Att veta vad som gjorts - En kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretisk analys av straffrättslig bevisteori
(2015) LAGM01 20152Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- I detta examensarbete åtar jag mig uppgiften att analysera bevisteori gällande svensk straffprocessrätt utifrån ett kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretiskt perspektiv. Härvid försöker jag först besvara frågan om vilka idéer eller föreställningar om kunskap som kommer till uttryck i bevisteorin. Jag gör dock inte anspråk på någon uttömmande uppräkning av dessa, utan vill snarare ge en översikt över ett antal sådana idéer. Jag har dessutom försökt visa att kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretiska argument, formulerade av Sandra Harding och W.V.O. Quine, är applicerbara även på bevisteorin, genom att ställa frågan vilken betydelse dessa argument kan tänkas ha i sammanhanget.
För att besvara den förstnämnda frågan har jag gjort en (något översiktlig)... (More) - I detta examensarbete åtar jag mig uppgiften att analysera bevisteori gällande svensk straffprocessrätt utifrån ett kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretiskt perspektiv. Härvid försöker jag först besvara frågan om vilka idéer eller föreställningar om kunskap som kommer till uttryck i bevisteorin. Jag gör dock inte anspråk på någon uttömmande uppräkning av dessa, utan vill snarare ge en översikt över ett antal sådana idéer. Jag har dessutom försökt visa att kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretiska argument, formulerade av Sandra Harding och W.V.O. Quine, är applicerbara även på bevisteorin, genom att ställa frågan vilken betydelse dessa argument kan tänkas ha i sammanhanget.
För att besvara den förstnämnda frågan har jag gjort en (något översiktlig) beskrivning av bevisningen i svenska brottmål, både vad gäller det processuella och vad gäller bevisföring och –prövning, vilket redovisas i uppsatsens andra kapitel. Jag har därefter försökt att (genom textanalys av bevisteoretiska texter) illustrera bevisning som en form av kunskapsproduktion. Detta beskriver jag i det tredje kapitlet i uppsatsen, där jag fokuserar på vissa kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretiskt intressanta aspekter. I detta sammanhang argumenterar jag för att kunskapen som produceras genom bevisning är mycket lik den traditionella uppfattningen om kunskap såsom justified true belief, att straffrättsbevisningen (läst som en kunskapsproduktion) är del av en rationalistisk-positivistisk idétradition, att de metoder som används förkroppsligar idéer från Descartes och Bertrand Russell, samt att bevisningen i brottmål, sedd som system, påminner om Charles Sanders Peirces kunskapsteori.
I samma kapitel applicerar jag både Hardings och Quines argument på bevisteorin. Gällande Harding finner jag att hennes kritik av ”svag” objektivitet i vetenskapen träffar även den juridiska motsvarigheten, och att hennes lösning, en ”stark” objektivitet, kan anpassas även i juridiska sammanhang. Gällande Quine, vars argument riktas mot den verifikationistiska idén om fasta sanningsvillkor, kommer jag till liknande slutsatser vad gäller argumentets relevans, men att detta inte nödvändigtvis utgör något större problem för domstolars bevisvärdering. Jag finner dock att det finns utrymme för ytterligare, mer specialiserade, studier gällande bägge argument (och deras potentiella lösningar). (Less) - Abstract
- In this graduate thesis I set out to analyze Swedish evidence theory (as it pertains to procedural law in criminal cases) using epistemology and philosophy of science. In doing so, I have attempted to answer question of which ideas or concepts, borrowed from these two disciplines, can be found in Swedish evidence theory, whether explicit or implicit. On this account, it has not been my aim to give a complete and total account of all such ideas embedded within or expressed through evidence theory, but to describe at least some of them. Additionally, I have tried to show that arguments given by the philosophers W.V.O. Quine and Sandra Harding are perfectly applicable to evidence theory and thus provide interesting illuminations of it, by... (More)
- In this graduate thesis I set out to analyze Swedish evidence theory (as it pertains to procedural law in criminal cases) using epistemology and philosophy of science. In doing so, I have attempted to answer question of which ideas or concepts, borrowed from these two disciplines, can be found in Swedish evidence theory, whether explicit or implicit. On this account, it has not been my aim to give a complete and total account of all such ideas embedded within or expressed through evidence theory, but to describe at least some of them. Additionally, I have tried to show that arguments given by the philosophers W.V.O. Quine and Sandra Harding are perfectly applicable to evidence theory and thus provide interesting illuminations of it, by asking what importance these arguments or accounts may hold for Swedish evidence theory. To answer the first question, I have firstly given an (admittedly somewhat brief, considering the vast scope of the subject) overview of evidence theory as applied to criminal cases by describing procedural aspects and methods of evidence evaluation. I then proceeded to reexamine evidence theory as a form of production of knowledge (by way of a form of textual analysis in which I have extrapolated ideas about knowledge, truth, doubt etc. from the explicitly jurisprudential texts used), which I describe in the third and final chapter of the paper, where I expand upon certain epistemologically and scientifically relevant aspects. There, I try to show that the knowledge produced by evidential procedure is very similar (though not identical) to the traditional conceptualization of knowledge as justified true belief, that Swedish evidential evaluation as a means of knowledge production is closely aligned to a Rationalist/positivist tradition, that the methods used embody both Cartesian ideas and ideas formulated by Bertrand Russell, and, finally, that the evidential procedure, taken as a whole, is reminiscent of Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of knowledge.
