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Hävning av entreprenadavtal i allmän obligationsrättslig belysning - Särskilt om försening som hävningsgrund

Leijon, Klara LU (2024) JURM02 20241
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
The right to terminate a contract is considered a general principle. However, there is no uniform understanding of the conditions required for the existence of a right to terminate or the legal consequences of termination. The purpose of the thesis is to analyze termination of construction contracts and particularly delay as a ground for termination, in the light of general contract law. The interpretation must also consider that the specific features of the construction contract may contradict an interpretation that is based on general contract law.

The thesis makes it evident that the concept of termination in AB 04 differs from what is generally included in the concept. Unlike what applies from a general contract law perspective,... (More)
The right to terminate a contract is considered a general principle. However, there is no uniform understanding of the conditions required for the existence of a right to terminate or the legal consequences of termination. The purpose of the thesis is to analyze termination of construction contracts and particularly delay as a ground for termination, in the light of general contract law. The interpretation must also consider that the specific features of the construction contract may contradict an interpretation that is based on general contract law.

The thesis makes it evident that the concept of termination in AB 04 differs from what is generally included in the concept. Unlike what applies from a general contract law perspective, it is not assumed that there must be a breach of contract for termination to be justified under AB 04 chapter 8 §§ 1–2. Accordingly, the concept of termination in AB 04 is broader than the termination concept used generally. The regulation in AB 04 also deviates from general contract law in that it does not consistently, at least not explicitly, require a materiality threshold as a condition for the right to terminate. In the thesis it is concluded that closer considerations are required in relation to each ground before imposing a materiality requirement in cases where such a requirement is not explicitly stated. However, the breaching party can argue, based on general contract law, that the right to termination requires that the breach of contract is material.

As with several types of contracts regulated by law, delay constitutes a ground for termination according to AB 04. This ground for termination is regulated by AB 04 chapter 8 § 1 point 1. For termination to be legally justified, it is required that the construction has been delayed to the extent that it is evidently not going to be completed within the contract period. It has been described as meaning that, from a professional standpoint, there should be no doubt that completion within the contract period will not be possible. Furthermore, it is required that the delay is not due to circumstances warranting an extension of the contract period. If there are disputed claims for an extension of the contract period, it may imply that it is not evident that the construction will be delayed. Finally, for the right to termination, it is required that the delay causes substantial inconvenience for the principal.

The concept of materiality for construction contracts is considered to have the same meaning as in the interpretation of contracts in general. What appears to be common for the statutory regulated contract types is that it involves an overall assessment made from the perspective of the affected party. The factors to be considered in the materiality assessment then depend on the type of contract and the nature of the breach. For example, it is conceivable that the extent of the delay and the need for completion within the contract period arising from the purpose of the contract could be considered in the materiality assessment according to chapter 8 § 1 point 1. Conditions on the contractor's side should on the other hand, as a starting point, be excluded from the materiality assessment. This means that consideration should not be given to the contractor's explanation of the delay or whether the contractor has been at fault. Furthermore, there is no convincing support for establishing a requirement that the substantial inconvenience must have been apparent to the contractor for the delay to constitute a ground for termination. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Rätten att häva gäller som en allmän obligationsrättslig princip. Det är emellertid omdiskuterat vad som innefattas i begreppet hävning; vad som krävs för att det ska föreligga hävningsrätt och vilka rättsverkningar en hävningsförklaring aktualiserar.

Uppsatsen tar avstamp i hävning från allmän obligationsrättslig utgångspunkt. Därefter inriktas uppsatsen på en särskild avtalstyp, närmare bestämt entreprenadavtal mellan näringsidkare som införlivar AB 04. Syftet med uppsatsen är analysera hävningsreglerna för entreprenadavtal och särskilt försening som hävningsgrund, i belysning av allmän obligationsrätt. Entreprenadavtalets speciella drag kan tala mot en tolkning som stöds av allmänna obligationsrättsliga utgångspunkter. Inom ramen... (More)
Rätten att häva gäller som en allmän obligationsrättslig princip. Det är emellertid omdiskuterat vad som innefattas i begreppet hävning; vad som krävs för att det ska föreligga hävningsrätt och vilka rättsverkningar en hävningsförklaring aktualiserar.

Uppsatsen tar avstamp i hävning från allmän obligationsrättslig utgångspunkt. Därefter inriktas uppsatsen på en särskild avtalstyp, närmare bestämt entreprenadavtal mellan näringsidkare som införlivar AB 04. Syftet med uppsatsen är analysera hävningsreglerna för entreprenadavtal och särskilt försening som hävningsgrund, i belysning av allmän obligationsrätt. Entreprenadavtalets speciella drag kan tala mot en tolkning som stöds av allmänna obligationsrättsliga utgångspunkter. Inom ramen för uppsatsen undersöks därför även i vilken mån och på vilket sätt entreprenadavtalets särdrag kan behöva beaktas vid tolkningen.

Av uppsatsen framkommer att hävningsbegreppet i AB 04 i viss mån skiljer sig från vad som i allmänhet avses med hävning. Till skillnad från utgångspunkten att hävning förutsätter avtalsbrott, kan hävning enligt AB 04 grundas på annat än avtalsbrott. Hävningsbegreppet i AB 04 är följaktligen vidare än det hävningsbegrepp som används i allmänhet. En annan skillnad är att det inte i AB 04 konsekvent uppställs ett uttryckligt väsentlighetskrav som förutsättning för hävningsrätt. I uppsatsen konstateras att det krävs närmare överväganden i förhållande till respektive hävningsgrund innan ett väsentlighetskrav uppställs i de grunder som ett uttryckligt sådant saknas. I regel kan emellertid den avtalsbrytande parten, med stöd i den allmänna obligationsrätten, hävda att hävningsrätt förutsätter att avtalsbrottet är väsentligt.

