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Uppsåt och vapenattrapper - Om otjänliga försök och NJA 2023 s. 393

Sjöbergh, Markus LU (2023) LAGF03 20232
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Denna uppsats undersöker NJA 2023 s. 393 (”Vapenattrappen”), och dess konsekvenser för såväl gällande rätt som domstolarnas rättstillämpning. Domen kom under våren 2023 att kritiseras hårt. I målet stod två män åtalade för försök till vapenbrott, eftersom de påstods ha försökt inneha vapen. Vapnen byttes emellertid ut mot en ofarlig attrapp av polis ca. fyra månader innan de tilltalade dök upp, varför det rörde sig om ett så kallat otjänligt försök där faran för brottets fullbordan var utesluten. Frågan i målet var därför om männen ändå kunde dömas.
Uppsatsen tar avstamp i gällande rätt så som den såg ut före Högsta domstolens dom, och undersöker förutsättningarna för straffbarhet av otjänliga försök. Här utvecklas särskilt innebörden av... (More)
Denna uppsats undersöker NJA 2023 s. 393 (”Vapenattrappen”), och dess konsekvenser för såväl gällande rätt som domstolarnas rättstillämpning. Domen kom under våren 2023 att kritiseras hårt. I målet stod två män åtalade för försök till vapenbrott, eftersom de påstods ha försökt inneha vapen. Vapnen byttes emellertid ut mot en ofarlig attrapp av polis ca. fyra månader innan de tilltalade dök upp, varför det rörde sig om ett så kallat otjänligt försök där faran för brottets fullbordan var utesluten. Frågan i målet var därför om männen ändå kunde dömas.
Uppsatsen tar avstamp i gällande rätt så som den såg ut före Högsta domstolens dom, och undersöker förutsättningarna för straffbarhet av otjänliga försök. Här utvecklas särskilt innebörden av fare- och uppsåtsrekvisiten, samt redogörs bland annat för försöksbestämmelsens bakomliggande teorier och principer. Två centrala sådana är objektiv respektive subjektiv försöksteori, som förklarar att försöksgärningar bör straffas utifrån gärningens farlighet respektive gärningsmannens onda uppsåt.
Högsta domstolen friade de två männen, eftersom domstolen ansåg att det inte kunde visas att deras uppsåt, brottsplanen, hade formats före det att vapnen byttes ut. Denna uppsats undersöker sedan hur detta avspeglats i underrätternas avgöranden i liknande situationer.
I uppsatsens analys konstateras så att Högsta domstolen, genom sin dom, har utvecklat och klargjort innebörden av det redan existerande uppsåtskravet vad gäller otjänliga försök. Trots detta kommer domstolen inte med ett heltäckande prejudikat, eftersom regeln formulerats som en huvudregel. Utfallet bedöms dock vara adekvat eftersom det motsatta utfallet hade inneburit ett utvidgande av svensk försöksbestraffning som präglas av såväl objektiv försöksteori som restriktivitet, samt ett åsidosättande av det grundläggande uppsåtskravet. Prejudikatregeln konstateras också ha påverkat rättstillämpningen genom att mycket fokus nu hamnar på att, med hänvisning till NJA 2023 s. 393, undersöka huruvida bevisningen kan styrka ett uppsåt före otjänlighetens uppkomst, något som resulterat i både friande och fällande domar. (Less)
Abstract
This paper examines NJA 2023 s. 393 ("The Dummy Weapon"), and its consequences for both current law and practical legal application. The verdict would come to be heavily criticized during the spring of 2023. Two men were prosecuted in the case. They were charged with attempted exceptionally aggravated weapons offence, since they had allegedly tried to possess firearms. The firearms had, however, been found and replaced with a dummy weapon by the police about four months before the two men showed up at the site. Consequently, is was a so called impossible attempt, in which the danger of the offence being completed was excluded. Therefore, the question for the Swedish Supreme Court was if these two men could still be convicted.
