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A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2005) In Recent Work on Intrinsic Value p.115-130
Abstract
The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final... (More)
The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
in
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value
editor
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael
pages
115 - 130
publisher
Springer
ISBN
9781402034857
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
0e78b119-88e3-451d-b7a6-8d37026275f3 (old id 777455)
date added to LUP
2008-01-28 08:57:07
date last changed
2016-10-19 11:26:29
@misc{0e78b119-88e3-451d-b7a6-8d37026275f3,
  abstract     = {The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc.},
  author       = {Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  editor       = {Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael},
  isbn         = {9781402034857},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {115--130},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0xbb42210)},
  series       = {Recent Work on Intrinsic Value},
  title        = {A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake},
  year         = {2005},
}