Stable and unstable choices
(2020) In Economics and Philosophy 36(1). p.113-125- Abstract
- This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes entail that the act of choosing a maximal alternative renders this alternative non-maximal is irrational. The paper illustrates how certain distributive theories that ascribe importance to what the status quo is violate this condition and argues that they thereby should be rejected.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0d2c78df-dc3f-4848-b487-49fafaf3d0ab
- author
- Herlitz, Anders LU
- publishing date
- 2020
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Economics and Philosophy
- volume
- 36
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 113 - 125
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85061933716
- ISSN
- 0266-2671
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0266267119000026
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 0d2c78df-dc3f-4848-b487-49fafaf3d0ab
- date added to LUP
- 2024-12-10 14:50:28
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 15:24:10
@article{0d2c78df-dc3f-4848-b487-49fafaf3d0ab,
abstract = {{This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes entail that the act of choosing a maximal alternative renders this alternative non-maximal is irrational. The paper illustrates how certain distributive theories that ascribe importance to what the status quo is violate this condition and argues that they thereby should be rejected.}},
author = {{Herlitz, Anders}},
issn = {{0266-2671}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{113--125}},
publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
series = {{Economics and Philosophy}},
title = {{Stable and unstable choices}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267119000026}},
doi = {{10.1017/S0266267119000026}},
volume = {{36}},
year = {{2020}},
}