Corrupt or Repressive? How Political Competition Incentivizes Hybrid Regimes to Subvert Police in Distinct Ways
(2025) In Governance 38(3).- Abstract
This article develops an argument that in hybrid regimes, different levels of party competition incentivize incumbents to subvert the police in distinct ways, resulting in more corrupt or more repressive policing practices. In competing-pyramid hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine (2013–2019), elites have stronger incentives to preserve police corruption as a tool for immediate resource extraction amid pervasive uncertainty about political survival. Conversely, in dominant-pyramid systems, like Georgia (2003–2012), ruling elites have stronger incentives to curtail police corruption in pursuit of a more disciplined and repressive police force. This theory is illustrated through a structured focused comparison and more than 60 interviews... (More)
This article develops an argument that in hybrid regimes, different levels of party competition incentivize incumbents to subvert the police in distinct ways, resulting in more corrupt or more repressive policing practices. In competing-pyramid hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine (2013–2019), elites have stronger incentives to preserve police corruption as a tool for immediate resource extraction amid pervasive uncertainty about political survival. Conversely, in dominant-pyramid systems, like Georgia (2003–2012), ruling elites have stronger incentives to curtail police corruption in pursuit of a more disciplined and repressive police force. This theory is illustrated through a structured focused comparison and more than 60 interviews collected during several rounds of fieldwork in Kyiv and Tbilisi.
(Less)
- author
- Bolkvadze, Ketevan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2025-07
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- corruption, hybrid regimes, policing, repression
- in
- Governance
- volume
- 38
- issue
- 3
- article number
- e70030
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:105005261614
- ISSN
- 0952-1895
- DOI
- 10.1111/gove.70030
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 0d1b096c-9206-417c-b364-5b360e2c7613
- date added to LUP
- 2025-07-16 13:54:52
- date last changed
- 2025-07-16 13:55:56
@article{0d1b096c-9206-417c-b364-5b360e2c7613,
abstract = {{<p>This article develops an argument that in hybrid regimes, different levels of party competition incentivize incumbents to subvert the police in distinct ways, resulting in more corrupt or more repressive policing practices. In competing-pyramid hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine (2013–2019), elites have stronger incentives to preserve police corruption as a tool for immediate resource extraction amid pervasive uncertainty about political survival. Conversely, in dominant-pyramid systems, like Georgia (2003–2012), ruling elites have stronger incentives to curtail police corruption in pursuit of a more disciplined and repressive police force. This theory is illustrated through a structured focused comparison and more than 60 interviews collected during several rounds of fieldwork in Kyiv and Tbilisi.</p>}},
author = {{Bolkvadze, Ketevan}},
issn = {{0952-1895}},
keywords = {{corruption; hybrid regimes; policing; repression}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Governance}},
title = {{Corrupt or Repressive? How Political Competition Incentivizes Hybrid Regimes to Subvert Police in Distinct Ways}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.70030}},
doi = {{10.1111/gove.70030}},
volume = {{38}},
year = {{2025}},
}