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Should David Armstrong be a Dispositionalist? An Indirect Defense of Powerful Properties

Zander, Daniel LU (2021) FTEM01 20211
Theoretical Philosophy
Abstract
A well-known debate among proponents of natural properties concerns the very nature of such properties. On one extreme, known as Dispositionalism (or the ‘powers’ view), the essence of a property is given by the nomological or causal role(s) it plays. Properties are powers, existentially exhausted by how they affect the actual and potential behavior of their instances. On the other, known as Categoricalism, such nomological or causal roles are contingent features of a property, the essence of which is primitive and self-contained (called quiddities). David Armstrong famously holds a categorical conception of natural properties. I argue that, on the basis of some of Armstrong’s ontological commitments and endorsements of certain... (More)
A well-known debate among proponents of natural properties concerns the very nature of such properties. On one extreme, known as Dispositionalism (or the ‘powers’ view), the essence of a property is given by the nomological or causal role(s) it plays. Properties are powers, existentially exhausted by how they affect the actual and potential behavior of their instances. On the other, known as Categoricalism, such nomological or causal roles are contingent features of a property, the essence of which is primitive and self-contained (called quiddities). David Armstrong famously holds a categorical conception of natural properties. I argue that, on the basis of some of Armstrong’s ontological commitments and endorsements of certain metaphysical principles, he should himself give more credence to Dispositionalism. In defending this claim, I hope to concurrently lend indirect support for the aforesaid theory. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Zander, Daniel LU
supervisor
organization
course
FTEM01 20211
year
type
H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
subject
keywords
Properties, Power, Dispositions, Essence, Quidditism, Necessity
language
English
id
9064812
date added to LUP
2021-10-04 09:20:02
date last changed
2021-10-04 09:20:02
@misc{9064812,
  abstract     = {{A well-known debate among proponents of natural properties concerns the very nature of such properties. On one extreme, known as Dispositionalism (or the ‘powers’ view), the essence of a property is given by the nomological or causal role(s) it plays. Properties are powers, existentially exhausted by how they affect the actual and potential behavior of their instances. On the other, known as Categoricalism, such nomological or causal roles are contingent features of a property, the essence of which is primitive and self-contained (called quiddities). David Armstrong famously holds a categorical conception of natural properties. I argue that, on the basis of some of Armstrong’s ontological commitments and endorsements of certain metaphysical principles, he should himself give more credence to Dispositionalism. In defending this claim, I hope to concurrently lend indirect support for the aforesaid theory.}},
  author       = {{Zander, Daniel}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Should David Armstrong be a Dispositionalist? An Indirect Defense of Powerful Properties}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}