In the same chapter, I apply both Harding’s and Quine’s philosophical arguments to evidence theory. Regarding Harding’s argument, concerning “weak” and “strong” objectivity, I conclude that the problems she identifies in the scientific concept of objectivity are mirrored in its jurisprudential and legal counterpart, and that her solution to these problems could reasonably be adopted in this context as well. Regarding Quine, whose argument targets verificationist idea of fixed “truth conditions”, I come to similar conclusions about applicability, but find that this is not necessarily a cause for any major concern as existing legal theory provides a way of dealing with the issue. Both accounts do, in my opinion, merit further, more specialized study. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8514043
- author
- Karlström, Alexander LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Knowing What Happened - An Analysis of Criminal Evidence Theory from the Perspective of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
- course
- LAGM01 20152
- year
- 2015
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, criminal law, kunskapsteori, epistemology, processrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 8514043
- date added to LUP
- 2016-02-04 12:01:31
- date last changed
- 2016-02-04 12:01:31
@misc{8514043,
abstract = {{In this graduate thesis I set out to analyze Swedish evidence theory (as it pertains to procedural law in criminal cases) using epistemology and philosophy of science. In doing so, I have attempted to answer question of which ideas or concepts, borrowed from these two disciplines, can be found in Swedish evidence theory, whether explicit or implicit. On this account, it has not been my aim to give a complete and total account of all such ideas embedded within or expressed through evidence theory, but to describe at least some of them. Additionally, I have tried to show that arguments given by the philosophers W.V.O. Quine and Sandra Harding are perfectly applicable to evidence theory and thus provide interesting illuminations of it, by asking what importance these arguments or accounts may hold for Swedish evidence theory. To answer the first question, I have firstly given an (admittedly somewhat brief, considering the vast scope of the subject) overview of evidence theory as applied to criminal cases by describing procedural aspects and methods of evidence evaluation. I then proceeded to reexamine evidence theory as a form of production of knowledge (by way of a form of textual analysis in which I have extrapolated ideas about knowledge, truth, doubt etc. from the explicitly jurisprudential texts used), which I describe in the third and final chapter of the paper, where I expand upon certain epistemologically and scientifically relevant aspects. There, I try to show that the knowledge produced by evidential procedure is very similar (though not identical) to the traditional conceptualization of knowledge as justified true belief, that Swedish evidential evaluation as a means of knowledge production is closely aligned to a Rationalist/positivist tradition, that the methods used embody both Cartesian ideas and ideas formulated by Bertrand Russell, and, finally, that the evidential procedure, taken as a whole, is reminiscent of Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of knowledge.
In the same chapter, I apply both Harding’s and Quine’s philosophical arguments to evidence theory. Regarding Harding’s argument, concerning “weak” and “strong” objectivity, I conclude that the problems she identifies in the scientific concept of objectivity are mirrored in its jurisprudential and legal counterpart, and that her solution to these problems could reasonably be adopted in this context as well. Regarding Quine, whose argument targets verificationist idea of fixed “truth conditions”, I come to similar conclusions about applicability, but find that this is not necessarily a cause for any major concern as existing legal theory provides a way of dealing with the issue. Both accounts do, in my opinion, merit further, more specialized study.}},
author = {{Karlström, Alexander}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Att veta vad som gjorts - En kunskaps- och vetenskapsteoretisk analys av straffrättslig bevisteori}},
year = {{2015}},
}