Hitting the Nail on the Head - Exploring the Post-Quantum Potential of Rowhammer
(2024) EITM01 20232Department of Electrical and Information Technology
- Abstract
- The dense arrangement of memory cells in modern computing systems introduces a significant concern known as read disturbance errors, stemming from the electrical properties of the capacitors within memory cells. When a memory cell is read, there exists a probability that it may inadvertently discharge its stored electrical charge to neighbouring cells, potentially altering their state from uncharged to charged.
This phenomenon poses a significant threat to the security of systems and the integrity of data in memory, as these errors can lead to unintended alteration in stored information, potentially compromising the confidentiality of sensitive data.
One attack that uses this vulnerability is called Rowhammer. In this attack, memory... (More) - The dense arrangement of memory cells in modern computing systems introduces a significant concern known as read disturbance errors, stemming from the electrical properties of the capacitors within memory cells. When a memory cell is read, there exists a probability that it may inadvertently discharge its stored electrical charge to neighbouring cells, potentially altering their state from uncharged to charged.
This phenomenon poses a significant threat to the security of systems and the integrity of data in memory, as these errors can lead to unintended alteration in stored information, potentially compromising the confidentiality of sensitive data.
One attack that uses this vulnerability is called Rowhammer. In this attack, memory rows above and below a targeted memory row are repeatedly accessed. Through this repeated access, bit-flips can be induced in the targeted row. This discovery has led to many different applications of the attack, including one detailed in a paper by Michael Fahr Jr. et al. called When Frodo Flips: End-to-End Key Recovery on FrodoKEM via Rowhammer. In their work, the Rowhammer attack is utilized to compromise a cryptographic algorithm called FrodoKEM, rendering it vulnerable to exploitation.
The question arises: How does the attack perform on other platforms? Can we get a more detailed evaluation, and can it be further modified in order to target other cryptographic algorithms? That is what we aim to investigate.
We successfully implement the attack in the programming language Rust and show that the attack is indeed reproducible. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of using the attack on other algorithms, and argue that it's theoretically possible if the attack can be made faster or the victim algorithm can be made slower. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9151731
- author
- Palmer, Vincent LU and Ryberg, Hannes LU
- supervisor
-
- Qian Guo LU
- organization
- course
- EITM01 20232
- year
- 2024
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- report number
- LU/LTH-EIT 2024-969
- language
- English
- id
- 9151731
- date added to LUP
- 2024-05-20 15:49:12
- date last changed
- 2024-05-20 15:49:12
@misc{9151731,
abstract = {{The dense arrangement of memory cells in modern computing systems introduces a significant concern known as read disturbance errors, stemming from the electrical properties of the capacitors within memory cells. When a memory cell is read, there exists a probability that it may inadvertently discharge its stored electrical charge to neighbouring cells, potentially altering their state from uncharged to charged.
This phenomenon poses a significant threat to the security of systems and the integrity of data in memory, as these errors can lead to unintended alteration in stored information, potentially compromising the confidentiality of sensitive data.
One attack that uses this vulnerability is called Rowhammer. In this attack, memory rows above and below a targeted memory row are repeatedly accessed. Through this repeated access, bit-flips can be induced in the targeted row. This discovery has led to many different applications of the attack, including one detailed in a paper by Michael Fahr Jr. et al. called When Frodo Flips: End-to-End Key Recovery on FrodoKEM via Rowhammer. In their work, the Rowhammer attack is utilized to compromise a cryptographic algorithm called FrodoKEM, rendering it vulnerable to exploitation.
The question arises: How does the attack perform on other platforms? Can we get a more detailed evaluation, and can it be further modified in order to target other cryptographic algorithms? That is what we aim to investigate.
We successfully implement the attack in the programming language Rust and show that the attack is indeed reproducible. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of using the attack on other algorithms, and argue that it's theoretically possible if the attack can be made faster or the victim algorithm can be made slower.}},
author = {{Palmer, Vincent and Ryberg, Hannes}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Hitting the Nail on the Head - Exploring the Post-Quantum Potential of Rowhammer}},
year = {{2024}},
}