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A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change

Enqvist, Sebastian LU (2011) In Belief revision meets philosophy of science
Abstract
Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or... (More)
Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
AGM Theory - Abduction - Belief revision - Conceptual spaces - Dynamic Doxastic Logic - Explanation - Idealization - Induction - Logical Empiricism - Research Agenda
in
Belief revision meets philosophy of science
editor
Olsson, Erik J and Enqvist, Sebastian
publisher
Springer
ISBN
978-90-481-9608-1
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
951c2bd3-9cd3-4e08-a3a2-b487818cfd77 (old id 1642364)
date added to LUP
2010-08-23 11:42:14
date last changed
2016-04-16 07:59:28
@misc{951c2bd3-9cd3-4e08-a3a2-b487818cfd77,
  abstract     = {Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.},
  author       = {Enqvist, Sebastian},
  editor       = {Olsson, Erik J and Enqvist, Sebastian},
  isbn         = {978-90-481-9608-1},
  keyword      = {AGM Theory - Abduction - Belief revision - Conceptual spaces - Dynamic Doxastic Logic - Explanation - Idealization - Induction - Logical Empiricism - Research Agenda},
  language     = {eng},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0xc7e4b78)},
  series       = {Belief revision meets philosophy of science},
  title        = {A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change},
  year         = {2011},
}