Reglering av lobbying
(2024) STVK04 20241Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- In this study, we conducted a qualitative comparative case study using text analysis and principal-agent theory to examine the effectiveness of transparency and accountability mechanisms in lobbying regulation. Our analysis delves into how these mechanisms function within different political systems, comparing the stringent regulations of the US to the more lenient framework of the EU. The thesis concludes that the US system, with it’s more demanding regulations and sanctions, is more effective in promoting transparency and accountability compared to the current EU system. The study also highlights that the effectiveness of transparency is problematic since information must reach citizens to enable accountability. Moreover, the ability to... (More)
- In this study, we conducted a qualitative comparative case study using text analysis and principal-agent theory to examine the effectiveness of transparency and accountability mechanisms in lobbying regulation. Our analysis delves into how these mechanisms function within different political systems, comparing the stringent regulations of the US to the more lenient framework of the EU. The thesis concludes that the US system, with it’s more demanding regulations and sanctions, is more effective in promoting transparency and accountability compared to the current EU system. The study also highlights that the effectiveness of transparency is problematic since information must reach citizens to enable accountability. Moreover, the ability to utilize sanction mechanisms depends on prior knowledge of lobbying and how regulatory tools can be employed. The study emphasizes the importance of considering which societal actors are responsible for informing about the impact of lobbying on democratic decision-making processes. This is essential to enable accountability and to improve the transparency and regulation of lobbying. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9152479
- author
- Ekström, Fabian LU and Jörlin, Agnes
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- STVK04 20241
- year
- 2024
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Transparens, ansvarsutkrävande, offentlighetsvillkor, delegering informationsasymmetri och sanktionsmekanismer.
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9152479
- date added to LUP
- 2024-07-18 11:06:58
- date last changed
- 2024-07-18 11:06:58
@misc{9152479, abstract = {{In this study, we conducted a qualitative comparative case study using text analysis and principal-agent theory to examine the effectiveness of transparency and accountability mechanisms in lobbying regulation. Our analysis delves into how these mechanisms function within different political systems, comparing the stringent regulations of the US to the more lenient framework of the EU. The thesis concludes that the US system, with it’s more demanding regulations and sanctions, is more effective in promoting transparency and accountability compared to the current EU system. The study also highlights that the effectiveness of transparency is problematic since information must reach citizens to enable accountability. Moreover, the ability to utilize sanction mechanisms depends on prior knowledge of lobbying and how regulatory tools can be employed. The study emphasizes the importance of considering which societal actors are responsible for informing about the impact of lobbying on democratic decision-making processes. This is essential to enable accountability and to improve the transparency and regulation of lobbying.}}, author = {{Ekström, Fabian and Jörlin, Agnes}}, language = {{swe}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Reglering av lobbying}}, year = {{2024}}, }