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Self-Identification and Self-Reference

Brinck, Ingar LU (1998) In Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Special Issue on the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. p.1-15
Abstract
Wittgenstein once made a distinction between two uses of "I". The first use, as object, as in "I have broken my arm" or "The wind is blowing in my hair", involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is the possibility of error concerning the identity of the person. In the other use, as subject, as in "I think it will rain" or "I am trying to lift my arm", no person is recognised. No mistake can be made about who the subject is. By this distinction, Wittgenstein drew attention to a phenomenon that later has been dubbed immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). The paper discusses Evans’ views on immunity to error through misidentification, and critically assesses some problems of his account, related to the fact that... (More)
Wittgenstein once made a distinction between two uses of "I". The first use, as object, as in "I have broken my arm" or "The wind is blowing in my hair", involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is the possibility of error concerning the identity of the person. In the other use, as subject, as in "I think it will rain" or "I am trying to lift my arm", no person is recognised. No mistake can be made about who the subject is. By this distinction, Wittgenstein drew attention to a phenomenon that later has been dubbed immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). The paper discusses Evans’ views on immunity to error through misidentification, and critically assesses some problems of his account, related to the fact that information-links by themselves neither can determine contents of thought, nor guarantee the IEM of judgements based on purely informational states. (Less)
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in
Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Special Issue on the Philosophy of Gareth Evans.
pages
1 - 15
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a538332d-0ae2-4e77-9228-ab76e43be344 (old id 961074)
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http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1998/brinck98.html
date added to LUP
2008-01-28 08:36:20
date last changed
2016-04-16 12:36:02
@misc{a538332d-0ae2-4e77-9228-ab76e43be344,
  abstract     = {Wittgenstein once made a distinction between two uses of "I". The first use, as object, as in "I have broken my arm" or "The wind is blowing in my hair", involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is the possibility of error concerning the identity of the person. In the other use, as subject, as in "I think it will rain" or "I am trying to lift my arm", no person is recognised. No mistake can be made about who the subject is. By this distinction, Wittgenstein drew attention to a phenomenon that later has been dubbed immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). The paper discusses Evans’ views on immunity to error through misidentification, and critically assesses some problems of his account, related to the fact that information-links by themselves neither can determine contents of thought, nor guarantee the IEM of judgements based on purely informational states.},
  author       = {Brinck, Ingar},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {1--15},
  series       = {Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Special Issue on the Philosophy of Gareth Evans.},
  title        = {Self-Identification and Self-Reference},
  year         = {1998},
}