A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake
(2005) p.115-130- Abstract
- The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final... (More)
- The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/777455
- author
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2005
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Recent Work on Intrinsic Value
- editor
- Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael
- pages
- 115 - 130
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85101545676
- ISBN
- 9781402034857
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 0e78b119-88e3-451d-b7a6-8d37026275f3 (old id 777455)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 11:05:18
- date last changed
- 2022-03-15 22:43:08
@inbook{0e78b119-88e3-451d-b7a6-8d37026275f3,
abstract = {{The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc.}},
author = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni}},
booktitle = {{Recent Work on Intrinsic Value}},
editor = {{Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael}},
isbn = {{9781402034857}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{115--130}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
title = {{A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5691773/777526.rtf}},
year = {{2005}},
}