Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties
Båve, Arvid LU
(2024)
In Erkenntnis
89(8).
p.3379-3384
- Abstract
Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, it also blocks all of the non-pathological instances of the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘a has the property of being F’. It thereby fails both as a theory of the ordinary conception and as a replacement of the ordinary notion, assuming the latter is defective.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/119af491-0727-461e-b6a5-c14c6d995fb9
- author
- Båve, Arvid
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Erkenntnis
- volume
- 89
- issue
- 8
- pages
- 3379 - 3384
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85149775916
- ISSN
- 0165-0106
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10670-023-00667-6
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 119af491-0727-461e-b6a5-c14c6d995fb9
- date added to LUP
- 2023-05-15 11:47:19
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:04:08
@article{119af491-0727-461e-b6a5-c14c6d995fb9,
abstract = {{<p>Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, it also blocks all of the non-pathological instances of the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘a has the property of being F’. It thereby fails both as a theory of the ordinary conception and as a replacement of the ordinary notion, assuming the latter is defective.</p>}},
author = {{Båve, Arvid}},
issn = {{0165-0106}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{8}},
pages = {{3379--3384}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Erkenntnis}},
title = {{Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00667-6}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10670-023-00667-6}},
volume = {{89}},
year = {{2024}},
}