Formulating deflationism
Båve, Arvid LU
(2013)
In Synthese
190(15).
p.3287-3305
- Abstract
- I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely,
the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ⟨p⟩
is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the
other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably,
Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be
accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing
non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema
instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In
particular, I argue that certain circularity charges rest on mistaken
assumptions about logic that lead to Carroll’s regress. I show how the
propositional... (More) - I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely,
the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ⟨p⟩
is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the
other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably,
Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be
accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing
non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema
instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In
particular, I argue that certain circularity charges rest on mistaken
assumptions about logic that lead to Carroll’s regress. I show how the
propositional quantifier can be seen as on a par with first-order
quantifiers and so equally acceptable to use. While the proposed
parallelism between these quantifiers is controversial in general,
deflationists have special reasons to affirm it. I further argue that
the main three types of approach the truth-paradoxes are open to an
adherent of (Q), and that the derivation of general facts about truth
can be explained on its basis. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0462c38e-5f87-4661-95e9-88c179d32999
- author
- Båve, Arvid
LU
- publishing date
- 2013-10
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Deflationism, Field, Gupta, Horwich, Minimalism, Propositional quantification, Soames, Sosa, Substitutional quantification, Tarski, Truth
- in
- Synthese
- volume
- 190
- issue
- 15
- pages
- 19 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84888074713
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11229-012-0163-2
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 0462c38e-5f87-4661-95e9-88c179d32999
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-09 11:32:54
- date last changed
- 2022-02-02 01:11:02
@article{0462c38e-5f87-4661-95e9-88c179d32999,
abstract = {{I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely,<br>
the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ⟨p⟩<br>
is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the <br>
other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, <br>
Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be <br>
accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing <br>
non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema <br>
instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In <br>
particular, I argue that certain circularity charges rest on mistaken <br>
assumptions about logic that lead to Carroll’s regress. I show how the <br>
propositional quantifier can be seen as on a par with first-order <br>
quantifiers and so equally acceptable to use. While the proposed <br>
parallelism between these quantifiers is controversial in general, <br>
deflationists have special reasons to affirm it. I further argue that <br>
the main three types of approach the truth-paradoxes are open to an <br>
adherent of (Q), and that the derivation of general facts about truth <br>
can be explained on its basis.}},
author = {{Båve, Arvid}},
issn = {{0039-7857}},
keywords = {{Deflationism; Field; Gupta; Horwich; Minimalism; Propositional quantification; Soames; Sosa; Substitutional quantification; Tarski; Truth}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{15}},
pages = {{3287--3305}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Synthese}},
title = {{Formulating deflationism}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0163-2}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11229-012-0163-2}},
volume = {{190}},
year = {{2013}},
}