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Parity and Comparability—a Concern Regarding Chang’s Chaining Argument

Andersson, Henrik LU (2016) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(1). p.245-253
Abstract

According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is... (More)

According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Chang’s argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Chang’s argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful.

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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Begging the question, Chang, Comparability, Comparisons, Parity, Trichotomy, Vagueness, Value relations
in
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
volume
19
issue
1
pages
9 pages
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • Scopus:84958749305
ISSN
1386-2820
DOI
10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
425c759c-dbc3-4e05-9b50-788cba69dc81
date added to LUP
2016-07-08 12:01:14
date last changed
2016-12-04 04:52:47
@misc{425c759c-dbc3-4e05-9b50-788cba69dc81,
  abstract     = {<p>According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Chang’s argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Chang’s argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful.</p>},
  author       = {Andersson, Henrik},
  issn         = {1386-2820},
  keyword      = {Begging the question,Chang,Comparability,Comparisons,Parity,Trichotomy,Vagueness,Value relations},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {02},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {245--253},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x9afe850)},
  series       = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
  title        = {Parity and Comparability—a Concern Regarding Chang’s Chaining Argument},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5},
  volume       = {19},
  year         = {2016},
}