The paper... (More)
This paper examines NJA 2023 s. 393 ("The Dummy Weapon"), and its consequences for both current law and practical legal application. The verdict would come to be heavily criticized during the spring of 2023. Two men were prosecuted in the case. They were charged with attempted exceptionally aggravated weapons offence, since they had allegedly tried to possess firearms. The firearms had, however, been found and replaced with a dummy weapon by the police about four months before the two men showed up at the site. Consequently, is was a so called impossible attempt, in which the danger of the offence being completed was excluded. Therefore, the question for the Swedish Supreme Court was if these two men could still be convicted.
The paper starts off by examining applicable law, as it was before the judgement. Here, the prerequisites for the punishment of impossible attempts are examined with a primary focus on the requirements of danger and intent. Underlying theories and principles are furthermore explained - in particular objective and subjective theory of criminal attempts. The former places its emphasis on the danger of realisation of the offence, and the latter on the offenders criminal intent.
The two men were cleared of charges, since the Supreme Court established that, for it to be a punishable impossible attempt, the offenders’ criminal intent must have been formed before the weapons were switched out. This paper then goes on to examine how this adjudication has impacted practical legal application in the lower courts in similar cases.
In the analysis, it is established that the Supreme Court has developed and clarified the meaning of the pre-existing requirement of intent, when it comes to impossible attempts. The precedent, however, does not come without ambiguities, as it is formulated as a general rule that allows for deviations. The utcome, despite this, is adequate, since the opposite outcome would entail disregard from the foundational requirement of intent, and an extention of the Swedish criminalization of attempts - which is imbued with the ideas of restrictiveness and objective theory of criminal attempts. The precedent, it is established, has also had effect on practical legal application, since effort now goes into examining, with reference to NJA 2023 s. 393, if the evidence can prove that the accused had criminal intent before the danger of the offence being completed was removed from the situation. This has effectively led to people being convicted, as well as cleared of charges. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Sjöbergh, Markus LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20232
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
straffrätt, criminal law, otjänliga försök, NJA 2023 s 393
language
Swedish
id
9143591
date added to LUP
2024-02-02 12:30:34
date last changed
2024-02-02 12:30:34
@misc{9143591,
  abstract     = {{This paper examines NJA 2023 s. 393 ("The Dummy Weapon"), and its consequences for both current law and practical legal application. The verdict would come to be heavily criticized during the spring of 2023. Two men were prosecuted in the case. They were charged with attempted exceptionally aggravated weapons offence, since they had allegedly tried to possess firearms. The firearms had, however, been found and replaced with a dummy weapon by the police about four months before the two men showed up at the site. Consequently, is was a so called impossible attempt, in which the danger of the offence being completed was excluded. Therefore, the question for the Swedish Supreme Court was if these two men could still be convicted.
The paper starts off by examining applicable law, as it was before the judgement. Here, the prerequisites for the punishment of impossible attempts are examined with a primary focus on the requirements of danger and intent. Underlying theories and principles are furthermore explained - in particular objective and subjective theory of criminal attempts. The former places its emphasis on the danger of realisation of the offence, and the latter on the offenders criminal intent.
The two men were cleared of charges, since the Supreme Court established that, for it to be a punishable impossible attempt, the offenders’ criminal intent must have been formed before the weapons were switched out. This paper then goes on to examine how this adjudication has impacted practical legal application in the lower courts in similar cases.
In the analysis, it is established that the Supreme Court has developed and clarified the meaning of the pre-existing requirement of intent, when it comes to impossible attempts. The precedent, however, does not come without ambiguities, as it is formulated as a general rule that allows for deviations. The utcome, despite this, is adequate, since the opposite outcome would entail disregard from the foundational requirement of intent, and an extention of the Swedish criminalization of attempts - which is imbued with the ideas of restrictiveness and objective theory of criminal attempts. The precedent, it is established, has also had effect on practical legal application, since effort now goes into examining, with reference to NJA 2023 s. 393, if the evidence can prove that the accused had criminal intent before the danger of the offence being completed was removed from the situation. This has effectively led to people being convicted, as well as cleared of charges.}},
  author       = {{Sjöbergh, Markus}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Uppsåt och vapenattrapper - Om otjänliga försök och NJA 2023 s. 393}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}