En för alla, alla för en? - En analys av tillämpningen av medgärningsmannaskap i svensk rätt
(2024) LAGF03 20241Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- En grundläggande utgångspunkt i den svenska straffrätten är att straffansvaret är individuellt; en person kan enbart straffas för vad den själv gjort, inte för vad någon annan gjort. Brottsliga gärningar begås emellertid ofta av flera personer gemensamt. I sådana fall kan samtliga personer dömas i medgärningsmannaskap för att ”tillsammans och i samförstånd” begått brottet. Domstolarnas tillämpning av denna ansvarsform blev under åren kring millennieskiftet föremål för omfattande kritik i doktrin. Sedan dess synes dis-kussionen emellertid ha avtagit. Uppsatsen syftar därför till att analysera hur HD:s senaste avgöranden rörande medgärningsmannaskap förhåller sig till den tidigare framförda kritiken.
För att uppnå uppsatsens syfte används... (More) - En grundläggande utgångspunkt i den svenska straffrätten är att straffansvaret är individuellt; en person kan enbart straffas för vad den själv gjort, inte för vad någon annan gjort. Brottsliga gärningar begås emellertid ofta av flera personer gemensamt. I sådana fall kan samtliga personer dömas i medgärningsmannaskap för att ”tillsammans och i samförstånd” begått brottet. Domstolarnas tillämpning av denna ansvarsform blev under åren kring millennieskiftet föremål för omfattande kritik i doktrin. Sedan dess synes dis-kussionen emellertid ha avtagit. Uppsatsen syftar därför till att analysera hur HD:s senaste avgöranden rörande medgärningsmannaskap förhåller sig till den tidigare framförda kritiken.
För att uppnå uppsatsens syfte används den rättsdogmatiska och den rättsanalytiska metoden. Efter en redogörelse för medgärningsmannaskap som konstruktion undersöks den tidigare kritiken mot ansvarsformen för att identifiera dess gemensamma nämnare. Sammanfattningsvis kan kritiken sägas handla om att domstolarna, i brist på bevisning, tillämpat medgärningsmannaskap på ett för extensivt sätt. Kritikerna menar att domstolarna tilllämpade en form av kollektivt ansvarstänkande där litet intresse lades vid respektive individs enskilda agerande utan snarare på vad som på gruppnivå skett och respektive individs inställning till detta. Utöver detta kritiserades även domstolarnas avgöranden ur rättssäkerhetssynpunkt då det sällan angavs på vilken grund de tilltalade dömdes som medgärningsmän.
Uppsatsens slutsats är att HD i dess tre senaste avgöranden rörande medgär-ningsmannaskap tillämpat ett mer individualistiskt ansvarstänkande genom att betona vikten av att bevisning som uppfyller beviskravet föreligger på individnivå och inte bara gruppnivå. Det synes också ha ställts högre krav på när ett brott ska anses vara genomfört tillsammans och i samförstånd. Vad gäller förutsebarheten kring ansvarsformens tillämplighet är det utifrån de i uppsatsen behandlade rättsfallen svårt att dra några slutsatser eftersom HD inte i något av fallen faktiskt dömde de tilltalade i medgärningsmanna-skap. (Less) - Abstract
- A fundamental principle in Swedish criminal law is that the criminal liability is individual; a person can only be held accountable for their own actions, not for the actions of others. However, criminal acts are often committed jointly by several individuals. In such cases, the individuals can be convicted in co-perpetratorship for having committed the crime "together and in mutual understanding”. The courts’ application of this form of liability became subject to extensive criticism in legal doctrine around the turn of the millennium. Since then, however, the discussion seems to have subsided. Therefore, this essay aims to analyze how the Supreme Court's (HD) latest judgments regarding co-perpetratorship relate to the previously... (More)
- A fundamental principle in Swedish criminal law is that the criminal liability is individual; a person can only be held accountable for their own actions, not for the actions of others. However, criminal acts are often committed jointly by several individuals. In such cases, the individuals can be convicted in co-perpetratorship for having committed the crime "together and in mutual understanding”. The courts’ application of this form of liability became subject to extensive criticism in legal doctrine around the turn of the millennium. Since then, however, the discussion seems to have subsided. Therefore, this essay aims to analyze how the Supreme Court's (HD) latest judgments regarding co-perpetratorship relate to the previously expressed criticism.
To achieve the essay's purpose, the legal dogmatic and the legal analytical method is used. After an explanation of the legal construction of co-perpetratorship, the previous criticism of this form of liability is examined to identify its common denominators. In summary, the criticism revolves around the perception that courts, in lack of evidence, applied the co-perpetratorship in an overly extensive manner. Critics argued that the courts applied a form of ”collective liability thinking”, where little attention was paid to each individual's separate actions but rather to what happened at a group level and each individual's attitude towards this. Additionally, the courts’ judgments were criticized from the perspective of legal certainty in terms of predictability, as the court seldom accounted on what basis the defendant was considered as a co-perpetrator.
The essay's conclusion is that in its three latest judgments concerning co-perpetratorship, the Supreme Court (HD) has applied a more individualistic approach to liability by emphasizing the importance of evidence that meets the standard of proof at the individual level rather than just the group level. It also seems that higher demands have been placed on when a crime should be considered as committed ”together and in mutual understanding”. Regarding the predictability of the applicability of the co-perpetratorship, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from the cases discussed in the essay since HD did not actually convict the defendants as co-perpetrators in any of the cases. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9152298
- author
- Johansson, Matilda LU
- supervisor
-
- Karol Nowak LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20241
- year
- 2024
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, medgärningsmannaskap, tillsammans och i samförstånd
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9152298
- date added to LUP
- 2024-06-26 11:55:09
- date last changed
- 2024-06-26 11:55:09
@misc{9152298,
abstract = {{A fundamental principle in Swedish criminal law is that the criminal liability is individual; a person can only be held accountable for their own actions, not for the actions of others. However, criminal acts are often committed jointly by several individuals. In such cases, the individuals can be convicted in co-perpetratorship for having committed the crime "together and in mutual understanding”. The courts’ application of this form of liability became subject to extensive criticism in legal doctrine around the turn of the millennium. Since then, however, the discussion seems to have subsided. Therefore, this essay aims to analyze how the Supreme Court's (HD) latest judgments regarding co-perpetratorship relate to the previously expressed criticism.
To achieve the essay's purpose, the legal dogmatic and the legal analytical method is used. After an explanation of the legal construction of co-perpetratorship, the previous criticism of this form of liability is examined to identify its common denominators. In summary, the criticism revolves around the perception that courts, in lack of evidence, applied the co-perpetratorship in an overly extensive manner. Critics argued that the courts applied a form of ”collective liability thinking”, where little attention was paid to each individual's separate actions but rather to what happened at a group level and each individual's attitude towards this. Additionally, the courts’ judgments were criticized from the perspective of legal certainty in terms of predictability, as the court seldom accounted on what basis the defendant was considered as a co-perpetrator.
The essay's conclusion is that in its three latest judgments concerning co-perpetratorship, the Supreme Court (HD) has applied a more individualistic approach to liability by emphasizing the importance of evidence that meets the standard of proof at the individual level rather than just the group level. It also seems that higher demands have been placed on when a crime should be considered as committed ”together and in mutual understanding”. Regarding the predictability of the applicability of the co-perpetratorship, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions from the cases discussed in the essay since HD did not actually convict the defendants as co-perpetrators in any of the cases.}},
author = {{Johansson, Matilda}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{En för alla, alla för en? - En analys av tillämpningen av medgärningsmannaskap i svensk rätt}},
year = {{2024}},
}