Ju striktare regler, desto mer manipulation
(2025) FEKH89 20252Department of Business Administration
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Sammanfattning
Titel: Ju striktare regler, desto mer manipulation.
Seminariedatum: 16 januari 2026.
Ämne/kurs: FEKH89, Examensarbete i finansiering på kandidatnivå, 15 högskolepoäng.
Författare: Elias Hagelin, Ludwig Müchler och Mohamed Ubeid.
Handledare Maria Gårdängen.
Fem nyckelord: Earnings management, Europeiska unionen, IFRS 16, informationsasymmetri, real earnings management.
Forskningsfråga: ”Har IFRS 16 ikraftträdande lett till en förändring i intensitet i AEM och REM hos börsnoterade bolag inom EU?”.
Arbetets syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka hur IFRS 16:s införande förändrat användningen av EM hos börsnoterade bolag inom EU.
Metod: Regressionsanalys utförd utifrån (McNichols, 2002) och... (More) - Sammanfattning
Titel: Ju striktare regler, desto mer manipulation.
Seminariedatum: 16 januari 2026.
Ämne/kurs: FEKH89, Examensarbete i finansiering på kandidatnivå, 15 högskolepoäng.
Författare: Elias Hagelin, Ludwig Müchler och Mohamed Ubeid.
Handledare Maria Gårdängen.
Fem nyckelord: Earnings management, Europeiska unionen, IFRS 16, informationsasymmetri, real earnings management.
Forskningsfråga: ”Har IFRS 16 ikraftträdande lett till en förändring i intensitet i AEM och REM hos börsnoterade bolag inom EU?”.
Arbetets syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka hur IFRS 16:s införande förändrat användningen av EM hos börsnoterade bolag inom EU.
Metod: Regressionsanalys utförd utifrån (McNichols, 2002) och (Roychowdhury, 2006) modeller. Sekundärdata inhämtad från Bloomberg.
Teoretiska perspektiv: Principal-Agent-teori, informationsasymmetri.
Resultat: Studien visar att till följd av IFRS 16:s införandet har REM ökat i omfattning. Studien kan inte visa att AEM varken ökat eller minskat i omfattning efter IFRS 16.
Slutsats: Empirin följer samma mönster som tidigare forskning, (Cohen et al. 2008; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005; Zang, 2012), nämligen att redovisningsmässiga uppstramningar leder till att ännu värre skadlig manipulation ökar i omfattning till följd av regelverksändringar.
JEL-koder: C12, D22, G18, G38, H32, M48, O52. (Less) - Abstract
- Abstract
Titel: The tighter the accounting regulations, the greater the scope for manipulation.
Seminar date: 16 January 2026.
Course: FEKH89, Degree Project Undergraduate level, Business Administration, Undergraduate level, 15 ECTS.
Authors: Elias Hagelin, Ludwig Müchler and Mohamed Ubeid.
Advisor: Maria Gårdängen.
Keywords: Earnings management, European union, IFRS 16, information asymmetry, real earnings management.
Research question: Has the implementation of IFRS 16 affected the intensity of earnings management by listed companies within the EU?
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the implementation of IFRS16 and its inpact on the use of earnings management within the EU.
... (More) - Abstract
Titel: The tighter the accounting regulations, the greater the scope for manipulation.
Seminar date: 16 January 2026.
Course: FEKH89, Degree Project Undergraduate level, Business Administration, Undergraduate level, 15 ECTS.
Authors: Elias Hagelin, Ludwig Müchler and Mohamed Ubeid.
Advisor: Maria Gårdängen.
Keywords: Earnings management, European union, IFRS 16, information asymmetry, real earnings management.
Research question: Has the implementation of IFRS 16 affected the intensity of earnings management by listed companies within the EU?
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the implementation of IFRS16 and its inpact on the use of earnings management within the EU.
Methodology: Regression analysis conducted based on the models of (McNichols, 2002) and (Roychowdhury, 2006). Secondary data collected from Bloomberg.
Theoretical perspectives: Agent theory, information asymmetry.
Results: The study shows that IFRS 16 has led to an increased use of REM, however, the study can neighter say that AEM has increased nor decreased in intensity following IFRS 16.
Conclusions: The empirics concur with the same pattern as previous studies, (Cohen et al. 2008; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005; Zang, 2012), namely that regulatory tightening of accounting standards creates incentives to even more harmful REM.
JEL-Classifications: C12, D22, G18, G38, H32, M48, O52. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9219662
- author
- Hagelin, Elias LU ; Müchler, Ludwig LU and Ubeid, Mohamed LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- En studie om hur införandet av IFRS16 påverkat börsnoterade bolags användning av earnings management inom Europeiska unionen
- course
- FEKH89 20252
- year
- 2025
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Earnings management, European union, IFRS 16, information asymmetry, real earnings management.
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9219662
- date added to LUP
- 2026-02-05 12:55:36
- date last changed
- 2026-02-05 12:55:36
@misc{9219662,
abstract = {{Abstract
Titel: The tighter the accounting regulations, the greater the scope for manipulation.
Seminar date: 16 January 2026.
Course: FEKH89, Degree Project Undergraduate level, Business Administration, Undergraduate level, 15 ECTS.
Authors: Elias Hagelin, Ludwig Müchler and Mohamed Ubeid.
Advisor: Maria Gårdängen.
Keywords: Earnings management, European union, IFRS 16, information asymmetry, real earnings management.
Research question: Has the implementation of IFRS 16 affected the intensity of earnings management by listed companies within the EU?
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the implementation of IFRS16 and its inpact on the use of earnings management within the EU.
Methodology: Regression analysis conducted based on the models of (McNichols, 2002) and (Roychowdhury, 2006). Secondary data collected from Bloomberg.
Theoretical perspectives: Agent theory, information asymmetry.
Results: The study shows that IFRS 16 has led to an increased use of REM, however, the study can neighter say that AEM has increased nor decreased in intensity following IFRS 16.
Conclusions: The empirics concur with the same pattern as previous studies, (Cohen et al. 2008; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005; Zang, 2012), namely that regulatory tightening of accounting standards creates incentives to even more harmful REM.
JEL-Classifications: C12, D22, G18, G38, H32, M48, O52.}},
author = {{Hagelin, Elias and Müchler, Ludwig and Ubeid, Mohamed}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Ju striktare regler, desto mer manipulation}},
year = {{2025}},
}