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Can two wrongs make it right? Reconsidering minimum resale price maintenance in the light of Allianz Hungaria

Nowag, Julian LU (2015) In European Competition Journal 11(2/3). p.340-366
Abstract
Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing the economic theory behind RPM and the EU court's approach to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise the approach to minimum RPM.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
per se illegality, RPM, minimum RPM, object and effect distinction, effects-analysis, cartels, anti-competitive object , anti-competitive effect, object restrictions, competition law, konkurrensrätt, avtal om prisbindning, effektanalys, karteller
in
European Competition Journal
volume
11
issue
2/3
pages
27 pages
ISSN
1744-1056
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
f8e68ea4-f75d-404e-9510-4945ee9325e0
alternative location
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1080044
date added to LUP
2016-06-27 13:52:06
date last changed
2016-06-30 15:39:18
@misc{f8e68ea4-f75d-404e-9510-4945ee9325e0,
  abstract     = {Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing the economic theory behind RPM and the EU court's approach to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise the approach to minimum RPM.},
  author       = {Nowag, Julian},
  issn         = {1744-1056},
  keyword      = { per se illegality, RPM,minimum RPM,object and effect distinction,effects-analysis,cartels,anti-competitive object ,anti-competitive effect,object restrictions,competition law,konkurrensrätt,avtal om prisbindning,effektanalys,karteller},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2/3},
  pages        = {340--366},
  series       = {European Competition Journal},
  title        = {Can two wrongs make it right? Reconsidering minimum resale price maintenance in the light of Allianz Hungaria},
  volume       = {11},
  year         = {2015},
}