Business judgment rule - bör svenska domstolar utvärdera företags affärsbeslut?
(2021) LAGF03 20211Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- Claims for damages against board members have historically been unusual in Sweden but have started to increase in recent years. The responsibility of board members is regulated in the 29th chapter 1 § of the Swedish Companies Act (SCA) and of particular interest for this essay are the cases where the board has caused damage upon the company through bad business decisions. In such cases in the US, board members are protected by the business judgment rule (BJR); a rule which stipulates that the board will not be responsible for merely having made a bad business decision. The rule works as a presumption and means that the court will not review a business decision that has turned out bad for the company, if the decision has been made on an... (More)
- Claims for damages against board members have historically been unusual in Sweden but have started to increase in recent years. The responsibility of board members is regulated in the 29th chapter 1 § of the Swedish Companies Act (SCA) and of particular interest for this essay are the cases where the board has caused damage upon the company through bad business decisions. In such cases in the US, board members are protected by the business judgment rule (BJR); a rule which stipulates that the board will not be responsible for merely having made a bad business decision. The rule works as a presumption and means that the court will not review a business decision that has turned out bad for the company, if the decision has been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. The burden is on the plaintiff to break this presumption, if he is not successful the case will be rejected by the court and will not be tried in substance.
In Sweden there is no formal BJR. However, in the legal literature there are those who claim that the Swedish courts in fact apply an approach that is more or less identical. The purpose of this essay has been to bring clarity on the matter by studying case law and legal doctrine written on the subject and in addition to discuss whether the Swedish legislator should take action in order to remove uncertainties.
The consensus in the Swedish legal literature is that courts will not review a business decision taken by the board of a company and that the courts should be cautious about holding board members responsible for bad business decisions. This main rule is in accordance with the BJR but there are exceptions according to the preparatory work of a partial reform of the SCA. The question of what these exceptions could be was left to the discretion of the courts.
Case law on the matter is limited. The Swedish supreme court has never expressly ruled on the matter of how the courts should determine when board members can be held accountable for bad decisions. There are cases in the lower courts where some factors that the judges consider are recurring, for example if the decision was taken on an informed basis and if the board members acted in what they thought was in the best interest of the company. These cases are analyzed in the final part of this essay and the conclusion is that the BJR does not exist in Sweden, but the lower court’s reasoning on the matter bears certain similarities. Hence, another conclusion is that a similar rule as the BJR should be expressly introduced. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Skadeståndsprocesser mot styrelseledamöter har historiskt varit ovanliga i Sverige men antalet fall har ökat på senare år. Styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar regleras i 29 kap. 1 § aktiebolagslagen (ABL) och av särskilt intresse för denna framställning är de fall där styrelseledamöterna orsakat skada för bolaget genom dåliga affärsbeslut. I USA skyddas styrelseledamöter i dessa fall av business judgment rule (BJR); en regel som kortfattat innebär att styrelseledamöter inte ska bli skadeståndsskyldiga blott genom att ha gjort en dålig affär. Regeln fungerar som en presumtion och innebär att domstolarna inte överprövar ett affärsbeslut som visat sig vara dåligt för bolaget förutsatt att beslutet fattats mot bakgrund av ett väl underbyggt... (More)
- Skadeståndsprocesser mot styrelseledamöter har historiskt varit ovanliga i Sverige men antalet fall har ökat på senare år. Styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar regleras i 29 kap. 1 § aktiebolagslagen (ABL) och av särskilt intresse för denna framställning är de fall där styrelseledamöterna orsakat skada för bolaget genom dåliga affärsbeslut. I USA skyddas styrelseledamöter i dessa fall av business judgment rule (BJR); en regel som kortfattat innebär att styrelseledamöter inte ska bli skadeståndsskyldiga blott genom att ha gjort en dålig affär. Regeln fungerar som en presumtion och innebär att domstolarna inte överprövar ett affärsbeslut som visat sig vara dåligt för bolaget förutsatt att beslutet fattats mot bakgrund av ett väl underbyggt informationsunderlag, i god tro och med bolagets bästa för ögonen. Käranden i målet måste bryta denna presumtion, annars avvisas målet och ingen materiell prövning sker.
