The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility : A laboratory investigation
Van Veldhuizen, R. LU
(2013)
In Journal of Economic Psychology
39.
p.341-356
- Abstract
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive... (More)
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.
(Less)
- author
- Van Veldhuizen, R.
LU
- publishing date
- 2013-12-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Bribery, Corruption, Experimental economics, Laboratory experiment
- in
- Journal of Economic Psychology
- volume
- 39
- pages
- 16 pages
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84886865729
- ISSN
- 0167-4870
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.009
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 0069fffc-b833-4ccd-8e7f-8704aad1a231
- date added to LUP
- 2019-04-08 14:38:34
- date last changed
- 2022-02-23 01:15:19
@article{0069fffc-b833-4ccd-8e7f-8704aad1a231,
abstract = {{<p>Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.</p>}},
author = {{Van Veldhuizen, R.}},
issn = {{0167-4870}},
keywords = {{Bribery; Corruption; Experimental economics; Laboratory experiment}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{12}},
pages = {{341--356}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Journal of Economic Psychology}},
title = {{The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility : A laboratory investigation}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.009}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.009}},
volume = {{39}},
year = {{2013}},
}