The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption
Dahlstrom, Carl ; Lapuente, Victor and Teorell, Jan LU
(2012)
In Political Research Quarterly
65(3).
p.656-668
- Abstract
- Comparative studies of corruption focus on the selection and incentives of policymakers. With few exceptions, actors who are in charge of implementing policies have been neglected. This article analyzes an original data set on the bureaucratic features and its effects on corruption in fifty-two countries. Two empirical findings challenge the conventional wisdom in literature. First, certain bureaucratic factors, particularly meritocratic recruitment, reduce corruption, even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations. Second, the analysis shows that other allegedly relevant bureaucratic factors, such as public employees' competitive salaries, career stability, or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3055746
- author
- Dahlstrom, Carl
; Lapuente, Victor
and Teorell, Jan
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Corruption, Bureaucracy, Meritocratic recruitment, Public administration
- in
- Political Research Quarterly
- volume
- 65
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 656 - 668
- publisher
- SAGE Publications
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000307111900014
- scopus:84860568415
- ISSN
- 1938-274X
- DOI
- 10.1177/1065912911408109
- project
- The Quality of Government Institute
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 074ef787-b54d-47b9-ad4a-914ed12ca2ad (old id 3055746)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 14:57:02
- date last changed
- 2022-04-22 05:41:38
@article{074ef787-b54d-47b9-ad4a-914ed12ca2ad,
abstract = {{Comparative studies of corruption focus on the selection and incentives of policymakers. With few exceptions, actors who are in charge of implementing policies have been neglected. This article analyzes an original data set on the bureaucratic features and its effects on corruption in fifty-two countries. Two empirical findings challenge the conventional wisdom in literature. First, certain bureaucratic factors, particularly meritocratic recruitment, reduce corruption, even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations. Second, the analysis shows that other allegedly relevant bureaucratic factors, such as public employees' competitive salaries, career stability, or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact.}},
author = {{Dahlstrom, Carl and Lapuente, Victor and Teorell, Jan}},
issn = {{1938-274X}},
keywords = {{Corruption; Bureaucracy; Meritocratic recruitment; Public administration}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{656--668}},
publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
series = {{Political Research Quarterly}},
title = {{The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912911408109}},
doi = {{10.1177/1065912911408109}},
volume = {{65}},
year = {{2012}},
}