Inherent hinders in International Law – a case study of obstacles for coherent human rights protection in Europe
(2011) JURM01 20111Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Den här uppsatsen handlar om aspekter av generell internationell rätt som begränsar ett enhetligt skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna i Europa. Genom att diskutera och förklara fall från EU-domstolen och Europadomstolen så visas de begränsande aspekterna i internationell rätt genom de bägge domstolarnas agerande.
EU-domstolen hade sedan tidigare, tydligt och med emfas, slagit fast att EU-rätten (EG-rätten fram till 1 januari 2010) är en egen rättsordning, skild från och högre stående än medlemsstaternas nationella rättsordningar. I fallet Kadi från 2008 tog domstolen ytterligare ett steg i sitt ”självständighetsförklarande” genom att särskilja EU-rätten från folkrätt skapad av Säkerhetsrådet, i frågor som rör mänskliga rättigheter.
... (More) - Den här uppsatsen handlar om aspekter av generell internationell rätt som begränsar ett enhetligt skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna i Europa. Genom att diskutera och förklara fall från EU-domstolen och Europadomstolen så visas de begränsande aspekterna i internationell rätt genom de bägge domstolarnas agerande.
EU-domstolen hade sedan tidigare, tydligt och med emfas, slagit fast att EU-rätten (EG-rätten fram till 1 januari 2010) är en egen rättsordning, skild från och högre stående än medlemsstaternas nationella rättsordningar. I fallet Kadi från 2008 tog domstolen ytterligare ett steg i sitt ”självständighetsförklarande” genom att särskilja EU-rätten från folkrätt skapad av Säkerhetsrådet, i frågor som rör mänskliga rättigheter.
Å andra sidan har Europadomstolen genom ett antal rättsfall visat på en motsatt attityd i förhållande till Säkerhetsrådet. Domstolen i Strasbourg har, i motsats till sin EU-granne i Luxemburg, genom rättsfall infogat sig i den folkrättsliga strukturen, i den hierarki skapad av FN-stadgan och med Säkerhetsrådet högst upp.
Den här uppsatsen belyser och diskuterar de mest centrala folkrättsliga aspekterna som ligger till grund för de bägge domstolarnas olika synsätt. Med dessa avses artikel 103 i FN-stadgan och den rättsliga osäkerheten kring Säkerhetsrådets skyldigheter att följa mänskliga rättigheter samt begreppet suveränitet inom internationell rätt. Vidare diskuteras potentiella konsekvenser för skyddet av mänskliga rättigheter i ljuset av de domstolarnas olika syn på folkrätten. Slutligen presenteras ett argument som författaren menar skulle lösa delar av problemet. Författaren menar att principen om lex specialis skulle kunna användas som tolkningsmedel för att skyddet för mänskliga rättigheter inte ska underordnas den tvingande karaktären i artikel 103 i FN-stadgan. (Less) - Abstract
- This thesis deals with the inherent hinders in international law, which are obstacles to a coherent human rights protection in Europe. By looking at cases from the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights respectively, the inherent hinders are presented through the differences in attitudes demonstrated in case-law from the two courts and discussed in light of the potential effects for human rights protection in Europe.
The ECJ had previously clearly, and firmly, established that EU-law (EC-law until 1 January 2010) is an autonomous legal system: separate from, and superior to, the domestic legal systems of the member states. In 2008, in Kadi, the ECJ took another decisive step in establishing its legal... (More) - This thesis deals with the inherent hinders in international law, which are obstacles to a coherent human rights protection in Europe. By looking at cases from the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights respectively, the inherent hinders are presented through the differences in attitudes demonstrated in case-law from the two courts and discussed in light of the potential effects for human rights protection in Europe.
The ECJ had previously clearly, and firmly, established that EU-law (EC-law until 1 January 2010) is an autonomous legal system: separate from, and superior to, the domestic legal systems of the member states. In 2008, in Kadi, the ECJ took another decisive step in establishing its legal independence by distinguishing EU-law from International Law created by the UN Security Council when human rights were at issue.
Quite on the contrary, in a series of cases, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted and confirmed its position as an international organ, part of the system of International Law, or the International Legal Order, with the UNSC as the supreme lawmaker.
This thesis highlights and discusses the key legal aspects underlying the two courts’ reasoning; Article 103 of the UN Charter and the human rights limitations of the UNSC as well as the notion of sovereignty in international law. Further, it discusses potential consequences of these attitudes and presents an argument to overcome part of the problem. The author argues that the principle of lex specialis could be used as an interpretive means to allow for human rights to trump the mandating character of Article 103 of the UN Charter. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1988270
- author
- Bengtson, Felix LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM01 20111
- year
- 2011
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- Public International Law
- language
- English
- id
- 1988270
- date added to LUP
- 2011-06-28 14:40:49
- date last changed
- 2011-06-28 14:40:49
@misc{1988270,
abstract = {{This thesis deals with the inherent hinders in international law, which are obstacles to a coherent human rights protection in Europe. By looking at cases from the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights respectively, the inherent hinders are presented through the differences in attitudes demonstrated in case-law from the two courts and discussed in light of the potential effects for human rights protection in Europe.
The ECJ had previously clearly, and firmly, established that EU-law (EC-law until 1 January 2010) is an autonomous legal system: separate from, and superior to, the domestic legal systems of the member states. In 2008, in Kadi, the ECJ took another decisive step in establishing its legal independence by distinguishing EU-law from International Law created by the UN Security Council when human rights were at issue.
Quite on the contrary, in a series of cases, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted and confirmed its position as an international organ, part of the system of International Law, or the International Legal Order, with the UNSC as the supreme lawmaker.
This thesis highlights and discusses the key legal aspects underlying the two courts’ reasoning; Article 103 of the UN Charter and the human rights limitations of the UNSC as well as the notion of sovereignty in international law. Further, it discusses potential consequences of these attitudes and presents an argument to overcome part of the problem. The author argues that the principle of lex specialis could be used as an interpretive means to allow for human rights to trump the mandating character of Article 103 of the UN Charter.}},
author = {{Bengtson, Felix}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Inherent hinders in International Law – a case study of obstacles for coherent human rights protection in Europe}},
year = {{2011}},
}