Confusing lobbying with corruption? Discursive tensions relating transparency and lobbying in the EU after Qatargate

Abstract

This study unravels discursive formulations of lobbying and transparency in the aftermath of Qatargate to better understand the relationship between lobbyists, corruption scandals, and transparency frameworks in the European Union. Using Foucault’s interpretive analytics operationalized by CDA and semi-structured interviews with Public Affairs practitioners and MEPs in Brussels, this inquiry argues that the occupational branding strategies collectively crafted by lobbyists to increase their legitimacy (Helgesson, 2024) define the lobbyist as a subject by association with a transparent, professional conduct and by opposition to corruption, ascribing wrongdoings to something other than lobbying itself. The discursive attempt to sever lobbying from corruption is framed as a response to the tainted perception of Public Affairs shared by wider publics, and accentuates the separation identified by literature between practitioners and public interest, for which the study proposes the “Brussels bubble” native category as a theoretically relevant metaphor. Transparency is also tightly bound to reputation, a key value- generating communication asset (Zerfass & Viertmann, 2017) hinging on the lobbyist’s relationships with clients, despite the literature’s emphasis on interactions with MEPs. Geopolitical tensions also articulate the agency-client relationships, and third countries are perceived to bear a heavier burden of scrutiny in comparison to Member States. This study thus problematizes overly managerial formulations of transparency that take assumed democratic benefits for granted and argues for a symbiotic relationship with secrecy with a public- centred approach.

Popular Abstract

This study unravels discursive formulations of lobbying and transparency in the aftermath of Qatargate, one of the largest corruption scandals in decades (Rasmi, 2024) to involve the EU's only elected institution. In response to "allegations of corruption" (EU Parliament, 2023), the Parliament implemented a 14-point reform (Regulation 2023/2095) to strengthen the Transparency Register. The research questions focus on understanding what associations lobbyists make between lobbying, transparency, and Qatargate in Brussels, articulating democratic concerns.


Lobbying struggles with the recurring question of whether practitioners contribute to democracy (Davidson & Rowe, 2016). As a growing body of research conceptualizes lobbying as a specialism within public relations (Nothhaft, 2017; Cutlip et al., 2000; Verčič & Verčič, 2012), my study joins scholars in theorizing public relations beyond an organization-centric point of view, incorporating civic concerns into the role (Davidson, 2015; Valentini et al., 2012). This inquiry further describes the occupational branding strategies collectively crafted by lobbyists (Helgesson, 2024) leveraging transparency's positive connotation to navigate a reputationally challenged profession (Ihlen & Raknes, 2020; Ashforth, 2019; Kantola, 2016).

Using Foucault's interpretive analytics (Christensen, 2024; Revel, 2015; Motion & Leitch, 2007) as operationalized by Fairclough's (1992; 2009) Critical Discourse Analysis, I conducted 11 semi- structured interviews (Tracy, 2020) with public affairs practitioners and MEPs. Partially funded by Lund University's Centre for European Studies (CFE), my inquiry centred its methodological approach on problematization (Alvesson & Deetz, 2021; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013) and abduction (Douven, 2022; Timmermans & Tavory, 2022).

Participants define the lobbyist subject by association with a transparent, professional conduct and by opposition to corruption, ascribing wrongdoings to something other than lobbying. This discursive severance accentuates the separation identified by literature between practitioners’ and public perceptions (Helgesson, 2024; Davidson & Rowe, 2016), for which my study proposes the “Brussels bubble” native category as a theoretically relevant metaphor.
Transparency is also tightly bound by participants to their own reputation, a key value-generating communication asset (Zerfass & Viertmann, 2017) hinging on the lobbyist’s relationships with clients, despite the literature’s emphasis on interactions with MEPs (Nothhaft, 2017; Naurin, 2007). I found geopolitical tensions add complexity to the agency-client relationships, as third countries are perceived to bear a heavier burden of scrutiny in comparison to Member States, reflecting social systems of differentiation (Foucault, 1983) rooted in global power struggles (Reis, 2022; Said, 2003; Ribeiro, 1995).

Since lobbyists’ legitimizing strategy assumes transparency measures allow the European peoples to scrutinize EU institutions, my study showcases practitioners’ potential to take action to empower public accountability, considering the growing academic evidence that information disclosure alone is insufficient to empower the civil society to hold organizations and institutions accountable (Christensen & Cheney, 2015; Mol, 2010).

This study problematizes overly managerial, neoliberal formulations of transparency (Vujnovic & Kruckeberg, 2016) that take assumed democratic benefits for granted (Hansen et al, 2015). Arguing for a symbiotic relationship with secrecy (Cronin, 2020), a public-centred approach to public affairs would advocate for transparency measures to account for all intended stakeholders (Vijge, 2018) and help fulfill promises made in the name of the European peoples.

• author: Calil Racanicci, Jamile
• supervisor: Camilla Nothhaft
• organization: Department of Strategic Communication
• course: SKOM12 20241
• year: 2025
• type: H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
• subject: Social Sciences
• keywords: lobbying, corruption, transparency, Qatargate, reputation, Brussels, EU, European Union, CDA, legitimacy
• language: English
• id: 9186539
• date added to LUP: 2025-03-17 11:41:54
• date last changed: 2025-03-17 11:41:54