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When sharing platforms fix sellers' prices

Nowag, Julian LU (2018) In Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 6(3). p.382-408
Abstract

While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This article explores possible antitrust responses to such centralized platform-driven price-fixing. The article, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the article highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It shows how such practices defy... (More)

While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This article explores possible antitrust responses to such centralized platform-driven price-fixing. The article, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the article highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It shows how such practices defy traditional antitrust thinking and give rise to new policy and legal challenges.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Agency, Employee, Enforcement, Hub-and-spoke, Platforms, Price-fixing, Sharing economy
in
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
volume
6
issue
3
pages
27 pages
publisher
Oxford University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:85060982597
ISSN
2050-0688
DOI
10.1093/jaenfo/jny007
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
106d1620-f713-4b3e-bd6d-314eb60231dd
date added to LUP
2019-02-15 09:21:08
date last changed
2019-03-12 04:21:24
@article{106d1620-f713-4b3e-bd6d-314eb60231dd,
  abstract     = {<p>While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This article explores possible antitrust responses to such centralized platform-driven price-fixing. The article, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the article highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It shows how such practices defy traditional antitrust thinking and give rise to new policy and legal challenges.</p>},
  author       = {Nowag, Julian},
  issn         = {2050-0688},
  keyword      = {Agency,Employee,Enforcement,Hub-and-spoke,Platforms,Price-fixing,Sharing economy},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {382--408},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  series       = {Journal of Antitrust Enforcement },
  title        = {When sharing platforms fix sellers' prices},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jny007},
  volume       = {6},
  year         = {2018},
}