“The Group Knobe Effect” : evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups
(2019) In Philosophical Explorations 22(1). p.44-61- Abstract
In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of... (More)
In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups (Experiment 1a), and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of actions (Experiment 1b). We also found evidence (Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4) that the “Group Knobe Effect” persists even when intentions and blame/praise are attributed to groups non-distributively, indicating that people tend not to think of group intentions and group blame/praise in distributive terms. We conclude that the folk are collectivist about group intentions, and also about the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of groups.
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- author
- Michael, John Andrew and Szigeti, András LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- blame, collective agency, collective intentions, collective responsibility, Knobe Effect, praise
- in
- Philosophical Explorations
- volume
- 22
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 18 pages
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85049591000
- ISSN
- 1386-9795
- DOI
- 10.1080/13869795.2018.1492007
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 084bdb39-0570-40c4-b861-7e9136391397
- date added to LUP
- 2018-07-23 11:23:55
- date last changed
- 2024-02-02 14:59:02
@article{084bdb39-0570-40c4-b861-7e9136391397,
abstract = {{<p>In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups (Experiment 1a), and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of actions (Experiment 1b). We also found evidence (Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4) that the “Group Knobe Effect” persists even when intentions and blame/praise are attributed to groups non-distributively, indicating that people tend not to think of group intentions and group blame/praise in distributive terms. We conclude that the folk are collectivist about group intentions, and also about the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of groups.</p>}},
author = {{Michael, John Andrew and Szigeti, András}},
issn = {{1386-9795}},
keywords = {{blame; collective agency; collective intentions; collective responsibility; Knobe Effect; praise}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{44--61}},
publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}},
series = {{Philosophical Explorations}},
title = {{“The Group Knobe Effect” : evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2018.1492007}},
doi = {{10.1080/13869795.2018.1492007}},
volume = {{22}},
year = {{2019}},
}