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Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2002) In Journal of Value Inquiry 36(4). p.463-472
Abstract
Hedonism and preferentialism are two popular theories about what has final value, i.e. is valuable for its own sake. The latter theory is customarily portrayed as the wider of these, in that it ascribes value to much more than pleasures, viz., to any object of a final preference. By examining the metaphysical underpinnings of these views, it is argued that a fundamental issue between these theories concerns the question “what are the fundamental bearers of final value?” While hedonism is here defined as the view that ascribes final value only to concrete sensations of pleasure, preferentialism is initially understood as claiming that final value accrues to the objects of preferences. Given that such objects are often assumed to be abstract... (More)
Hedonism and preferentialism are two popular theories about what has final value, i.e. is valuable for its own sake. The latter theory is customarily portrayed as the wider of these, in that it ascribes value to much more than pleasures, viz., to any object of a final preference. By examining the metaphysical underpinnings of these views, it is argued that a fundamental issue between these theories concerns the question “what are the fundamental bearers of final value?” While hedonism is here defined as the view that ascribes final value only to concrete sensations of pleasure, preferentialism is initially understood as claiming that final value accrues to the objects of preferences. Given that such objects are often assumed to be abstract entities, hedonists might launch a possible argument against preferentialism, viz., that since value on a preferentialist reading only accrues to abstract objects (states of affairs), preferentialists are debarred from valuing what hedonists value (concrete sensations). Various replies with which a preferentialist might counter this objection are examined. However, it is concluded that these suggestions are not convincing. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Journal of Value Inquiry
volume
36
issue
4
pages
463 - 472
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • WOS:000180344100007
  • Scopus:0141790876
ISSN
0022-5363
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
68d9ef0b-492d-4dbb-8d45-29f1311f116e (old id 793456)
date added to LUP
2008-01-28 09:16:13
date last changed
2016-10-13 04:51:47
@misc{68d9ef0b-492d-4dbb-8d45-29f1311f116e,
  abstract     = {Hedonism and preferentialism are two popular theories about what has final value, i.e. is valuable for its own sake. The latter theory is customarily portrayed as the wider of these, in that it ascribes value to much more than pleasures, viz., to any object of a final preference. By examining the metaphysical underpinnings of these views, it is argued that a fundamental issue between these theories concerns the question “what are the fundamental bearers of final value?” While hedonism is here defined as the view that ascribes final value only to concrete sensations of pleasure, preferentialism is initially understood as claiming that final value accrues to the objects of preferences. Given that such objects are often assumed to be abstract entities, hedonists might launch a possible argument against preferentialism, viz., that since value on a preferentialist reading only accrues to abstract objects (states of affairs), preferentialists are debarred from valuing what hedonists value (concrete sensations). Various replies with which a preferentialist might counter this objection are examined. However, it is concluded that these suggestions are not convincing.},
  author       = {Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  issn         = {0022-5363},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {463--472},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x9e31f28)},
  series       = {Journal of Value Inquiry},
  title        = {Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers},
  volume       = {36},
  year         = {2002},
}