Patentpoolen och risken för konkurrenshämmande verksamhet
(2021) LAGF03 20212Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The market economy sought within the European Union is based on concepts such as competitiveness, welfare, and innovation. Innovation is, in particular, considered to be an important and dynamic part of the market by promoting competition. The patent pool is based on an arrangement between competitors. Anyone who has become acquainted with competition law is well aware of its critical attitude towards cooperation agreements. Pooling agreements illustrate the difficulty of balancing the interests of intellectual property rights and competition law. Competition law is uniformly regulated within the union. When dealing with patent pools, the relevant regulation is Article 101 (1) TFEU, under which cooperation that risks harming competition is... (More)
- The market economy sought within the European Union is based on concepts such as competitiveness, welfare, and innovation. Innovation is, in particular, considered to be an important and dynamic part of the market by promoting competition. The patent pool is based on an arrangement between competitors. Anyone who has become acquainted with competition law is well aware of its critical attitude towards cooperation agreements. Pooling agreements illustrate the difficulty of balancing the interests of intellectual property rights and competition law. Competition law is uniformly regulated within the union. When dealing with patent pools, the relevant regulation is Article 101 (1) TFEU, under which cooperation that risks harming competition is prohibited. As patent pools are not covered by the regulations which exempt groups of agreements from the prohibited area, the assessment is made in relation to Article 101. In order to help companies examine their agreements the Commission has developed general guidelines.
The guidelines paint a picture of the conditions under which pooling agreements are assumed to harm or promote competition. The assessment takes place in two steps and the analysis includes the agreement on the formation of the pool as well as the licensing out agreement. Several risks can be identified. Firstly, the nature of the pooled patents is crucial. Substitute patents should not be pooled at all, and attention should be paid to pools that contain complementary but non-essential patents. When assessing such pools, the risk of exclusion of third parties is crucial as well as rule of reason analysis where economic benefits are taken into account. Overall, the Commission emphasizes the risk of exclusion of third parties. To reduce the risks, the Commission offers some solution through, for example, the use of an independent expert. On the same track, open participation, non-exclusivity and reasonable as well as fair conditions are highly valued.
The thesis describes the legal framework that surrounds patent pools within the union and discusses the risks associated with such arrangements. The lack of actual sources of law has brought shortcomings in the current system to light. In the author’s opinion, there is reason to question the durability in the current regulation. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Den sociala marknadsekonomi som eftersträvas inom EU har sin grund i begrepp som konkurrenskraft, välfärd och innovation. Just innovation anses utgöra en viktig och dynamisk del av marknaden genom att främja fri konkurrens. Patentpooler har av många ansetts vara ett gott medel för att gynna innovation och dessa utgör därmed en viktig spelare på den fria marknaden. Patentpoolen innebär i grunden ett avtal mellan konkurrenter. Den som tidigare bekantat sig med konkurrensrätten känner till den kritiska inställning till samarbetsavtal som rättsområdet står för. Poolingarrangemang rör sig i gränslandet mellan tillåtet och otillåtet samarbete och illustrerar väl balansgången mellan konkurrens- och immaterialrättens intressen. Frågor som rör fri... (More)
- Den sociala marknadsekonomi som eftersträvas inom EU har sin grund i begrepp som konkurrenskraft, välfärd och innovation. Just innovation anses utgöra en viktig och dynamisk del av marknaden genom att främja fri konkurrens. Patentpooler har av många ansetts vara ett gott medel för att gynna innovation och dessa utgör därmed en viktig spelare på den fria marknaden. Patentpoolen innebär i grunden ett avtal mellan konkurrenter. Den som tidigare bekantat sig med konkurrensrätten känner till den kritiska inställning till samarbetsavtal som rättsområdet står för. Poolingarrangemang rör sig i gränslandet mellan tillåtet och otillåtet samarbete och illustrerar väl balansgången mellan konkurrens- och immaterialrättens intressen. Frågor som rör fri konkurrens regleras enhetligt inom unionen. För patentpoolens del aktualiseras framförallt artikel 101.1 FEUF under vilken samarbete som riskerar att skada konkurrensen förbjuds. Eftersom patentpooler inte omfattas av de förordningar som undantar grupper av avtal från förbudsområdet sker bedömningen i förhållande till artikel 101. Som vägledning har kommissionen tagit fram allmänna riktlinjer.
