Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem and the Cyclically Fair Norm
(2013) In New Economic Windows p.201-216- Abstract
- In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n... (More)
- In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n and then again the same process is repeated between periods (n+1) and 2n and so on. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/022673ae-78fb-41a0-b458-682840f679d3
- author
- Banerjee, Priyodorshi ; Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan LU
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- host publication
- Econophysics of Systemic Risk and Network Dynamics
- series title
- New Economic Windows
- editor
- Abergel, Frédéric
- pages
- 201 - 216
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84874571955
- ISBN
- 978-88-470-2553-0
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0_13
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 022673ae-78fb-41a0-b458-682840f679d3
- date added to LUP
- 2016-07-25 13:35:26
- date last changed
- 2022-07-12 10:24:37
@inbook{022673ae-78fb-41a0-b458-682840f679d3,
abstract = {{In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n and then again the same process is repeated between periods (n+1) and 2n and so on.}},
author = {{Banerjee, Priyodorshi and Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan}},
booktitle = {{Econophysics of Systemic Risk and Network Dynamics}},
editor = {{Abergel, Frédéric}},
isbn = {{978-88-470-2553-0}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{201--216}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{New Economic Windows}},
title = {{Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem and the Cyclically Fair Norm}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0_13}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0_13}},
year = {{2013}},
}