Contract enforcement in Russia and Ukraine
(2021) STVK02 20212Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between effectivity of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesize is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents’ power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where Ease of doing business’ Enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies’ Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova’s Strategic... (More)
- The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between effectivity of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesize is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents’ power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where Ease of doing business’ Enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies’ Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova’s Strategic pressure theory.
The text’s conclusion is that an overarching trend of higher levels of contract enforcement within authoritarian regimes compared to hybrid regimes can be observed. However, the quantitative analyses of the individual cases showed a positive correlation in which higher levels of democracy improves contract enforcement, even within the authoritarian regime - which opposes the stated hypothesize. Nevertheless, Russia has substantially more effective contract enforcement while also being very similar to Ukraine except for regime type. The qualitative analysis shows how there are differences in contract enforcement procedure within each respective judiciary and how Strategic pressure theory can help explain those. Still, this text lacks the substantial evidence to establish a clear causal link and therefore concludes by recommending future research. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9070496
- author
- Oscarsson, Hannes LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- A case study of the difference in contract enforcement between hybrid and authoritarian regimes
- course
- STVK02 20212
- year
- 2021
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Contract enforcement, Strategic pressure theory, Democratization, Judiciary Independence, Hybrid regime, Authoritarian Regime, Ukraine, Russia
- language
- English
- id
- 9070496
- date added to LUP
- 2022-03-14 12:22:06
- date last changed
- 2022-03-14 12:22:06
@misc{9070496, abstract = {{The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between effectivity of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesize is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents’ power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where Ease of doing business’ Enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies’ Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova’s Strategic pressure theory. The text’s conclusion is that an overarching trend of higher levels of contract enforcement within authoritarian regimes compared to hybrid regimes can be observed. However, the quantitative analyses of the individual cases showed a positive correlation in which higher levels of democracy improves contract enforcement, even within the authoritarian regime - which opposes the stated hypothesize. Nevertheless, Russia has substantially more effective contract enforcement while also being very similar to Ukraine except for regime type. The qualitative analysis shows how there are differences in contract enforcement procedure within each respective judiciary and how Strategic pressure theory can help explain those. Still, this text lacks the substantial evidence to establish a clear causal link and therefore concludes by recommending future research.}}, author = {{Oscarsson, Hannes}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Contract enforcement in Russia and Ukraine}}, year = {{2021}}, }