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Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism

Strandberg, Caj LU (2004)
Abstract
The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny (1), (2) and (3), respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie reasons to assume that non-cognitivism and error-theory are erroneous. In chapters 2 and 3, I suggest that the two main forms of reductionism, analytic and synthetic reductionism, are... (More)
The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny (1), (2) and (3), respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie reasons to assume that non-cognitivism and error-theory are erroneous. In chapters 2 and 3, I suggest that the two main forms of reductionism, analytic and synthetic reductionism, are mistaken. In chapter 4, I argue that the considerations in the previous chapters in relation to non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism provide support to moral realism. It is also suggested that these considerations make it plausible to hypothesise that moral properties depend on non-moral properties in a way I refer to as ‘the realist formula’. The realist formula confirms moral realism since it implies that moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I argue that moral realism, much owing to the realist formula, is able to explain significant meta-ethical issues regarding moral disagreement, moral reason and moral motivation. Among other things, externalism concerning moral motivation is defended. The explanatory value of moral realism in relation to these meta-ethical issues is taken to suggest that this view is preferable to non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism. Some of the meta-ethical issues discussed in these chapters, particularly moral disagreement and motivation, have been thought to provide support to non-cognitivism and error-theory. I maintain that since realism, unlike reductionism, is able to counter these arguments, it justifies us in upholding the view that moral sentences have truth-value and the view that there are moral properties. In chapter 8, various objections against realism with regard to the dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties are responded to. In chapter 9, I consider an influential argument to the effect that moral properties are not involved in causal explanations. I maintain that this argument fails and that it therefore is reasonable to assume that moral properties are natural properties. However, the discussions in chapters 8 and 9 also suggest that moral realism might face problems that cannot be thoroughly discussed in this thesis. (Less)
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author
opponent
  • Professor Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, University of North Carolina
organization
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
keywords
epistemology, ideology, Praktisk filosofi, ideologi, kunskapsteori, metafysik, estetik, Morallära, Systematic philosophy, Moral science, Gilbert Harman., Simon Blackburn, Michael Smith, J. L. Mackie, G. E. Moore, David Brink, Nicholas Sturgeon, moral explanation, argument from queerness, metaphysics, supervenience, fetishist argument, externalism, internalism, moral motivation, moral properties, open question argument, moral reason, moral disagreement, naturalism, reductionism, error-theory, Cornell realism, moral realism, non-cognitivism, meta-ethics, ethics, aesthetics
pages
314 pages
publisher
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
defense location
Sal 104, Kungshuset, Lund
defense date
2004-10-29 10:00
ISBN
91-628-6257-X
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
d7363aed-5d01-406d-b5a0-3456e5daf9f7 (old id 21857)
date added to LUP
2007-05-28 12:15:28
date last changed
2016-09-19 08:45:13
@misc{d7363aed-5d01-406d-b5a0-3456e5daf9f7,
  abstract     = {The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). Realism is contrasted with non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism, which, in brief, deny (1), (2) and (3), respectively. In the introductory chapter, it is also argued that there are some prima facie reasons to assume that non-cognitivism and error-theory are erroneous. In chapters 2 and 3, I suggest that the two main forms of reductionism, analytic and synthetic reductionism, are mistaken. In chapter 4, I argue that the considerations in the previous chapters in relation to non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism provide support to moral realism. It is also suggested that these considerations make it plausible to hypothesise that moral properties depend on non-moral properties in a way I refer to as ‘the realist formula’. The realist formula confirms moral realism since it implies that moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I argue that moral realism, much owing to the realist formula, is able to explain significant meta-ethical issues regarding moral disagreement, moral reason and moral motivation. Among other things, externalism concerning moral motivation is defended. The explanatory value of moral realism in relation to these meta-ethical issues is taken to suggest that this view is preferable to non-cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism. Some of the meta-ethical issues discussed in these chapters, particularly moral disagreement and motivation, have been thought to provide support to non-cognitivism and error-theory. I maintain that since realism, unlike reductionism, is able to counter these arguments, it justifies us in upholding the view that moral sentences have truth-value and the view that there are moral properties. In chapter 8, various objections against realism with regard to the dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties are responded to. In chapter 9, I consider an influential argument to the effect that moral properties are not involved in causal explanations. I maintain that this argument fails and that it therefore is reasonable to assume that moral properties are natural properties. However, the discussions in chapters 8 and 9 also suggest that moral realism might face problems that cannot be thoroughly discussed in this thesis.},
  author       = {Strandberg, Caj},
  isbn         = {91-628-6257-X},
  keyword      = {epistemology,ideology,Praktisk filosofi,ideologi,kunskapsteori,metafysik,estetik,Morallära,Systematic philosophy,Moral science,Gilbert Harman.,Simon Blackburn,Michael Smith,J. L. Mackie,G. E. Moore,David Brink,Nicholas Sturgeon,moral explanation,argument from queerness,metaphysics,supervenience,fetishist argument,externalism,internalism,moral motivation,moral properties,open question argument,moral reason,moral disagreement,naturalism,reductionism,error-theory,Cornell realism,moral realism,non-cognitivism,meta-ethics,ethics,aesthetics},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {314},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0xbcaaa38)},
  title        = {Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism},
  year         = {2004},
}