate whether an action is to be brought. This must take place within one year of the annual report and the presentation of the auditor's report at the AGM. As a general rule, the limitation period for an action for damages against a member or managing director begins to run at the time of presentation of the annual report and the auditor’s report, which must take place within six months from the end of the financial year, whereby the liability issue must be de-cided. The law states that the AGM may postpone the discharge issue for a max-imum of eight weeks, but that further deferral is not permitted. An interesting question that has not been answered in the legal sources is how the prohibition on deferral relates to the starting point of the limitation period. In this essay, I ex-amine what support there may be for and against the idea that the deferral ban has anything to do with the starting point of the limitation period. Among other things, arguments relating to efficiency purpose and constitutional comments enable me to finally come to the conclusion that the limitation period for claims for damages against a board member begins to run no later than six months and eight weeks after the end of the financial year.}},
  author       = {{Abdul Ahad, Jennifer}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Bolagsstämmans ansvarsfrihetsbeslut - om majoritetskrav för ansvarsfrihetsbeslut och preskription av styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}