I Sverige finns det ingen uttrycklig regel likt BJR. I viss juridisk litteratur hävdas det emellertid att domstolarna tillämpar något som är nästintill identiskt. Syftet med detta arbete har varit att försöka klargöra rättsläget på området genom att studera doktrin och praxis, samt att ta ställning till huruvida lagstiftaren borde agera och införa en uttrycklig reglering.
Det råder samstämmighet inom den juridiska litteraturen om att domstolar inte överprövar affärsmässigheten i ett beslut taget av en styrelse och att restriktivitet bör iakttas med att hålla styrelseledamöter skadeståndsskyldiga för dåliga affärer. Detta är en utgångspunkt som stämmer väl överens med elementen i BJR, men utgångspunkten är inte undantagslös, vilket bland annat framhålls av förarbetena till en delreform av ABL. Frågan om exakt var gränserna går överlämnades där till rättstillämparens diskretion.
Praxis på området är dessvärre begränsad. HD har aldrig uttryckligt behandlat frågan om hur denna bedömning ska göras. Det finns emellertid viss underrättspraxis på området där en del faktorer som beaktas av domstolarna är återkommande. Fokus läggs ofta på beslutsprocessen, exempelvis huruvida informationsinsamlingen är fullgod och om styrelseledamöterna tagit beslutet utifrån att de trodde att det var det bästa för bolaget. Dessa domstolsavgöranden analyseras i slutet av uppsatsen och slutsatsen blir att BJR inte finns i Sverige men att underrätterna använder sig av snarlika resonemang. Ytterligare en slutsats blir därmed att en regel likt BJR bör införas uttryckligen i Sverige. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9045607
- author
- Winström, Ted LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20211
- year
- 2021
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- associationsrätt, business judgment rule
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9045607
- date added to LUP
- 2021-06-29 16:32:35
- date last changed
- 2021-06-29 16:32:35
@misc{9045607,
abstract = {{Claims for damages against board members have historically been unusual in Sweden but have started to increase in recent years. The responsibility of board members is regulated in the 29th chapter 1 § of the Swedish Companies Act (SCA) and of particular interest for this essay are the cases where the board has caused damage upon the company through bad business decisions. In such cases in the US, board members are protected by the business judgment rule (BJR); a rule which stipulates that the board will not be responsible for merely having made a bad business decision. The rule works as a presumption and means that the court will not review a business decision that has turned out bad for the company, if the decision has been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. The burden is on the plaintiff to break this presumption, if he is not successful the case will be rejected by the court and will not be tried in substance.
In Sweden there is no formal BJR. However, in the legal literature there are those who claim that the Swedish courts in fact apply an approach that is more or less identical. The purpose of this essay has been to bring clarity on the matter by studying case law and legal doctrine written on the subject and in addition to discuss whether the Swedish legislator should take action in order to remove uncertainties.
The consensus in the Swedish legal literature is that courts will not review a business decision taken by the board of a company and that the courts should be cautious about holding board members responsible for bad business decisions. This main rule is in accordance with the BJR but there are exceptions according to the preparatory work of a partial reform of the SCA. The question of what these exceptions could be was left to the discretion of the courts.
Case law on the matter is limited. The Swedish supreme court has never expressly ruled on the matter of how the courts should determine when board members can be held accountable for bad decisions. There are cases in the lower courts where some factors that the judges consider are recurring, for example if the decision was taken on an informed basis and if the board members acted in what they thought was in the best interest of the company. These cases are analyzed in the final part of this essay and the conclusion is that the BJR does not exist in Sweden, but the lower court’s reasoning on the matter bears certain similarities. Hence, another conclusion is that a similar rule as the BJR should be expressly introduced.}},
author = {{Winström, Ted}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Business judgment rule - bör svenska domstolar utvärdera företags affärsbeslut?}},
year = {{2021}},
}