Analysing the Initial Emergency Phase during Operational Response of the 2025 Senyar Cyclone in Aceh, Indonesia

Abstract

This study examines how Indonesia’s networked emergency response system performed during the first 72 hours of the Cyclone Senyar disaster in Aceh and what conditions influenced its reliability. Guided by a high-reliability network (HRN) perspective, this research investigates how coordination and collective capacity shape the system’s ability to maintain performance under extreme time pressure and multi-jurisdictional flooding. The study adopts a qualitative case study design with an abductive logic of inquiry, drawing on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted online between February and March 2026 with key municipal actors in Aceh Tamiang, North Aceh, and Pidie Jaya. Data were analysed using directed qualitative content analysis, combining deductive coding based on high-reliability organisation (HRO), high-reliability preparedness networks (HRPN), and HRN theories with inductive coding of emerging themes.

The findings reveal a pattern of partial reliability: while the system did not collapse entirely, reliability was sustained primarily at the tactical and community level through local actors’ improvisation, autonomous decision-making, and community solidarity, whereas it broke down at the institutional and systemic level, where coordinated command, shared situational awareness, and collective preparedness were absent. Three clusters of conditions shaped this outcome: pre-existing structural fragility, crisis-activated breakdown in communication and preparedness, and compensatory mechanisms that mitigated but did not replace systemic reliability. The study concludes that an effective 72-hour response in Indonesia requires pre-established network-level conditions for cooperation and coordination. Future research should prioritise access to national-level actors not captured in this study and conduct a comparative study across different decentralised governance systems.

Popular Abstract

What Senyar Cyclone Exposed about Indonesia’s Emergency Response

When Tropical Cyclone Senyar struck Aceh Province in late November 2025, over 242,000 people were forced to flee their homes, making it one of Indonesia's worst disasters. What happened next was not what anyone had planned. The coordination centres had shut down, electricity and communications had failed, and roads across the affected area were no longer passable. The agencies that were supposed to take charge were affected and prioritised their safety.
The study examined how Indonesia’s emergency response worked during the first 72 hours after Senyar struck – the window that most determines who survives – and what conditions shaped whether the system could be relied upon. The study draws on 15 in-depth interviews with government officials, humanitarian volunteers, and affected community members.
The result showed that the system did not fully collapse but did not truly work either. The top formal system broke within hours. Officials who received six days of advance warning still failed to mobilise in time, partly because they misread the approaching cyclone as just another seasonal flood. When the storm hit, no one had a clear mandate to lead, whether at the provincial or local level. Without any communication backup when the infrastructure failed, situational awareness disappeared almost entirely. As one participant said, “… we wanted to send logistics — but to where; to how many people; what items? We couldn't answer any of those questions.”
At the grassroots level, however, a different story unfolded. Field workers initiated the operations, community members improvised evacuation tools from whatever was at hand, and a deep-rooted Acehnese tradition of mutual aid became the backbone of a response the formal systems could not provide. But the communities that suffered most were those living in remote areas, where access to informal networks was limited, and those trapped by their geographical locations.
Three clusters of conditions produce this outcome. Firstly, structural fragility that pre-dated the disaster: unreadiness of equipment, dormant coordination forums, and a near-absence of joint training between agencies. Second, a breakdown triggered by the crisis itself: the simultaneous collapse of electricity, communications, and roads, compounded by unclear authority between regional and local governments. Third, compensatory mechanisms such as community solidarity and field-level improvisation prevented complete failure, but unevenly.
The findings suggest three practical adjustments: clarify and consolidate in advance who takes command when the disaster emergency state is escalated; activate joint coordination teams before disaster, not – as happened here – 14 days after; and ensure newly appointed local leaders receive sufficient emergency management orientation as part of existing handover procedures. The study concludes that the partial reliability observed during the Senyar response was not caused by the storm but resulted from cumulative underinvestment – in collective preparedness, in trust between government agencies and civil society and in governance mechanisms designed to hold under pressure. Reliable emergency systems are not built in a crisis. They were built continuously in the years before the disaster arrived.

• author: Zakina, Naomi
• supervisor: Tove Frykmer
• organization: Division of Risk Management and Societal Safety
• course: VBRM15 20261
• year: 2026
• type: H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
• subject: Social Sciences
• keywords: Early phase disaster response, 72-hour window, multi-actor coordination, high-reliability network.
• language: English
• id: 9244635
• date added to LUP: 2026-06-29 10:24:24
• date last changed: 2026-06-29 10:24:24