Affective Engagement : Essays on Emotion, Value, and Normative Phenomenology
(2025)- Abstract
- In this doctoral thesis I investigate two key issues at the heart of the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the emotions – their nature and their normativity. I argue against the deeply entrenched view according to which emotions are representational mental states and fitting in virtue of accurately representing their objects. Drawing on recent attitudinal accounts of the emotions, I develop my own view according to which emotions are sui generis affective modes of engagement through which we express our cares, concerns, and various commitments – i.e., elements that constitute our evaluative orientations and practical identities as agents. In light of this conception of the emotions, I go on to argue that the issue of emotional... (More)
- In this doctoral thesis I investigate two key issues at the heart of the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the emotions – their nature and their normativity. I argue against the deeply entrenched view according to which emotions are representational mental states and fitting in virtue of accurately representing their objects. Drawing on recent attitudinal accounts of the emotions, I develop my own view according to which emotions are sui generis affective modes of engagement through which we express our cares, concerns, and various commitments – i.e., elements that constitute our evaluative orientations and practical identities as agents. In light of this conception of the emotions, I go on to argue that the issue of emotional fittingness is essentially an agent-relative matter, the answer to which can only be settled by taking into consideration the full range of the particular agent’s evaluative orientation.
The thesis consists of an introductory kappa and four self-contained papers, all of which touch on a variety of different issues pertaining to philosophy of emotion, value theory, normativity, moral psychology, moral responsibility, and phenomenology. The objective of the thesis can thus be seen as not only examining various isolated questions concerning the emotions, but also as making sense of the way in which such questions hang together in the broader scheme of things, things that are part and parcel of the lives we lead. In short, the thesis might be said to be about the ways in which affectivity imbues life with meaning and substance, how it structures our relationships to other people and to ourselves, and the indispensable role it plays in constructing a world in which things matter. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/039d44c0-6bb8-4087-81fc-6e956b0bcd12
- author
- Pál-Wallin, Robert LU
- supervisor
- opponent
-
- professor Antti Kauppinen, Helsingfors universitet
- organization
- publishing date
- 2025-09-25
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Affective Experience, Emotion, Empathy, Fear, Fittingness, Moral Responsibility, Normativity, Phenomenology, Reactive Attitudes, Reasons, Value
- pages
- 180 pages
- publisher
- Department of Philosophy, Lund University
- defense location
- LUX C121
- defense date
- 2025-10-18 10:00:00
- ISBN
- 978-91-90055-34-2
- 978-91-90055-35-9
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 039d44c0-6bb8-4087-81fc-6e956b0bcd12
- date added to LUP
- 2025-09-19 03:01:09
- date last changed
- 2025-09-25 11:49:16
@phdthesis{039d44c0-6bb8-4087-81fc-6e956b0bcd12,
abstract = {{In this doctoral thesis I investigate two key issues at the heart of the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the emotions – their nature and their normativity. I argue against the deeply entrenched view according to which emotions are representational mental states and fitting in virtue of accurately representing their objects. Drawing on recent attitudinal accounts of the emotions, I develop my own view according to which emotions are sui generis affective modes of engagement through which we express our cares, concerns, and various commitments – i.e., elements that constitute our evaluative orientations and practical identities as agents. In light of this conception of the emotions, I go on to argue that the issue of emotional fittingness is essentially an agent-relative matter, the answer to which can only be settled by taking into consideration the full range of the particular agent’s evaluative orientation.<br/><br/>The thesis consists of an introductory kappa and four self-contained papers, all of which touch on a variety of different issues pertaining to philosophy of emotion, value theory, normativity, moral psychology, moral responsibility, and phenomenology. The objective of the thesis can thus be seen as not only examining various isolated questions concerning the emotions, but also as making sense of the way in which such questions hang together in the broader scheme of things, things that are part and parcel of the lives we lead. In short, the thesis might be said to be about the ways in which affectivity imbues life with meaning and substance, how it structures our relationships to other people and to ourselves, and the indispensable role it plays in constructing a world in which things matter.}},
author = {{Pál-Wallin, Robert}},
isbn = {{978-91-90055-34-2}},
keywords = {{Affective Experience; Emotion; Empathy; Fear; Fittingness; Moral Responsibility; Normativity; Phenomenology; Reactive Attitudes; Reasons; Value}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{09}},
publisher = {{Department of Philosophy, Lund University}},
school = {{Lund University}},
title = {{Affective Engagement : Essays on Emotion, Value, and Normative Phenomenology}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/228042369/Affective_Engagement_-_Robert_Pa_l-Wallin.pdf}},
year = {{2025}},
}