Liberty, Law and Leviathan. Of Being Free from Impediments by Artifice
(2012) In Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy 59(131). p.1-20- Abstract
- The argument in this paper is that Hobbes’ theory of freedom in Leviathan allows for four ways of being free to act – corporal freedom by nature, freedom from obligation by nature, the freedom to disobey, and the freedom of no-rule – each corresponding to a particular absence, some of which make sense only in the civil state. Contrary to what some have claimed, this complexity does not commit Hobbes to an unarticulated definition of freedom in tension with the only one that he explicitly offers, which is that freedom consists of nothing other than the absence of external impediments of motion. To be free from obligation is to be free from impediments. As a political subject in the state, the power that is blocked or compelled by law is a... (More)
- The argument in this paper is that Hobbes’ theory of freedom in Leviathan allows for four ways of being free to act – corporal freedom by nature, freedom from obligation by nature, the freedom to disobey, and the freedom of no-rule – each corresponding to a particular absence, some of which make sense only in the civil state. Contrary to what some have claimed, this complexity does not commit Hobbes to an unarticulated definition of freedom in tension with the only one that he explicitly offers, which is that freedom consists of nothing other than the absence of external impediments of motion. To be free from obligation is to be free from impediments. As a political subject in the state, the power that is blocked or compelled by law is a person’s power to perform artificial acts as her will directs. Laws and prior commitments are external impediments that block or compel making an artificial, institution dependent act either impossible or unavoidable. The bonds of law bind artificially yet corporally given that the power that makes them is, quite literally, an external body that moves at will. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/2219804
- author
- Halldenius, Lena LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Hobbes, liberty, law, Leviathan, artifice, obligation, impediment, act, institution
- in
- Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy
- volume
- 59
- issue
- 131
- pages
- 1 - 20
- publisher
- Thales
- ISSN
- 0040-5825
- DOI
- 10.3167/th.2012.5913102
- project
- Liberty, Law and Leviathan
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- bca05da6-0d72-41ff-9871-ebda5b6d234e (old id 2219804)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 09:34:26
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 20:54:05
@article{bca05da6-0d72-41ff-9871-ebda5b6d234e,
abstract = {{The argument in this paper is that Hobbes’ theory of freedom in Leviathan allows for four ways of being free to act – corporal freedom by nature, freedom from obligation by nature, the freedom to disobey, and the freedom of no-rule – each corresponding to a particular absence, some of which make sense only in the civil state. Contrary to what some have claimed, this complexity does not commit Hobbes to an unarticulated definition of freedom in tension with the only one that he explicitly offers, which is that freedom consists of nothing other than the absence of external impediments of motion. To be free from obligation is to be free from impediments. As a political subject in the state, the power that is blocked or compelled by law is a person’s power to perform artificial acts as her will directs. Laws and prior commitments are external impediments that block or compel making an artificial, institution dependent act either impossible or unavoidable. The bonds of law bind artificially yet corporally given that the power that makes them is, quite literally, an external body that moves at will.}},
author = {{Halldenius, Lena}},
issn = {{0040-5825}},
keywords = {{Hobbes; liberty; law; Leviathan; artifice; obligation; impediment; act; institution}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{131}},
pages = {{1--20}},
publisher = {{Thales}},
series = {{Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{Liberty, Law and Leviathan. Of Being Free from Impediments by Artifice}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/th.2012.5913102}},
doi = {{10.3167/th.2012.5913102}},
volume = {{59}},
year = {{2012}},
}