Genom riktlinjerna skapas en bild av under vilka förutsättningar poolingarrangemang antas skada eller gynna den fria konkurrensen. Bedömningen sker grovt taget i två steg, där analysen omfattar såväl avtalet om bildandet av poolen som licensieringsavtalet från denna. Vissa risker identifieras. För det första är patentens inbördes förhållanden avgörande. Substitutpatent bör inte poolas alls och extra uppmärksamhet bör riktas till pooler som innehåller kompletterande men icke-nödvändiga patent. Vid bedömning av sådana pooler blir risken för utestängning av tredje man avgörande, tillsammans med en proportionalitetsbedömning där hänsyn tas till den ekonomiska nyttan av poolen. Även i övrigt läggs stor vikt vid risken för utestängning av tredje man. För att minska riskerna erbjuder kommissionen viss lösning genom till exempel anlitandet av en oberoende expert. På samma spår värderas öppet deltagande, icke-exklusivitet och rimliga samt rättvisa villkor högt.
Uppsatsen redogör för de rättsliga ramar som omgärdar patentpooler inom EU och diskuterar samtidigt de risker som kopplas till arrangemangen. Under arbetets gång har avsaknaden av bindande rättskällor tydliggjort brister i det nuvarande systemet. Det finns, enligt författarens mening, grund att ifrågasätta den säkerhet regleringen innebär för den fria konkurrensen. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9070118
- author
- Henningsson, Johanna LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20212
- year
- 2021
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Konkurrensrätt, Immaterialrätt, EU-rätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9070118
- date added to LUP
- 2022-02-15 11:36:55
- date last changed
- 2022-02-15 11:36:55
@misc{9070118,
abstract = {{The market economy sought within the European Union is based on concepts such as competitiveness, welfare, and innovation. Innovation is, in particular, considered to be an important and dynamic part of the market by promoting competition. The patent pool is based on an arrangement between competitors. Anyone who has become acquainted with competition law is well aware of its critical attitude towards cooperation agreements. Pooling agreements illustrate the difficulty of balancing the interests of intellectual property rights and competition law. Competition law is uniformly regulated within the union. When dealing with patent pools, the relevant regulation is Article 101 (1) TFEU, under which cooperation that risks harming competition is prohibited. As patent pools are not covered by the regulations which exempt groups of agreements from the prohibited area, the assessment is made in relation to Article 101. In order to help companies examine their agreements the Commission has developed general guidelines.
The guidelines paint a picture of the conditions under which pooling agreements are assumed to harm or promote competition. The assessment takes place in two steps and the analysis includes the agreement on the formation of the pool as well as the licensing out agreement. Several risks can be identified. Firstly, the nature of the pooled patents is crucial. Substitute patents should not be pooled at all, and attention should be paid to pools that contain complementary but non-essential patents. When assessing such pools, the risk of exclusion of third parties is crucial as well as rule of reason analysis where economic benefits are taken into account. Overall, the Commission emphasizes the risk of exclusion of third parties. To reduce the risks, the Commission offers some solution through, for example, the use of an independent expert. On the same track, open participation, non-exclusivity and reasonable as well as fair conditions are highly valued.
The thesis describes the legal framework that surrounds patent pools within the union and discusses the risks associated with such arrangements. The lack of actual sources of law has brought shortcomings in the current system to light. In the author’s opinion, there is reason to question the durability in the current regulation.}},
author = {{Henningsson, Johanna}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Patentpoolen och risken för konkurrenshämmande verksamhet}},
year = {{2021}},
}