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Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem and the Cyclically Fair Norm

Banerjee, Priyodorshi; Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan LU (2013) In New Economic Windows p.201-216
Abstract
In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n... (More)
In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n and then again the same process is repeated between periods (n+1) and 2n and so on. (Less)
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author
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
in
New Economic Windows
editor
Abergel, Frédéric and
pages
201 - 216
publisher
Springer Milan
external identifiers
  • scopus:84874571955
DOI
10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0_13
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
022673ae-78fb-41a0-b458-682840f679d3
date added to LUP
2016-07-25 13:35:26
date last changed
2017-05-29 10:37:42
@inbook{022673ae-78fb-41a0-b458-682840f679d3,
  abstract     = {In this paper we revisit the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem by allowing for a more general (but common) preference of the n customers defined over the set of n restaurants. This generalization allows for the possibility that each pure strategy Nash equilibrium differs from the Pareto efficient allocation. By assuming that n is small and by allowing for mutual interaction across all customers we design strategies to sustain cyclically fair norm as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem. We have a cyclically fair norm if n strategically different Pareto efficient strategies are sequentially sustained in a way such that each customer gets serviced in all the n restaurants exactly once between periods 1 and n and then again the same process is repeated between periods (n+1) and 2n and so on.},
  author       = {Banerjee, Priyodorshi and Mitra, Manipushpak and Mukherjee, Conan},
  editor       = {Abergel, Frédéric },
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {201--216},
  publisher    = {Springer Milan},
  series       = {New Economic Windows },
  title        = {Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem and the Cyclically Fair Norm},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-2553-0_13},
  year         = {2013},
}