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Hur blev det för koncernerna? - En rättslig och empirisk studie av visselblåsardirektivets och visselblåsarlagens inverkan på koncerners visselblåsarfunktioner

Ravinder, Carl LU (2024) JURM02 20241
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
In 2019, the EU introduced the so-called Whistleblower Directive. The directive was established to address misconduct in the internal market and strengthen the level of protection for whistleblowers. As a result of the directive's new regulations, all EU member states needed to amend their national legislation in this area. According to the directive, every legal entity with 50 or more employees must have its own internal reporting channels. The channels are used by a whistleblower when they submit their report. Additionally, the directive puts emphasis that reports shall be investigated locally in the company where the whistleblower submitted the report. Since several corporate groups already had a group-wide whistleblowing function... (More)
In 2019, the EU introduced the so-called Whistleblower Directive. The directive was established to address misconduct in the internal market and strengthen the level of protection for whistleblowers. As a result of the directive's new regulations, all EU member states needed to amend their national legislation in this area. According to the directive, every legal entity with 50 or more employees must have its own internal reporting channels. The channels are used by a whistleblower when they submit their report. Additionally, the directive puts emphasis that reports shall be investigated locally in the company where the whistleblower submitted the report. Since several corporate groups already had a group-wide whistleblowing function before the directive, there was opposition regarding whether the requirements for internal reporting channels were necessary. Many of those participating in the opposition were general counsels, compliance officers, and lawyers working with whistleblowing-related matters. They believed that the requirements for internal reporting channels led to unwanted decentralisation. Decentralisation, in turn, would result in unnecessary risks, costs, and decreased protec- tion for whistleblowers. But are their fears justified?
In the study, I note that several of the concerns expressed by corporate groups have, to some extent, been valid. It is challenging to achieve a sufficiently high level of competence at the subsidiary level to ensure that whistleblower reports are handled correctly. However, several corporate groups have circumvented the requirements and limitations of the legislation. Several groups have intentionally let their whistleblowing systems not comply with the whistleblowing law in consideration of higher prioritised interests. Some groups, for instance, have worked hard to market their internal group-wide whistleblowing functions as a better alternative than the internal reporting channels in the subsidiaries. I also conclude that the Whistleblower Directive should be re-phrased to allow a higher degree of centralisation of whistleblowing functions. However, the current commitment to change is low. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
År 2019 introducerade EU det så kallade visselblåsardirektivet. Direktivet tillkom för att komma till rätta med oegentligheter på den inre marknaden och stärka skyddsnivån för visselblåsare. Till följd av direktivets nya krav och bestämmelser behövde samtliga medlemsstater i EU ändra sin nationella lagstiftning på området. Enligt direktivet ska varje rättslig enhet med 50 eller fler arbetstagare ha egna interna rapporteringskanaler. Dessa används av en rapporterande person när hen lämnar in sin rapport. Dessutom ska rapporten generellt utredas lokalt i bolaget som den rapporterande personen lämnade rapporten i. Eftersom flera koncerner redan hade en koncerngemensam visselblåsarfunktion innan direktivet, väcktes opinion om kraven kring de... (More)
År 2019 introducerade EU det så kallade visselblåsardirektivet. Direktivet tillkom för att komma till rätta med oegentligheter på den inre marknaden och stärka skyddsnivån för visselblåsare. Till följd av direktivets nya krav och bestämmelser behövde samtliga medlemsstater i EU ändra sin nationella lagstiftning på området. Enligt direktivet ska varje rättslig enhet med 50 eller fler arbetstagare ha egna interna rapporteringskanaler. Dessa används av en rapporterande person när hen lämnar in sin rapport. Dessutom ska rapporten generellt utredas lokalt i bolaget som den rapporterande personen lämnade rapporten i. Eftersom flera koncerner redan hade en koncerngemensam visselblåsarfunktion innan direktivet, väcktes opinion om kraven kring de interna rapporteringskanalerna var nödvändiga. Flera av dem som deltog i opinionen var chefsjurister, compliance-chefer och advokater som arbetar med visselblåsning. De ansåg att kraven kring interna rapporteringskanaler medförde en oönskad decentralisering. Decentralisering skulle i sin tur medföra onödiga risker, kostnader och ett försämrat skydd för visselblåsaren. Men stämmer detta?
I undersökningen konstaterar jag att flera av de farhågor som koncernerna uttryckt till viss del varit sanna. Det är svårt att uppnå en tillräckligt hög nivå av kompetens på dotterbolagsnivå för att säkerställa att visselblåsarrapporter hanteras på ett korrekt sätt. Däremot har flera av koncernerna kringgått kraven och begränsningarna i lagstiftningen. Flera koncerner har avsiktligt låtit sina visselblåsarsystem inte vara i överensstämmelse med visselblåsarlagen med hänsyn till högre prioriterade intressen. Vissa koncerner har arbetat hårt med att marknadsföra sina interna koncerngemensamma visselblåsarfunktioner som ett bättre alternativ än de interna rapporteringskanaler i dotterbolagen. Jag konstaterar även att visselblåsardirektivet bör omformuleras för att tillåta en högre grad av centralisering av visselblåsarfunktioner. Däremot är det nuvarande engagemanget för förändring lågt. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Ravinder, Carl LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
How Did It Turn Out for the Corporate Groups? - A Legal and Empirical Study of the Impact of the Whistleblower Directive and the Whistleblower Act on Corporate Group's Whistleblowing Functions
course
JURM02 20241
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
arbetsrätt, EU-rätt
language
Swedish
id
9152152
date added to LUP
2024-06-03 09:10:05
date last changed
2024-06-03 09:10:05
@misc{9152152,
  abstract     = {{In 2019, the EU introduced the so-called Whistleblower Directive. The directive was established to address misconduct in the internal market and strengthen the level of protection for whistleblowers. As a result of the directive's new regulations, all EU member states needed to amend their national legislation in this area. According to the directive, every legal entity with 50 or more employees must have its own internal reporting channels. The channels are used by a whistleblower when they submit their report. Additionally, the directive puts emphasis that reports shall be investigated locally in the company where the whistleblower submitted the report. Since several corporate groups already had a group-wide whistleblowing function before the directive, there was opposition regarding whether the requirements for internal reporting channels were necessary. Many of those participating in the opposition were general counsels, compliance officers, and lawyers working with whistleblowing-related matters. They believed that the requirements for internal reporting channels led to unwanted decentralisation. Decentralisation, in turn, would result in unnecessary risks, costs, and decreased protec- tion for whistleblowers. But are their fears justified?
In the study, I note that several of the concerns expressed by corporate groups have, to some extent, been valid. It is challenging to achieve a sufficiently high level of competence at the subsidiary level to ensure that whistleblower reports are handled correctly. However, several corporate groups have circumvented the requirements and limitations of the legislation. Several groups have intentionally let their whistleblowing systems not comply with the whistleblowing law in consideration of higher prioritised interests. Some groups, for instance, have worked hard to market their internal group-wide whistleblowing functions as a better alternative than the internal reporting channels in the subsidiaries. I also conclude that the Whistleblower Directive should be re-phrased to allow a higher degree of centralisation of whistleblowing functions. However, the current commitment to change is low.}},
  author       = {{Ravinder, Carl}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Hur blev det för koncernerna? - En rättslig och empirisk studie av visselblåsardirektivets och visselblåsarlagens inverkan på koncerners visselblåsarfunktioner}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}