Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem and the Cyclically Fair Norm
(2013) In New Economic Windows p.201216 Abstract
 In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n... (More)
 In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n and then again the same process is repeated between periods (n+1) and 2n and so on. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/022673ae78fb41a0b458682840f679d3
 author
 Banerjee, Priyodorshi; Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan
 publishing date
 2013
 type
 Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
 publication status
 published
 in
 New Economic Windows
 editor
 Abergel, Frédéric
 pages
 201  216
 publisher
 Springer Milan
 external identifiers

 Scopus:84874571955
 DOI
 10.1007/9788847025530_13
 language
 English
 LU publication?
 no
 id
 022673ae78fb41a0b458682840f679d3
 date added to LUP
 20160725 13:35:26
 date last changed
 20161013 05:11:55
@misc{022673ae78fb41a0b458682840f679d3, abstract = {In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n and then again the same process is repeated between periods (n+1) and 2n and so on.}, author = {Banerjee, Priyodorshi and Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan}, editor = {Abergel, Frédéric }, language = {eng}, pages = {201216}, publisher = {ARRAY(0x9a543d0)}, series = {New Economic Windows }, title = {Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem and the Cyclically Fair Norm}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9788847025530_13}, year = {2013}, }