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On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change

Olsson, Erik J LU and Westlund, David (2006) In Erkenntnis 65(2). p.165-183
Abstract
The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent's beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent's epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view-a view that we identify as a "Quinean dogma" - is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent's research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person's questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical... (More)
The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent's beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent's epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view-a view that we identify as a "Quinean dogma" - is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent's research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person's questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Erkenntnis
volume
65
issue
2
pages
165 - 183
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • WOS:000243137700002
  • Scopus:33751181437
ISSN
1572-8420
DOI
10.1007/s10670-006-9001-6
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e67e7620-fbd2-4030-a110-f33462a141e4 (old id 757483)
date added to LUP
2007-12-20 09:27:11
date last changed
2016-10-13 04:57:19
@misc{e67e7620-fbd2-4030-a110-f33462a141e4,
  abstract     = {The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent's beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent's epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view-a view that we identify as a "Quinean dogma" - is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent's research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person's questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology.},
  author       = {Olsson, Erik J and Westlund, David},
  issn         = {1572-8420},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {165--183},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x95164c8)},
  series       = {Erkenntnis},
  title        = {On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9001-6},
  volume       = {65},
  year         = {2006},
}