I likhet med vad som gäller enligt flera förmögenhetsrättsliga lagar, utgör dröjsmål (försening) en grund för hävning i AB 04. Hävningsgrunden regleras av AB 04 kap. 8 § 1 p. 1. För att hävning ska komma i fråga krävs att entreprenaden har försenats så att den uppenbarligen inte kan färdigställas inom kontraktstiden. Det anses innebära att det på fackmässiga grunder inte ska råda någon tvekan om att ett färdigställande inom kontraktstiden inte kommer att kunna ske. Vidare krävs att förseningen inte beror på omständigheter som berättigar till tidsförlängning. Om det finns tvistiga krav på tidsförlängning, kan det medföra att det inte är uppenbart att entreprenaden kommer att försenas. För hävningsrätt krävs slutligen att en försening skulle medföra väsentlig olägenhet för beställaren.

Väsentlighetsbegreppet för entreprenadavtal anses ha samma innebörd som vid tolkning av avtal i allmänhet. Den gemensamma utgångspunkten för flera lagreglerade avtalstyper är att väsentlighetsbedömningen utgör en helhetsbedömning som ska ske från den drabbade partens synvinkel. Vilka konkreta faktorer som ska beaktas i väsentlighetsbedömningen preciseras sedan efter avtalstyp och avtalsbrottets karaktär. I väsentlighetsbedömningen enligt kap. 8 § 1 p. 1 kan exempelvis omfattningen av förseningen och vilket behov av färdigställande inom kontraktstiden som följer av syftet med entreprenaden vara faktorer av betydelse. Förhållanden på entreprenörens sida ska däremot i regel lämnas utanför bedömningen. Det innebär att hänsyn inte ska tas till bland annat entreprenörens förklaringar till förseningen eller huruvida entreprenören varit vållande. Vidare konstateras att det saknas stöd för att uppställa ett krav på att den väsentliga olägenheten ska ha varit synbar för entreprenören för att förseningen ska vara hävningsgrundande. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Leijon, Klara LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Termination of construction contracts in the light of general contract law - Particulary about delay as a ground for termination
course
JURM02 20241
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Avtalsrätt, Entreprenadrätt, Hävning, Entreprenadavtal, Allmän obligationsrätt, AB 04, Tolkning, Försening, Väsentlighetskrav, Synbarhetskrav
language
Swedish
id
9152622
date added to LUP
2024-06-10 17:15:54
date last changed
2024-06-10 17:15:54
@misc{9152622,
  abstract     = {{The right to terminate a contract is considered a general principle. However, there is no uniform understanding of the conditions required for the existence of a right to terminate or the legal consequences of termination. The purpose of the thesis is to analyze termination of construction contracts and particularly delay as a ground for termination, in the light of general contract law. The interpretation must also consider that the specific features of the construction contract may contradict an interpretation that is based on general contract law. 
 
The thesis makes it evident that the concept of termination in AB 04 differs from what is generally included in the concept. Unlike what applies from a general contract law perspective, it is not assumed that there must be a breach of contract for termination to be justified under AB 04 chapter 8 §§ 1–2. Accordingly, the concept of termination in AB 04 is broader than the termination concept used generally. The regulation in AB 04 also deviates from general contract law in that it does not consistently, at least not explicitly, require a materiality threshold as a condition for the right to terminate. In the thesis it is concluded that closer considerations are required in relation to each ground before imposing a materiality requirement in cases where such a requirement is not explicitly stated. However, the breaching party can argue, based on general contract law, that the right to termination requires that the breach of contract is material. 

As with several types of contracts regulated by law, delay constitutes a ground for termination according to AB 04. This ground for termination is regulated by AB 04 chapter 8 § 1 point 1. For termination to be legally justified, it is required that the construction has been delayed to the extent that it is evidently not going to be completed within the contract period. It has been described as meaning that, from a professional standpoint, there should be no doubt that completion within the contract period will not be possible. Furthermore, it is required that the delay is not due to circumstances warranting an extension of the contract period. If there are disputed claims for an extension of the contract period, it may imply that it is not evident that the construction will be delayed. Finally, for the right to termination, it is required that the delay causes substantial inconvenience for the principal. 

The concept of materiality for construction contracts is considered to have the same meaning as in the interpretation of contracts in general. What appears to be common for the statutory regulated contract types is that it involves an overall assessment made from the perspective of the affected party. The factors to be considered in the materiality assessment then depend on the type of contract and the nature of the breach. For example, it is conceivable that the extent of the delay and the need for completion within the contract period arising from the purpose of the contract could be considered in the materiality assessment according to chapter 8 § 1 point 1. Conditions on the contractor's side should on the other hand, as a starting point, be excluded from the materiality assessment. This means that consideration should not be given to the contractor's explanation of the delay or whether the contractor has been at fault. Furthermore, there is no convincing support for establishing a requirement that the substantial inconvenience must have been apparent to the contractor for the delay to constitute a ground for termination.}},
  author       = {{Leijon, Klara}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Hävning av entreprenadavtal i allmän obligationsrättslig belysning - Särskilt om försening som hävningsgrund}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}